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PREFACE. 
The object of  this study is to afford a  connected view 
of  the  basic  facts and  most  noticeable features  of  the 
,-redit  system and banks in France from the year 1800 to 
the present time.  It  is designed, therefore, not as a history 
in which multiplicity of  detail is apt to obscure a view of 
the subject as a whole, but as a coijrdinated outline of  the 
successive stages in the development of  credit and of  the 
institutions which distribute it. 
This outline is divided into three very unequal periods: 
The first--a  period  of  beginnings, of  slow  growth, of 
formation,  during  which  the Bank  of  France  succeeds 
in gaining a complete monopoly--extends  from the foun- 
dation of  that establishment until about 1848. 
The second and shorter period is a time of  transition. 
It extends  from  1848  to  about  1875.  During  these 
twenty-five years new institutions and new forms of  credit 
associations make  their  appearance.  Better laws facili- 
tate the organization of  these  credit associations as well 
as of  all kinds of  associations, both industrial and com- 
mercial.  It  includes the war of  1870-71  and its immedi- 
ate  results.  This  event  seems  to  have  hastened  the 
development  of  the credit  system  or  at least  to have 
given it a stimulus, arising from the consequent  reaction 
against  the  misfortunes  which  had  overwhelmed  the 
country.  France begins to recover and finds, in her sturdy National  Monetary  Commission 
spirit of  economy and her  ability to save, the elements 
productive of  new vigor and potency. 
The third period, which might be called the period of 
full maturity, extends from 1875 to the present time.  In 
this interval the organization of  the credit system is put 
on a firm footing as the result of  a century's evolution. 
In this  evolution the various  critical  movements  are 
described  and  explained-the  political,  economic,  and 
financial crises-constituting,  as it were, the pathological 
growth of  the credit system and banks in France. 
The study  is  supplemented  by  the  addition  of  two 
appendices, of  which the first portrays the development of 
the Crddit  Foncier  and its results, while the second out- 
lines the rather recent organization of  the Crddit Agricole; 
thus completing a series of  observations, impartially  set 
forth, and designed to assist specialists seeking the solu- 
tions of  problems along these lines. 
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TO THE PRESENT TIME. 
THE BANK  OF  FRANCE  AND  THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF CREDIT,  1800 TO 1848. 
EVOLUTION  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF CREDIT  AND  CREDIT 
INSTITUTIONS IN FRANCE FROM THE YEAR  1800. 
INTRODUCTORY. 
Law's bank.-The  bank compromised in certain undertakings.-Failure  of  Law's 
bank and "system."-The  liberty of  issuing bank notes in Prance from 1721 on.- 
The Caisse d9Escompte.-Dangerous  relations of  the Caisse d'Escompte with the 
State.-Its  difficult situation.-Its  liquidation.-Commercial  banks during the Rev- 
olution.-Prudence  of the commercial bankers.-Pounding  of  free banks of  issue, 
1796-1800.-The  Caisse des Comptes Courants, 1796.-Conditions  of  discount.- 
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formed by  these banks  of  issue during the last  few years of  the  eighteenth 
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century. 
The son  of  a Scotch banker named Law succeeded in 
obtaining from the Regent on hlay 2, I 716, permission to 
organize a  bank  of  issue.  It was  called  the  Banque 
Gbnkale,  and  was  opened  the  following  month.  If 
Law,  the  president  of  the  bank,  had  kept  within 
the  normal  bounds  of  operations  of  banks  of  this 
kind,  it  is  probable  that  he  would  have  rendered  a 
real service to commerce and industry.  Instead  of  this, 
he  soon  associated  the  bank  with  vast  and  uncertain National  Monetary  Commission 
enterprises  aimed  at the  exploitation of  the colonies; 
and  presently  the  Banque  Generale  was brought  into 
closer relations with the State, and on June 4, I 718, took 
the name of  the Banque  Royale.  All  the departments 
of private and public finance fell into Law's hands.  The 
issue of  bank notes by the bank  and  the issue of  shares 
by the different companies that he founded soon  became 
an abuse.  Neither bank notes nor shares represented  in 
reality any certain value.  Stock-jobbing and wild specu- 
lation  hastened  the downfall of  what  was called Law's 
system.  The Banque Royale closed its doors in  I 72  I,  and 
the various companies founded by 14aw  were liquidated at 
great loss.  It  was a disaster which  caused the ruin of  a 
large  number  of  people.  The  memory  of  this  failure 
remained fresh in the minds of  all classes of  people, even 
the poorest,  during the whole  of  the eighteenth century, 
and it was  a  long time before any one  dared to found 
another bank of  issue. 
-4lthough the monopoly which  Law had obtained from 
the Regent  in  1716, namely the exclusive right to issue 
bank notes, had been abolished in I 72 I by an edict which 
gave the right of  free issue. 
Not until fifty-five years later did anyone try to organize 
a  bank  of  issue; even  then  the establishment  was  not 
called a  bank, so closely  was the name associated with 
1,aw's  failure.  On  March  24,  I 776,  when  Turgot a  was 
Minister of  Finance, Planchaud and Clouard, the first  a 
Swiss, the second a Scotchman, founded a bank of  issue 
a In 1767 an attempt was made to found a bank of issue to which the 
name of  Caisse d'Escompte  was already given, but as a matter of  fact it 
did not go into operation. 
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under  the  name  of  Caisse  d'Escompte.  This  concern 
was  chartered  as  a  limited  liability  partnership  (sous 
forme de  commandite), and, after some difficulties at the 
start, succeeded  in  doing  a  moderately  good  business. 
However, it was not long before the Comptrollers of  Fi- 
nance,  d'ormesson  first  and  afterwards  Calonne, being 
short  of  money, borrowed from it.  From this moment 
dates the first blow to the soundness of  the credit of  the 
Caisse d'Escompte.  Except  for  these  dangerous  rela- 
tions with  the State, the Caisse d'Escompte  engaged in 
a  normal  and  regular  banking  business, including  the 
issuance  of  bank  notes.  But repeated state loans and 
government  interference  in  its  management  completely 
altered  its  character.  Yet  the  directors  were  men 
of  ability and worth; Lavoisier, the celebrated  chemist, 
was  one  of  them.  The National  Assembly,  which  had 
just  convened,  spent  much  time  discussing the  under- 
taking.  Mirabeau was always unfriendly to it, while, on 
the other hand, Dupont de Nemours tried to defend the 
true principle of  banks of  issue, asserting that a bank with- 
out a privilege, not involved in business relations with a 
deb  t-ridden and needy State, without the prerogative  of 
forced currency, can not do otherwise than pay in coin on 
demand the value of  every note issued. 
Soon the Caisse d'Escompte, as a result of  closer and 
closer  relations  with  the  State, became  nothing more 
than  a  branch  of  the public  administration  of  finance, 
until, deprived of  the resources it had been counting on, 
it appealed to the Government to take its affairs in hand 
and offered  to give the Minister of  Finance a  statement 
of  its assets  and  liabilities.  Apart from the one  error 
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of  forming an alliance with the Government,  the Caisse 
d'Escompte had made every possible effort to protect  the 
interests of  its clients.  For some time the State had been 
issuing assignats or paper money through the emergency 
bureau  (Caisse  de  Z'Extraordinaire).  Issues  of  hank 
notes and assignats were  in competition.  The paroxysms 
of  the Revolution  completed the disorganization of  the 
Caisse  d'Escompte.  Several of  its administrators-la- 
voisier, Vandernier, and  others-mounted  the scaffold, and 
lastly Cambon issued a decree suppressing the institution 
altogether.  Its liquidation, begun  in  I 793, was  not fin- 
ished until the time of  the First  Empire.  It is needless 
to add that the stockholders lost the greater part of  their 
investment.  The  Caisse  d'Escompte  lasted  seventeen 
years. 
The cause of its downfall is to be sought in the abnor- 
mal political events which succeeded each other at that 
time.  However, in all that concerns proper banking op- 
erations, the Caisse d'Escompte was wisely administered, 
and  would  have  been of  real  service to commerce if  it 
had  not  allowed  itself  to  become  the State's  banker, 
lending  money to the  State without  sufficient security, 
and  receiving  nothing  in  return  but  privileges  which 
could not fail to be disastrous to it. 
The revolutionary disturbances gradually subsided.  A 
reaction set in, vigorous in proportion  to the violence of 
the political and social upheaval which had gone before 
it.  Although  France emerged from this long ordeal ex- 
hausted and disorganized, business had not been utterly 
destroyed.  The transactions necessary for the barest sub- 
sistence of  the citizens gave employment to commerce and 
industry, and made some sort of  credit necessary.  Com- 
mercial banks, engaging only in discount operations, collec- 
tions, and running accounts (comptes courants) ,  had quietly 
and steadily kept on in spite of  the Reign of  Terror, the 
ordeal of  the wars, and the dangerous  and ruinous flood 
of  assignats.  Many of  these banking houses were very old. 
That of  the Mallets, which is still in existence, was founded 
in 1723.  These bankers were, for the most part, Protes- 
tants whose families had taken refuge in Switzerland after 
the revocation of  the edict of  Nantes.  Among them was 
Perr&gaux,  of  Neufch&tel,  who employed as a clerk Jacques 
Laffitte, and made him his successor; then too  there was 
Vernes, who toward 1772 had in his employ Necker, after- 
ward Minister of  Finance.  These bankers had learned the 
art of  credit  and the handling of  capital in Switzerland, 
chiefly at Geneva, where banks  had  always been  pros- 
perous.  They maintained the course of  current business, 
and, as we shall see, were always extremely prudent, even 
in dealing with Napoleon.  They did not allow themselves 
to be cajoled into granting the State favors of  credit which 
would have cost them dear. 
When order was reestablished and the State had ceased 
issuing worthless paper money, commercial banks under- 
took to found on discount the issue of  bank notes.  The 
first was  the  Caisse  des  Comptes  Courants, established 
June  29,  1796, with  headquarters in Paris at  the Place 
des Victoires.  The capital stock was moderate, amount- 
ing to 5,000,000 francs, divided into I ,000 shares of  5,000 
francs each.  This  institution  was  the work  of  a great National  Monetary  Commissio~  Esolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
number  of  Paris bankers," who  joined  together in  this 
way  to  make  their  collections, etc.  The  Caisse  kept 
the funds of  these  individual  banks, and, moreover, re- 
discounted their commercial paper.  This bank was called 
"  caisse,"  for, as we  have said, the word bank, recalling 
that of  Law, still terrified the  public.  This Caisse des 
Comptes Courants  was  therefore  a bankers'  bank.  We 
shall see presently that the first regulations of  the Bank 
of  France  were  copied  from  it, and, in  short, that the 
Caisse des Comptes Courants was transformed later into 
the Bank of  France.  It discounted commercial paper at 
a  maximum  time  limit  of  ninety  days, three indorse- 
ments being required. 
The  Caisse  caused  interest  or  discount  rates  to fall 
from 9 per cent to 6 per cent.  It made handsome profits, 
which fact encouraged the setting up of  other banks of 
the same kind.  Its circulation, including bank notes in 
the coffers,  amounted  to  20,000,000  francs.  The  only 
-notes issued  were  of  denominations  of  1,000 and  500 
francs.  It  encountered  no  difficulties,  except  perhaps 
the following  circumstance,  which  was,  however,  quite 
accidental: About  seventeen  months  after its founding, 
in November, 1797, the bank was robbed of  some 2,500,000 
francs, which  was rather  a large  sum for  the Caisse des 
Comptes Courants.  The news  spread rapidly.  Bearers 
of  bank notes became alarmed and appeared in crowds at 
the doors.  But the bankers who had founded the Caisse 
des Comptes Courants  immediately united  and declared 
themselves personally responsible for the liabilities of  the 
Caisse.  Although  at that period the form  known as a 
a Several  of  them  had  gained experience in administering the affaiairs 
of  the Caisse d'Escompte. 
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limited  liability  partnership (commandite) had  not been 
established  by  law,  it was  already  in  existence.  The 
stockholders of  the Caisse showed on this occasion that 
they knew how to make a decision and assume responsi- 
bilities.  The Caisse did an excellent business ; its situation 
therefore was strong, and the panic proved momentary. 
Another  establishment  was  organized in  1797 shortly 
after the forming  of  the Caisse  des Comptes Courants. 
This time the scheme was not promoted by bankers but 
by merchants, who wished to procure in this way facilities 
for their own business, rather than to seek profits directly 
from banking operations.  The institution was called the 
Caisse d'Escompte  du  Commerce.  The  origin  of  the 
Caisse des Comptes  Courants  was  sufficiently indicated 
by  its name,  and the entirely  commercial  character  of 
the  Caisse  d'Escompte  du  Commerce  is shown  in  the 
same  way.  This  will  explain  the  bitter  resistance  of 
the latter concern to being merged in the Bank of  France, 
while on  the other  hand  the Caisse  des  Comptes Cou- 
rants  joined  forces with  it willingly and at once.  The 
Caisse  du Commerce (as it was  called  for  convenience) 
seems indeed to have yielded only to force.  The Bank 
of  France, in spite of  all Napoleon could do, was destined 
to remain in reality a bankers' bank.  Now, the interests 
of  the Caisse du Commerce were entirely different. 
The  nominal  capital  of  the Caisse  du  Commerce 
amounted to 24,000,000 francs, represented by 2,400 shares 
of ~o,ooo  francs each.  But the shareholders had not paid 
in more than a quarter of this sum-that  is to  say, 6,000,mo 
francs.  Its board of  directors was made up of  merchants 
of  all kinds, grocers, haberdashers, cloth merchants, silk National  Monetary  Commission 
merchants,  etc.  The  undertaking  was  successful.  Its 
issue never exceeded 20,000,000 francs. 
It may be well  to mention  another  bank, founded at 
this time, as  a  result of  the success of  the two  estab- 
lishments  whose  origins  and  workings  we  have  just 
described  briefly.  It  was called the Comptoir  Commer- 
cial, and was founded in 1800.  It  was usually known as 
the Caisse Jabach.  In comparison with  the others this 
bank had one interesting peculiarity:  In addition to notes 
of  the denominations of  1,000 and  500 francs, it issued 
notes for 250 francs.  The Caisse Jabach carried on a dis- 
counting business, the only one, of  course, which justifies 
the issue of  bank notes redeemable at sight. 
Lastly must be mentioned the founding at Rouen in 
April, I 798, of  a bank of  issue, which also made discounts. 
It took securities with two names, with a maximum ma- 
turity of  one hundred  and eighty days.  It is seen that 
in the matter of  maturities it departed from the custom 
of  the Caisse des Comptes Courants, which took paper of 
'not  over ninety  days, or just  half  as long.  This bank 
issued notes of  the denominations of  I ,m,  500, 250  and 
100 francs.  No  note as small as  IOO  francs was issued 
by any  Paris bank.  It is not probable  that this house 
did  a large business, or that it had deposits of  any great 
amount with which to make discounts (as a matter of  fact 
it allowed interest to its time depositors), for the issue did 
not go  beyond the very moderate sum of  200,000 francs. 
It  can not be denied that after the terrible years of  the 
Revolution, in the midst of  the confusion and anarchy of 
the  Directory,  these  credit  establishments,  in  spite  of 
difficult  conditions, survived, maintained their credit, and 
'4 
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were of  real service to the commerce and bankers of  Paris. 
They  gave  not  the slightest  occasion for  complaint  or 
interference on the part of  the public authorities.  With- 
out any sort of  privilege, having no connection with the 
Government, they were able to meet their obligations even 
in the midst of  serious panics. 
How does it happen, then, that this most satisfactory 
state of  freedom came to an end and  that in the course 
of a few years there was orga1:ized  in Paris a bank with 
the exclusive privilege of  issue?  Is it due to a series of 
natural causes?  No.  Not  one  of  the Caisses  just  de- 
scribed  had  occasioned  disaster  or  invited  suppression. 
The  new  state of  things  came  from  the idea of  credit 
which existed  in the mind of  General Bonaparte, as well 
as from his tendency to centralize everything, and because 
the Government  at that moment  was  in  great need  of 
money.  By  following  logically the development of  the 
facts we  shall  see  that the  prime  motive  was  the all- 
powerful will of  Napoleon. 
It  was necessary to make these few introductory remarks 
in order to show the conditions which existed at the time 
of the founding of  the Bank of  France-a  bank which was 
to possess  later  the sole right  of  issue for the whole  of 
France, influencing at the same time the general organiza- 
tion  of  the credit system of  that country.  It is at the 
present moment the center and pivot of  the system.  And 
yet, it is not through the Bank of  France, through its own 
action,  but  independently  of  it-making  of  course due 
allowance for the rGle  that circumstances have bestowed 
upon  it-that  this  evolution  of  credit  institutions  has 
taken place. Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
CHAPTER  I.-The  founding  of  the Bank  of  France. 
Reasons for founding the Bank of France.-Napoleon  wanted a bank of his own.- 
Preparation for founding the Bank.-Capital  of the Bank of  France.-Its  transac- 
tions.-Its  organization.-DUBculties  in the way  of raising the  Bank's  capital of 
30,000,OM)  francs.-The  intervention of the  sinking fund.-The  Bank's  first re- 
sources.-Delay  in  disposing of  the  first  shares.-The  first  subscribers.-The 
assistance of the National Lottery.-First  charges of  the Bank.-Obligatory  rela- 
tions between the Bank and the State.-The  bank notes of  the Caisse des Comptes 
Courants.-The  first operations of  the Bank.-Tendency  toward a single bank of 
issue.-The  First Consul's schemes of  centralization.-First  conference with the 
Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce.-Resistance  of the Caisse dlEscompte du Com- 
merce.-Manoeuvres  against the Caisse dPEscompte.-The final agreement with 
the Caisse d'Escompte. 
At  the  time  when  the  foundations  of  the  Bank  of 
France were laid, as well  as during the whole period of 
the  Empire, the  press  and  writers  in  general  had  so 
little  freedom  that  it  is  impossible  to  obtain,  either 
through books or other authentic documents, trustworthy 
details or exact information concerning the circumstances 
which led to the creation of  the Bank. 
Baron Pelet  (de la I,oz&re),  who was admitted when a 
very young man to Napoleon's Council of  State, published 
in 1833  a the notes he had collected while he was a mem- 
ber of  that great body.  He tells us on the subject of  the 
founding of the Bank of  France  (p. 248) : "The rate of 
interest on money was then 3 per cent a month.  It was 
determined to lower this rate, and especially to have an 
establishment which would take the  government's paper 
and  help  its  operations."  This  means  that the credit 
concerns were  not  willing  to take government  paper  or 
the drafts of  the government  contractors, because they 
aOpinions de Napolbon  sur  divers sujets  de  Politique et  d'admanistratiolt 
rectleillies par un  membre de son Conseil d'Etat.  Paris, 1833. 
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lacked  confidence  in  the  Government.  Further  proof 
of  this  fact is  given by the same author  (p. 249, same 
volume).  Here he sets forth the difficulties which arose 
in 1804 between Napoleon and the Bank of  France.  "  He 
(the Emperor)  in  the  year  1804 bitterly  reproached  a 
deputation from the Bank because there was, right in its 
midst, an opposition party which kept the obligations of 
the collectors-general from being discounted and also re- 
fused  to give commerce the necessary accommodations. 
The truth of  the matter is  that the Bank  already  held 
government  obligations to the amount of  25,000,ooo  or 
30,000,000 francs, and that the alleged commercial effects 
which  it had refused  were  those of  Hervas, Michel, and 
other contractors, whose paper was nothing more nor less 
than government  paper.  The  Bank  had  in  circulation 
bills for 75,000,ooo francs, and must of  necessity be pre- 
pared to honor them on demand.  Napoleon wanted the 
Bank to increase the issue to ~oo,ooo,ooo  or  ~~o,ooo,ooo, 
at the risk of  not being able to satisfy the bearers." 
All  the facts so  far as  known  tend  to prove  that 
First  Consul  Bonaparte  took  the  initial  steps  toward 
founding the Bank  of  France.  He could  not  get  what 
he wanted from the free banks.  On the other hand, he 
felt  that  the  Treasury  needed  money,  and  wanted  to 
have  under  his  hand  an  establishment  which  he  could 
compel to meet his wishes.  It appears indeed from this 
extract from the notes of  Baron  Pelet that nearly  three 
years  after  the  founding  of  the  Bank,  Napoleon, 
then  Emperor  and  undisputed  master  of  France, did 
not  hesitate  to speak  sharply to  the directors  of  the National  Monetary  Commission 
P-  - 
Bank, who  were  little inclined to discount  the paper  of 
the government contractors. 
It is very likely that he broached the subject more in 
particular  to certain bankers who  were  near  him, espe- 
cially Perr&gaux,  who had come from NeufchAtel several 
years before the Revolution and founded at Paris avery 
prosperous banking  house.  The directors of  the Caisse 
des Comptes Courants, among whom was Perregaux, were 
probably  notified, for  they  came together  and drew  up 
the plan of  a new  establishment which was to take over 
the Caisse des Comptes Courants. 
It would certainly seem that here originated the idea of 
creating a  new bank of  issue.  However, public opinion, 
as represented  by merchants  and citizens of  all classes, 
was brought into play.  A certain number  of  these men 
met and prepared  a petition addressed to the Directory, 
in  which  the signers requested  the formation  of  a  new 
credit institution.  This occurred toward the end of  I 799 
and the first days of  January, I 800. 
Previous  to this  manifestation  the first  plan  of  the 
general statutes of  the projected bank had been submitted 
to the Minister of  Finance.  On  January 6, 1800, the re- 
gents, but  recently  elected,  MM.  Lecoulteux-Canteleu, 
Mallet, Perrdgaux, Nautort,  Perrier, and  Perrd, went to 
the Minister of  Finance and laid before him "  the princi- 
pal features of  the protection"  which  they asked of  the 
Government. 
The plan was to create a bank of  discount, circulation, 
and issue with a capital of  30,000,000 francs.  The figure 
was  large  for  the  time.  How  was  this  capital  to be 
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raised?  This  difficulty  had  been  foreseen.  To  solve 
it  they  had  prepared  to  merge  the  Caisse  des 
Comptes  Courants and  the new  bank, which was  to be 
called  the Bank  of  France.  On  January  18, 1800,  the 
general assembly  of  the stockholders  of  the Caisse  des 
Comptes  Courants voted  to dissolve this  company and 
enter the new  combination. 
The  capital  stock  was  fixed  at  30,000,ooo  francs 
and  divided  into  3~~000  personal  shares  of  1,000 
francs  each.  The  Bank  of  France,  according  to  its 
first  statutes, was  to engage  in  the  following  transac- 
tions: Discounts, collections, running  accounts, the issue 
of  notes payable to bearer on demand, and commerce in 
gold  and  silver bullion.  It was  also to open a  sort of 
savings  department  called  the  savings  and  investment 
bureau,  allowing  interest  to depositors.  But  for  some 
reason  this  department  was  little  patronized,  and  was 
abolished in 1808.  At first it paid 5 per cent on deposits; 
later 4 per cent. 
A regents' council of  15 members was to administer the 
affairs of  the Bank of  France; its direct management was 
entrusted to a committee of  three regents, and its super- 
vision was committed to a  council of  three censors.  A 
general  assembly  consisting  of  the  200  largest  stock- 
holders represented the whole body of  stockholders.  Five 
shares were enough to give the holder a vote, and he had 
as  many  votes  as  he  had  multiples  of  five  shares,  not 
exceeding a maximum of  four. 
The very day on which the Caisse des Comptes Courants 
was  dissolved,  a  decree  of  the  consuls  authorized  the National  Monetary  Commission 
Minister of  Finance to lease for the Bank the state building 
known as the "  Oratory," and "  the former church which 
makes a part of  it."  And there the Bank was installed, 
in property belonging to the State, which showed already 
what close relations  existed  between the new  establish- 
ment and the Government. 
All  this  was  effected  without  obstacles.  Not  so  the 
getting together of  the capital of  the Bank.  The great 
difficulties  which  were  encountered  here  are  officially 
stated in the report  laid before the stockholders of  the 
Bank  on  October  I 7,  1800.  Here is the passage: 
"The regents  who  were  in charge of  the Bank being 
convinced, owing to the scattered state of  capital, that it 
would  be  useless  to expect  that  the 30,000,000 francs 
which  were  to serve  as  banking  capital would  be  sub- 
scribed promptly, simply by calling together stockholders, 
their  first  care was to call to the attention of  the Gov- 
ernment  the  protection  and  cooperation  necessary  to 
insure the success of  the proposed establishment. 
"  The very day of  their election, the directors addressed 
a petition to the Minister of  Finance requesting him to ob- 
tain from the consuls  the permission  to deposit  in the 
Bank of France the funds accruing from the bonds fur- 
nished by the collectors-general of  the departments, and 
destined by the law of  the sixth Frimaire preceding to the 
paying off  of  the public debt, and also to guarantee the 
payments  of  these  ame  collectors-general.  An  order of 
July  18, 1800, granted the request, and j,ooo,ooo francs 
were deposited in the Bank in return for 5,ooo shares reg- 
istered to the credit of  the sinking fund. 
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"The  Bank having got its first start through this fund 
could now commence operations in competition with the 
Caisse des Comptes Courants, which was then doing busi- 
ness; but for fear of disturbing the money market by this 
division  of  resources,  the  regents  determined  to  make 
every effort to unite the two establishments whose com- 
petition might  prove dangerous." 
Even  in  this  official report, which  was  intended  to 
disguise  some of  the difficulties encountered  in  raising 
the capital stock of  the Bank, it is perfectly clear through 
the very testimony of  the founders that this establishment 
got its first start by official order, from the sinking fund 
of  the state debt.  That amount, however, made only one- 
sixth of  the capital.  Subscribers for shares had  not ap- 
peared  in  great  numbers.  During the first year  (1800) 
only 7,447 shares a were taken, and this only after uniting 
with the Caisse des Comptes Courants.  Among the earli- 
est  subscribers  are  found  the  following: First  Consul 
Bonaparte,  his  brother  Joseph  Bonaparte,  J.  Murat, 
Hortense Beauharnais, then aides-de-camp such as Duroc 
and  Lemarois,  and  finally,  Senator  Sidyes  and  several 
other members of  Napoleon's immediate circle, including 
Barbe-Marbois, Crdtet, Cambacer&s,  etc. 
In the early part of  March,  1800, a new decree of  the 
consuls directed that the reserve fund of  the national lot- 
--  -- 
a Only 7,590 shares received the dividend at the end of  the second half 
Year of  I 800;  12,348 shares received the dividend of  the first half of  1801 ; 
14,705 that of  the second half of  the same year.  It was only for the fiscal 
year  1802 that the number 30,000 was reached,  and even then because a 
subscription took  place in October and November,  1801.  It was on this 
occasion  that  the shares of  the Bank  commenced  to be  quoted on  the 
Paris Bourse (October  27,  1801). National  Monetary  Commission 
tery should be  deposited  at the Bank.  Little by little 
they succeeded in this way in disposing of  15,000 out of 
the 30,000 shares-that  is, half of  the capital stock stipu- 
lated in the statutes. 
The Government had been in reality the first subscriber, 
through the agency of  the sinking fund, but it had made 
the condition that in return for this first cooperation the 
unpaid obligations of  the collectors-general should be met 
in full by  the Bank  of  France to the amount not  only 
of  the sums standing to the credit of  the sinking fund 
(which had deposited at the Bank funds proceeding from 
the bonds  furnished  by  the collectors-general) but also 
an amount equivalent to the total of  the shares bought 
by  the Government, which,  as we  know,  amounted  to 
5,000,ooo francs. 
So the State gave with one hand and took away with 
the other.  Having  been  placed  at the very  beginning 
under  the  protection  of  the Government, the Bank was 
forced  little by  little to tighten the bonds  from  which 
it could no longer escape.  Although Perrdgaux, president 
of  the Bank, declared in his report of  October  17, 1800, 
that the Bank  "negotiates  with  the Government  only 
when it finds it advantageous to do so  and receives  all 
its usual securities," the new institution of  issue was not 
as  free  as  Perr6gaux  declared, as  was  proved  by  the 
sequel.  At any rate, the State had sold without scruple 
the greater part of  its shares.  In 1801-2  (in the year X), 
of  the 5,000 shares that the sinking fund had bought in 
the beginning, all but 500 had been sold. 
It was with the bank notes  of  the Caisse des Comptes 
Courants that the Bank of  France began operations.  At 
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the time it was  incorporated with  the Bank  of  France 
this establishment brought the following resources : 
It  had in addition, either in circulation or in its coffers, 
20,780,327 francs in bank notes.  It brought also a very 
substantial  credit,  and  the  technical  experience  of  its 
administrators.  So the notes of  the Caisse des Comptes 
Courants became the first fiduciary money of  the Bank. 
It was in 1808 that the notes of  the Caisse des Coniptes 
Courants  disappeared  entirely  from  circulation.  They 
were probably withdrawn in 1807. 
In the first  year's  activity  (1801, year  IX)  the Bank 
discounted  commercial  paper  to the amount  of  about 
89,ooo,ooo  francs.  The  following  year  its  discounts 
doubled, reaching in round  numbers  180,000,000 francs. 
while its circulation  during the second year amounted to 
30,000,ooo francs. 
Besides  the  Bank  of  France,  several  other banks  of 
issue which we have mentioned above were still in oper- 
ation.  The most important among them was the Caisse 
d'Escompte du Commerce.  The idea of  the First Consul 
from the start was to make of  the new concern an institu- 
tion which he could have under his control.  This appears 
in the very beginning, when a deputation from the bank 
council, accompanied by  M. CrCtet, Councillor of  State, 
who had an important share in these events, asked him 
for  government  protection.  +Not being  familiar  with 
financial questions, and especially with questions of  bank- 
ing and credit, he simply applied to this matter his ideas 
of centralization.  It may be surmised from the opinions National  Monetary  Commission 
he expressed afterwards  in  public  that he was  already 
turning over in his mind the plan for a single bank of  issue, 
with a view of  using it to  further his projects and ambition. 
To attain this end the first method tried was diplomacy. 
Negotiations were  opened  in  April,  1802, to induce the 
Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce to carry out of  its own 
accord  its fusion  with  the Bank.  They  were  from the. 
start  exceedingly  difficult.  The  Caisse  d'Escompte  re- 
fused to be  merged  in  the  Bank.  When  the directors 
were assured that in the matter of  the issue of  bank notes 
the unity of the issuing establishment was a necessity and 
an advantage to the public, they answered, on  May  14, 
I 802, "  that the Caisse d'Escompte  with 6,000,ooo francs 
of  capital issued  bank  notes  to the value  of  20,000,000 
francs, while the Bank with a capital of  30,000,000 francs 
liad a circulation of  only 30,000,000 francs."  The argu- 
ment was good, for the aim of  issuing bank notes is to keep 
in  circulation, in the form of  bank notes  payable to the 
bearer on demand, paper money with a real value, easy to 
handle and representing commercial paper  which  is  held 
until maturity in the safe of  the bank which makes the issue. 
The capital is there only to make good the non-payment of 
commercial  paper  on  maturity.  Now,  discount  intelli- 
gently handled ought to suffer only small losses; a reserve 
of  specie in the coffers should suffice to cover these losses 
and redeem  the bank notes  which  have been  issued  on 
the  basis  of  unpaid  effects.  Credit  by  issue  does  not 
mean circulation  in the form of  paper  money  of  specie, 
but of  short-dated commercial bills. 
The Caisse d'Escompte  was  slow  in being persuaded, 
and held out for a long time.  What happened finally has 
never been cleared up.  The press, as we  have said, was 
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not free, and there is no trace of  the methods (probably 
despotic) which were resorted to at the moment to con- 
vert  the administrators  of  the Caisse  d'Escompte.  An 
English newspaper, the London  Courier, which published 
letters from France, received one dated October 9, 1802, 
in which  it was  said  that the State had  applied several 
times to the Caisse d'Escompte to discount its obligations 
and had  been  refused.  Then,  as it was alleged, a well- 
known expedient had been resorted to-that  of  collecting 
a great quantity of  bank notes of  the Caisse d'Escompte 
and  presenting  them  all  at once  one  fine  morning  for 
redemption.  The establishment paid  them.  The Caisse 
went through the same ordeal a second time and held out 
successfully  against  the Government.  At  last, still  ac- 
cording to this English correspondence, the Government, 
being weary of  the struggle, sent an armed force to close 
the offices  of  the Caisse  d' Escompte. 
But, let it be repeated, there is in existence no authen- 
tic document proving these facts.  However, even if  they 
are not to be considered as certain, it is possible to assert 
that the directors of the Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce 
consented to unite with the Bank only because they saw 
that further resistance would be useless.  The final agree- 
ment with the Bank was not signed until August 25, 1803, 
more  than four  months  after  the Bank  of  France  had 
been invested with the exclusive privilege of  issuing bank 
notes in Paris. 
Naturally, the Factorerie and the Comptoir Commercial 
and the Comptoir Jabach disappeared likewise, or at least 
were incorporated with the Bank. Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
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CHAPTER  11.-The  charter or privilege of  the  Bank 
of  France. 
The Bank of France is given the exclusive right to  issue bank notes in Paris.- 
The law of April  14,  1803.  24  Germinal, Year XI.-Duration  of  the privilege.-In- 
crease of capital.-The  right to  discounts extended.-Fixing  the dividends.-Per- 
sonnel of  the regents' council.-The  real situation.-The  balance was not  main- 
tained between the circulation and the convertible resources.-The  crisis of  1805.- 
The Emperor's departure for  Germany.  Rumors that were circulated.-Reduc- 
tion of amount of discounts.-Limiting  the redemption of notes.-Normal  appeal 
to  the provincial banks.-The  mistakes that had been made.-The  bad effect o! 
relations between the State and the Bank. 
From the facts that have just  been stated it will not 
be difficult to foresee  their  only possible outcome.  It is 
obvious that the Bank of  France was destined to receive 
the sole right of  issue.  And what is more, this was noth- 
ing but a  stopping place on  the way  to the final goal, 
namely, handing over the establishment to the head  of 
the State. 
Although  the event was planned  beforehand,  a  slight 
panic which  made  itself  felt  in  the course of  1802 (the 
year XI) was seized upon as a pretext for carrying out the 
idea of  a single bank  of  issue.  The pretext was a suffi- 
ciently flimsy one, for the banks of  issue, including the 
Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce, had  given no occasion 
for complaint. 
It  was the law of  April 14, I 803, which radically changed 
the statutes of  the Bank.  As the president of  the stock- 
holders  said  in  his  report  of  the  year  XI1 (1804), it 
was not so much a commercial as it was  a  political law. 
Its underlying  provisions were  as follows: The Bank  of 
France was henceforth to have the exclusive privilege of 
issuing  bank  notes.  The  Caisse  d'Escompte  du  Com- 
merce, the Factorerie, and other companies which issued 
notes  in  Paris, ceased  to have  the right  to issue  new 
ones from the date of  publication  of  the law of  Germi- 
nal.  They were  to withdraw all notes  from circulation 
within  the  very  short  period  of  six  months  or  there- 
abouts.  No  bank  could  be  organized in  the provinces 
without  the consent  of  the Government.  The Govern- 
ment reserved  the right  to grant the privilege of  issue, 
and  to fix  the maximum  of  notes  issued,  declaring  at 
the same time that these  notes  could  not  be  manufac- 
tured  elsewhere  than  at Paris.  The  privilege  was  to 
last fifteen years,  from  the  first  Vendgmiaire, year XI1 
(September  24,  1803).  The  capital  of  the  Bank  was 
raised to 45,000,ooo francs by creating I 5,000 new shares. 
The smallest denomination for Bank of  France notes was 
to be  500  francs,  and  250  francs  for  any departmental 
banks  that might  be  founded.  In the  statutes  of  the 
year  VIII, the shareholders alone had  special rights  to 
discount;  in future, they  were  no  longer  to enjoy  this 
privilege;  every  merchant,  manufacturer,  banker,  etc., 
on satisfying the general requirements, could be admitted 
to discount his paper at this establishment.  The annual 
dividend was fixed at 6 per cent, not including the income 
on the surplus capital invested in government stock, which 
could be distributed in addition to the 6 per cent.  Seven 
regents  out of  fifteen and the three censors were  to be 
chosen  from  the manufacturers, mill  owners,  or  trades- 
men who were shareholders in the Bank.  Every member 
of  the company could have but one vote, whatever the 
number of  shares he held. National  Monetary  Commission 
Let  us  note  at this point  that the capital stock was 
raised  from 30,000,000 to 45,000,ooo francs without  the 
slightest commercial necessity. 
To all appearances, from the year V111 to the year XII, 
the Bank  had  increased  in  rather  large  proportions  its 
"  portfolio " of  commercial paper-in  other words, its dis- 
counts.  Here are the comparative figures (maximum and 
minimum)  relative  to the  reserve, the  commercial dis- 
counts, and  the circulation of  bank  notes for the years 
V111 and XII: 
[Milhon francs.] 
Reserve.  COmmerda' dis-  Circulation.  counts. 
1  Maxi-  /  Mini-  I  Maxi-  I  Mini-  Maxi-  1  Mini- 
mum.  mum.  mum.  mum.  /  mum.  mum. 
Year VIII, second half year 
21 
Average rate of interest. 6 per cent. 
But, according to the opinion of  Mollien, who was not 
unfriendly to the Bank of  France, there was in what was 
called the commercial "  portfolio " only a very small per 
cent of  real commercial values.  These large figures were 
mostly  made  up  of  government  paper  or  that of  the 
contractors. 
In reality, they were not liquid values, capable of  being 
realized in specie quickly  or on  short notice,  making  it 
possible to redeem  bank  notes without running  the risk 
of  bankruptcy in case of  a panic.  M.  Gautier, who was 
afterwards deputy governor of  the Bank, states positively 
in his study on the institutions  of  issue in  France  and 
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America, that out of  97,000,000  francs of  paper discounted 
there was as much as 80,000,000 which represented obli- 
gations of  the collectors-general taken at 6 per cent, and 
which the Bank would not have been able to rediscount, 
even at 12 per cent.  On the other hand, from the year 
V111  to the year  XIII, the Bank had  advanced to the 
public  Treasury  722,000,000  francs;  the  total  of  all 
discounts  during  this  period  of  six  years  was  scarcely 
three times  this  amount.  Now,  in  the year  XIII, the 
circulation  of  bank notes had reached nearly  8o,ooo,o~ 
francs.  The  maximum  reserve  had  not  gone  beyond 
24,000,ooo  francs,  and  the  "portfolio"  contained  not 
more than  17  per  cent  of  real  commercial  paper,  that 
is,  of  negotiable  paper  or  paper  convertible  into 
specie.  Notice  that we  have  spoken  of  the maximum 
reserve; the minimum fell the same years (1804-5)  below 
2 ,000,000 francs.  At the slightest economic disaster, the 
Bank, placed in this abnormal situation, must necessarily 
get into difficulties. 
We  will  not  describe in  detail  the transactions  with 
the Merchants' Association, conducted by the celebrated 
army contractor, Ouvrard.  This company had  dealings 
with the Treasury.  It discounted effects at the Bank, in 
return for which the latter gave bank notes, increasing by 
that  much  the  circulation.  Now,  these  effects  were 
credit paper, and the Rank had taken them only to oblige 
the  Government,  then  represented  by  Baron  Marbois, 
Minister of  the Treasury.  In addition to this, after the 
Emperor had set out for Germany, the rumor was circu- 
lated  in  Paris  that  he  had  carried  away  the metallic National  Monetary  Commission 
reserve  from  the  Bank  to fill  his  army  coffers.  The 
statement was not true.  To be sure many soldiers had 
come to draw money from their accounts at the Bank in 
order to take the field.  As  a result of  the working of  all 
of  these  causes,  a  real  panic  arose.  Bank  notes  were 
presented  in great numbers at the doors of  the Bank of 
France.  The  directors  of  this  establishment  made  the 
mistake of  restricting their discounts-a  disastrous  pro- 
ceeding at such a moment.  The bank notes depreciated 
10 and 15 per cent.  'I'he  Bank was reduced to a partial 
suspension  of  payments; it  limited  the  redemption  of 
notes  to 600,000  francs  a  day.  The Bank  acted  more 
wisely in sending to the provincial bankers paper on their 
own  localities, asking  them  to send  back  the value  of 
this paper  in specie. 
What  mistake  had  been  made?  Issuing  more  bank 
notes  than  the needs  of  commerce  justified.  And  in 
exchange for what securities had the Bank made this issue? 
In exchange for the credit paper of  the government con- 
tractors; in  exchange  for  the obligations of  collectors- 
general which could not be paid, because the directors of 
the Merchants' Association had already received the money 
that these obligations represented.  At the critical moment 
the specie in the coffers fell to 782,000 francs on September 
24, 1805, in the face of  a circulation of  63,ooo,ooo francs. 
Order  was  reestablished  by  the end  of  a  month.  The 
victory  of  Austerlitz  helped,  and  also  the more  or  less 
regular  measures that had been adopted  pell-mell, good 
and  bad  together.  It was  certainly, too,  the opinion 
people  had  of  the relations  of  the Bank with  the State 
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that had aggravated this crisis.  It is moreover a typical 
example  of  the mistakes  that may  be  committed  by  a 
bank  of  issue, both  in becoming  involved  in  a  difficult 
situation and in trying to escape from it by expedients 
which are for the most part more harmful than efficacious. 
Napoleon,  on  returning  from  Germany,  was  much 
alarmed at this crisis, the real causes of  which he did not 
clearly grasp.  He wanted  to have  the Bank  "more  in 
his hands," and,  with this in view, prepared a new consti- 
tution for  the establishment.  It was the decree of  Jan- 
uary I 6,  I 808, which sanctioned these modifications. Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
CHAPTER  111.-The  fundamental  statutes  of  the  Bank- 
It comes into closer relation with the State, 1806-1814. 
The law of April  22,  1806.-Decree  of January 16,  1808, ratifying the law of April 
22, 1808.-The  Bank creates branch offices in the provinces.-Limited  transactions 
of these Comptoirs.-Their  disappearance.-The  Bank of  Prance from I808 to  the 
fall of the Empire.-Industry  in France at the end of  the eighteenth century and the 
beginning of the nineteenth-National  expositions at Paris under the Empire.- 
The efforts  of learned men.-Political  obstacles.-Napoleon's  anxiety for his Bank. 
His study of the question.-Napoleon  asks Mollien to  explain the nature of  a bank 
of issue.-The  Havre note.-Masterly  statement of  the true mechanism of a bank 
of issue.-Extracts  from the Havre note, May 29, 1810.-The  opinion of  ~ollien  on 
the nature of the operations of  a bank of  issue.-The  last years of the Empire.- 
Danger of holding state paper  in panic times.-Crisis  of  1814.  Panic of  holders of 
notes. 
According to the law of  April 22, 1806, the committee 
of  three which  had  been  chosen from the regents named 
by the stockholders to govern the Bank, was replaced  by 
a governor and two deputy governors, named by the head 
of  the State.  The first governor was M. Crdtet, Councillor 
of  State.  He assumed his  duties April  25,  1806.  This 
governor was  nothing  more  than a functionary, subject 
to the dictates of  the State.  The privilege was prolonged 
twenty-five  years  beyond  the  fifteen years  granted  by 
the law of  the year XI.  The capital was doubled by the 
issue  of  45,000  new shares  and raised, consequently, to 
go,ow,mo francs.  The regents'  council, still  composed 
of 15 members, was to include 5 manufacturers, merchants, 
or mill owners, and 3 collectors-general.  This introduc- 
tion of  manufacturers, tradesmen, and collectors-general 
into the board of  directors came from Napoleon's notion 
that  the crisis  was  caused  by  the bankers  themselves. 
He was not overfond of  them, especially since the Consu- 
late, when they had refused him money, and he distrusted 
them because he saw that they made use of  the Bank to 
advance their own interests. 
In placing  Crttet at the head  of  this  establishment, 
Napoleon, knowing  the tendencies  of  the governor  and 
his administrative skill,  transformed the Bank of  France 
in reality into a state bank whose  capital was furnished 
by private individuals. 
The annual dividend was composed, first, of  a distribu- 
tion not to exceed 6 per cent of  the original capital; sec- 
ond, of  a  second distribution equal to two-thirds  of  the 
remaining profits.  The other third was kept in reserve. 
The imperial decree of  January I 6, I 808, ratified the law 
of  April  22, 1806.  It was there specified that the Bank 
should  create  in  the principal  provincial  towns  branch 
offices, chiefly in places where they would serve the needs 
of  commerce.  Several months later, a decree of  May  18, 
1808, regulated the organization of  these branches.  The 
rate of  discount was fixed at 5 per cent.  Once a year the 
Minister of  Finance was to make a report on the transac- 
tions of  each branch office, and propose, if  it were judged 
necessary, a lowering of  this rate.  In obedience to this 
order, branches were created on  June  24,  1808, at Lyons 
and Rouen.  The Bank had the exclusive right of  issue only 
in the towns where it had branch offices.  The State could 
therefore give this privilege to other establishments in other 
places.  A third branch was founded at  Lille May 29,1810. 
This latter was not successful, and closed its doors in 18  13. 
It had been very little patronized, and its affairs were not 
difficult to liquidate.  The branch at  Rouen had a rather National  Monetary  Commission 
brisk  business for  several years.  People in Rouen were 
alreadv used to banks of  issue and to bank notes.  We 
have seen above that in that town there existed a very 
prosperous institution of  issue when  the founding of  the 
Bank of  France and the suppression of  the right of  free 
issue of  bank notes were decreed by the Directory.  The 
Lyons and Rouen branches  each lasted nine years, and 
were  closed  in  181  7.  The latter had discounted in this 
time commercial bills to the amount of  16o,ooo,om  francs, 
or an average  of  I 7,5m,mo francs  a  year.  The profits 
had not been large.  The Lyons branch had been a little 
more active, as the location was more favorable to busi- 
ness  than  Rouen.  The first few  years were fairly good. 
It was not until  1810 that the Bank  sent to its branch 
offices notes of  the denomination of  250 francs.  On this 
occasion the rate of  discount, which had been 5 per cent, 
was lowered to 4 per cent.  But the foreign invasions  and 
the slackness of  business which marked the downfall of  the 
Empire brought  about the closing  of  the branches.  In 
reality, the Bank  had  not become much involved in this 
scheme.  If  these establishments made some profits in the 
first years, they saw them disappear and even change to 
losses in I 8  I 7, when they ran short ~oo,ooo  francs. 
The law of  1806 and the decrees of  1808, which con- 
firmed and at the same time  aggravated it, had, as we 
have seen, brought the Government and the Bank  closer 
together.  At  that period  the Bank  was chiefly a state 
concern.  For four years, until  1812, no difficulties were 
encountered.  To be  sure, business was dull, the political 
situation was  uncertain; continual wars  interfered  with 
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the setting up of  industrial and commercial enterprises. 
Capital was abundant and idle.  The year  1810 was the 
only one which can be reckoned in any degree active; the 
Bank made discounts amounting to a total of  7  I 5 ,ooo,ooo 
francs, and that thanks to the lowering of  the interest rate 
to 4 per cent.  But at the beginning of  the year  181  2 it 
had in the coffers I 14,000,000  francs in specie, and in cir- 
culation I I 7,000,000 francs in bank notes; commercial dis- 
counts amounted to only I 5,000,ooo francs; in the course 
of  the year they even fell as low as ~o,ooo,ooo  francs.  It 
was  the  Treasury  which  furnished  bills  for  discount. 
Thus in 181  I the Bank discounted state obligations to the 
value of  about I 5  ,ooo,ooo francs.  These obligations went 
under the name of  excise duties  (droits rdunis), and had 
to do with the tax or octroi on goods brought into the city. 
In  181  2  the same  kind  of  obligations  were  discounted 
again  for the sum  of  2,000,000 francs.  In addition, an 
advance of  40,000,000 francs had been made to the State 
in the preceding years on the obligations of  the collectors- 
general.  At this moment, therefore, the principal client 
of  the Bank was the Treasury, and the Bank was neglecting 
for the Treasury the interests  of  its clients  in  industry 
and commerce. 
However, it was not the elements of  economic progress 
that were lacking in France.  In spite of  the Revolution, 
in spite of  the anarchy  of  the Directory  and the grave 
financial disturbances resulting from it, a renewal of  in- 
dustry, a veritable revival of  the arts, business, and inven- 
tions had taken place.  This is proved by the number of 
expositions held at that time. National  Monetary  Commission 
The first exposition which was opened in Europe was 
organized by France.  It was held in the Champ de Mars, 
and lasted  a  week,  but was not  a  very  brilliant  affair. 
There were  I 10 exhibitors, of  whom  10  or  12  received 
prizes.  The expositions of  1801 and 1802 were more suc- 
cessful.  Carcel received  a prize for his lamps, Jacquart 
for his machine loom, Ternaux for woolen  stuffs, Mont- 
golfier, of  the town of  Annonay, for his paper, Fauler for 
his morocco leather.  At the exposition of  1802 were seen 
cashmere shawls, imitating those of  India, Sallandrouze 
carpets, and Sevres porcelain.  After the victory of  Aus- 
terlitz  a new  exposition was planned, and the buildings 
erected on the parade ground of  the Invalides.  Twenty- 
seven gold medals were distributed, 146 silver medals, 326 
honorable  mentions,  etc.  The following table  will  give 
an idea of  the increasing importance of  these expositions: 
-  -  --  /  Date  /  ::,hi: 
The discoveries  in  chemistry which  revolutionized  at 
that time certain industries, as, for example, the manu- 
facture of  artificial soda, the improvements in the paper 
industry, and, finally, mechanical inventions for spinning 
and weaving-all  these  were  the vanguard  of  the  one 
supreme  invention  most  marvelous  of  all, namely, the 
steam  engine.  Chaptal,  Berthollet,  Conte,  Vauquelin, 
Thdnard, Jacquart, and others were working to bring out 
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of science new  industries.  But political obstacles arose, 
hindering  economic  progress.  Even  though  the  nearly 
continual wars supported themselves, and though they in- 
volved  the manufacture  of  arms and munitions,  and so 
furnished employn~ent  to the industries  connected  with 
the equipment and maintenance of  armies, they took away 
many  hands  from  agriculture,  manufactures,  and  com- 
merce.  Peace is the first necessity of  business prosperity. 
Business enterprises  can not be launched  without  a fair 
certainty  that no  unforeseen  event  will  brinx  them  to 
grief.  This explains the very slight commercial activity 
of  the Bank during these years,  but the years to follow 
are still more unfavorable and more filled with trials for 
this institution. 
Napoleon  was  solicitous  for  all  that  concerned  the 
Bank-his  Bank as he called it in discussions in the Coun- 
cil of  State.  He urged his ministers to study the subject. 
Among  them was  Mollien,  Minister  of  the Treasury,a  a 
highly  educated  man,  very  learned  both  in  economic 
theory and practice.  Napoleon was attached to him not 
because of  any liking for him, but because he was useful. 
Mollien dared tell the truth to the Emperor; he was never 
a courtier.  Napoleon had  asked him his opinion on  the 
Bank of  France.  The Emperor was (May, I 8  10) at Havre, 
and  in correspondence with  Mollien  in regard to found- 
ing  a  branch  office  of  the  Bank  at Lille.  In a letter 
dated  May  20 he said to his  Minister  of  the Treasury, 
after speaking of  discount at Rouen: "  Make me a report 
a There were at that time, and during the whole period of  the Empire, 
two  Ministers  of  Finance:  The  first,  Gaudin,  Minister  of  Finance,  or 
Receipts;  the second, Mollien, Minister of  the Treasury, or Expenditures. National  Monetary  Commission 
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which will help me to  understand the nature of  the deposit 
of  the  Bank  of  France.  Who  issues the bank  notes? 
Who secelves  the  profits?  Who furnishes  the funds?  " 
Mollien replied in the celebrated memorandum called the 
Havre note, in which he  makes  clear the true theory of 
banks of  issue.  This was called the Havre note, because 
the Emperor was still at Havre, and wrote  to Mollien  on 
receiving  it : "  This is the first thing I have ever read on 
the  subject  that is perfectly clear, well thought out, and 
without abstractions; I had an idea of  having itprinted, 
but I  should  like to know  first  if  there would  be  any 
objection.  Take this memorandum to  the Bank as coming 
from me  and give them a chance to attack it  in  your 
presence. " 
We will give the most important points of  this document. 
The question is admirably stated, and it is here that must 
be sought trustworthy information as to the true mechan- 
ism of a bank of  issue.  It  is, let us note in passing, suffi- 
.  ciently surprising that Napoleon adopted so readily such 
daring ideas: "  The purpose of  this capital (the 30,000,000 
francs decreed by  the law of  the year VIII) was not to 
give the bank the funds necessary to exploit its privilege; 
this capital is not  the instrument of  its discounts,  and 
can not be used for discounts.  The privilege of  the Bank 
consists in the right  to create  and  manufacture  special 
money for its discounts.  If  a bank  used its capital for 
discounts, it would not need any privilege.  *  *  *  It 
is independently of  its capital that it creates by its notes 
its true  and  only  discounting  medium.  *  *  *  The 
necessity of furnishing capital is imposed on the founders 
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of a bank only in order to provide  those who  accept its 
notes as real  money with  a  pledge and guaranty against 
the errors and imprudences  that this Bank may commit 
in the use of  its notes, or against any losses it may suffer 
from admitting doubtful bills to discount; in a word  (to 
use the technical expression of  commerce), against its bad 
paper  (avaries de son portefeuille) . 
Since a bank issues and must issue notes only against 
good  and  valid  bills  of  exchange, having  two  or  three 
months to run at the outside, it should have on hand in its 
'portfolio' in  bills  of  exchange a sum at least equal to 
the notes issued; the bank is then in a position to with- 
draw all  its notes  from  circulation  within  the space  of 
three months, simply as a result of  the successive falling 
due of  the loans, and this without involving any part of 
its capital. " 
Mollien  shows  next  that a  bank  of  issue  must  be  a 
bank  engaging  only in  operations  of  commercial credit; 
that its administrators  must  refrain  from  all participa- 
tion, direct or indirect, in industrial or commercial enter- 
prises;  and he expresses himself very clearly on this point 
as  follows: "  Discount,  as it is  practiced  by  a  bank  on 
everything  discountable in a particular  place, is such an 
important  and  delicate  operation,  demanding  so  much 
attention, so much foresight, so much care, such minute 
observation of  the methods used by each tradesman, and 
the adjustment of  supply  and demand in each locality, 
of  the circumstances which  may  lessen  or  increase day 
by  day the credit of  each signer of  a bill of  exchange- 
811  these  duties  are  such  that  the operation  does  not National  Monetary  Commission 
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admit  the intrusion of  any other  interest.  Those who 
decide on discounts are the judges  of  trade; they ought 
not to descend into the arena of  commerce." 
It should  be  noted  here  that Mollien  advocated  the 
privilege of  the Bank, but for  Paris only.  He  did not 
advise extending  it to the whole  of  France, nor  did he 
think that discounts of  provincial banks could be profit- 
ably managed  from  Paris.  He admitted, however, the 
feasibility of  branch offices, knowing that Napoleon was 
in favor of  them; but the Minister of  the Treasury in no 
way  disguised his belief  as to the precautions  necessary 
in such a case.  Let us say that the fears of  Mollien were 
not  justified.  What explains  his  timidity  on this point 
is that the railroads and telegraph were not yet in exist- 
ence, and communication between Paris and the provinces 
was slow and difficult and often uncertain. 
Having  made  this  digression  to  show  the  economic 
situation of  that time, and the attitude of  Napoleon and 
his minister, Mollien, toward the Bank of  France, let us 
resume the account  of  the progress  of  the Bank, which 
we  left at the end of  181  2. 
The year  I 8  I 3 was unfavorable.  The Empire was vis- 
ibly beginning to decline.  The loans of  the Bank to the 
Treasury exceeded 34o,ooo,o00 francs.  The discounts fell 
to a total of  less than 30,000,000 francs.  It is true that 
the circulation of  bank notes diminished as well.  After 
being  at  I 34,000,ooo  francs  maximum  and  82 ,000,000 
francs  minimum  in  1812, it  fell  to  a  maximum  of 
g5,ooo,ooo francs in 1813. 
At this moment the Bank was creditor of  the State  for 
the amount of 54,000,ooo francs (40 ,000,ooo  francs direct 
40 
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loan and 14,000,000 francs on the excises), without count- 
ing the  advances  on  the obligations  of  the  collectors- 
general.  But, in addition, the Bank possessed a capital of 
35,000,000  francs  invested  in  government  stock  (rentes 
d'~tat).  How was this capital to be realized on at  such a 
critical moment?  For the Bank had  not sufficient avail- 
able  funds to  meet  its  engagements payable  at sight. 
If  we  examine the maxima we  shall  see that the Bank 
had in its coffers  3g,ooo,ooo  francs in specie, but it owed 
at sight 95,000,000 francs on  bank  notes  in circulation 
and 23,000,000 francs on current accounts of  depositors; in 
a word, 3g,ooo,ooo francs versus I 18,000,ooo francs.  Its 
"portfolio" was not  easy to rediscount, composed  as it 
was of  state paper.  A part of the capital, of  course, was 
in the  35,000,000 francs invested  in  government  stock. 
But how was this stock to be  sold off?  At the price to 
which it  had then fallen the Bank would  have lost on the 
purchase  price.  It would  have forced  the price of  this 
stock  still lower if  such a quantity of  it had been put on 
the  market.  Pinally,  the  State, which  had  so much 
influence  on  the  Bank, would  not  have  allowed  this 
operation to be carried  through, because of  the depres- 
sion which  it would have caused on the Bourse.  In the 
month of  December the Bank  redeemed  notes for  about 
40,000,000 francs.  But as the crisis grew more acute the 
general council of  the Bank asked to restrict redemptions 
to 500,000 francs a  day, beginning with January 20, 1814. 
This state of  things lasted until April  14, 1814.  Toward 
January  20, at the height  of  the panic, at the moment of 
the invasion, the Bank  borrowed 6,000,000 francs, with- National  Monetary  Commission 
out which  it would have been  obliged to suspend pay- 
ments entirely.  This loan, in all probability, was  made 
by one or more private bankers in  Paris. 
As  soon as the political crisis was over, the affairs of 
the  Bank  resumed  their  normal  course.  Nothing  was 
modified  in  its organization,  although  Laffitte  and  the 
general council had proposed to bring the Bank back to 
its original  purpose  before it had become a ward of  the 
State.  It  was proposed also to keep the exclusive privi- 
lege of  issue only for Paris, to give up provincial branches, 
and to leave the election of  the governor to the stock- 
holders.  But these plans could not come up for discus- 
sion.  The Ministers of  Finance were perplexed with too 
many grave problems at that moment, and when Gaudin, 
former Minister of  Finance under the Empire, was nomi- 
nated governor in  1820, all hope of  liberal reform took 
flight.  Two motions had been laid before the Chambers 
of Deputies in that interval (I  814-1 820), one on Novem- 
ber  16, 1814, the other on April 13, 1818; both aimed at 
a reaction against the imperial decrees which had reduced 
the Bank to a state dependency.  These two plans came 
to nothing. 
CHAPTER  1V.-The  Bank under  the Restoration-Founding 
of  departmental banks. 
Several banks have the pr~vilege  of  issue in France.  The departmental banks.- 
Conditions  of  issue  Imposed  on  these  three  banks.-D~fRculty  of  found~ng 
departmental banks.--Cr~sls  of  1818.-From  1818 to 1830. 
The liberal ideas of  Laffitte and his friends, though they 
had not succeeded in modifying the despotic~constitution 
imposed on the Bank by the Empire, resulted at least in 
several liberal  measures in  another quarter.  The most 
important  was  the  establishing  of  departmental banks. 
These banks also had the privilege of  issue in the centers 
where  they were  established  and even  in  a  little wider 
circle. 
They were  of  real  service to the towns  and districts 
where  they  were  situated.  The  need  of  them  was  all 
the greater because, as we have seen, the Bank of  France. 
after opening a number of  branch offices, had closed them 
following several years of  poor returns. 
Three departmental banks were founded under the Res- 
toration; they were, let it be remembered, banks of  issue. 
Here is a short account of  each of  them: 
The  Bank of  Rouen (May  I 7, I 8  I 7) -Capital,  I ,ooo,ooo 
francs;  charter to last nine years;  right of  discount for 
Rouen, Havre, Paris; right of  paying interest on deposits, 
even sight deposits (it exercised this right) ; right of  issue; 
its charter was renewed in  1826;  the bank increased its 
capital at intervals and when it disappeared in 1848, for 
reasons  that  we  shall  explain  later,  the  capital  was 
3,000,000  francs. National  Monetary  Commission 
Bank  of  Nudes.-Chartered  May  18,  1818; did  not 
begin operations until January  I, I 82 2 ; original capital, 
600,000 francs;  right to pay  interest  on deposits; right 
to discount paper on  all the markets in France; right of 
issue;  this bank, too, increased its capital at intervals; in 
1840 it was  3,000,000 francs.  It restricted its privileges 
of  discount to Nantes, Paris, and Bordeaux. 
Bank of  Bordeaux.-Chartered  by royal decree Novem- 
ber  23, I 8  I 8 ; original capital, 3,000,000 francs ; same rights 
as the two preceding banks.  The Bank of  Bordeaux went 
through more acute crises than those of  Rouen and Nantes. 
Its capital  was  not  increased,  properly  speaking, since 
in 1843 it was  still  3,150,ooo francs.  In the beginning 
it had  great difficulty in getting the public to accept its 
notes.  People gradually got used to them, however. 
As we know, the Bank of  France had submitted in its 
statutes to no  special  conditions  for  the issue  of  bank 
notes.  Not  so  the  departmental  banks.  In  the  first 
place,  they  had  the privilege  of  issuing notes  only  for 
their headquarters and several other towns mentioned in 
their statutes  Then the total of  their engagements pay- 
able at sight could in no case be more than three times 
the metallic reserve.  But these banks,  contrary  to the 
condition imposed on the Bank of  France, could choose 
their own directors, at least until 1840. 
In order to establish a departmental bank  under  the 
Restoration, it was necessary to obtain the consent of  the 
government  offices  and  the  council  of  state.  In  the 
offices, as well  as in the council of  state, there still pre- 
vailed  the formalism, slowness, and  red  tape by  which 
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France had been governed despotically during the Empire. 
On the other hand, the Bank of  France, although it had 
closed its branch offices, did not see these new establish- 
ments  founded without  a  certain  anxiety.  It used  its 
influence  on  the  central  government  to  delay  their 
creation.  So there were many obstacles to overcome in 
obtaining  permission  to  found  a  departmental  bank. 
And, even when  the permission was  granted, the bank 
was  obliged  to work within  rather  narrow  limits.  Con- 
ditions  were  imposed  on the directors in banking stat- 
utes which  were  not  of  the least use in protecting the 
interests of  the public, and yet were a hindrance to the 
extension  of  business.  In spite  of  this, these  concerns 
prospered.  As we  shall see further on, they increased in 
number  under  the  Monarchy  of  July.  The  Bank  of 
France,  alarmed  by  this  competition,  began  anew  to 
found branch offices after the Revolution of  1830. 
In I 8  18 the Bank suffered a crisis, caused by the demand 
for capital, made first by France, to pay the indemnity to 
the Allies, then by other countries, such as Austria, Prussia, 
Russia, etc.  These loans diminished the supply of  specie, 
especially in  the Paris market.  The cash in the coffers 
of  the Bank fell to 34,000,000 francs at a  moment when 
the sight liabilities amounted  to more than  160,000,000 
francs.  This time the Bank did not ask to limit payments, 
but resorted  to the expedient of  refusing to discount all 
paper  having  more  than  forty-five  days  to  run.  The 
object of  this was to avoid increasing the discount rate, 
but the proceeding is open to severe criticism.  It would 
have been better if  the Bank had obeyed the law of  supply National  Monetary  Comrnissiort 
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and demand.  In limiting discounts to short-dated bills, 
it  embarrassed  merchants,  who  needed  money  all  the 
more, in that they had  on hand  nothing  but sixty  and 
ninety  day  paper.  They  would  willingly  have  paid  a 
higher rate for the credit they needed.  On the other hand, 
in  maintaining  discount  at the  same  rate  as  formerly 
during a crisis caused by  a scarcity  of  specie, the Bank 
gave an undue advantage to holders of  short-dated paper, 
and yet this paper was not to fall due until a month and 
a half  later.  In our opinion, it is a great mistake for a 
bank of issue not to vary the rate of  discount according 
to the fluctuations of  the money market. 
The history  of  the  Bank from 1818 to 1830 offers no 
feature sufficiently noteworthy  to serve as a  subject  of 
study.  The total of  its issue  showed a tendency to in- 
crease.  In I 8  I 8 its maximum reached I 26,000,000 francs ; 
in 1830,239,000,000  francs.  Its minimum was 87,000,000 
francs in  I 81  8, and  2 14,000,000 francs  in  I 830.  From 
1820  to  1830  the  minimum  of  circulation  or  issue 
approached the  maximum.  There was a  like tendency 
in the specie reserve.  As  for the commercial discounts, 
they  underwent  fluctuations  by  periods  lasting  several 
years; they diminished from 1819 to 1824, and increased 
until  1829,  at  which  time  there  was  a  depression. 
Excepting for  the year 1830, this depression was some- 
what visible until I 835. 
CHAPTER  V.-The  Bank of  France under the Monarchy of 
July-Founding  of  comptoirs or branch ofices-Renewal 
of  the privilege, and competition with departmental banks. 
Discount  crisis of  1830.-Political  causes of  the  crisis.-Lack  ot  intermediary 
bankers.-Necessary  evolution of  credit with a single bank of  issue regulated in 
its operations.-Loans  on securities, 1834.-Formation  of  new departmental banks.- 
Plurality of  banks of  issue.-Branch  offices of  the Bank  of  France.-Crisis  of 
183637.-Renewal  of  the  privilege  of  the  Bank.  It  is prepared  in  1840.-The 
representatives of the departmental banks lay a request before the authorities.- 
The  law  of  May  21,  1840.  Extension of  privilege.-The  privilege is confined to 
Paris.-The  balance sheet must be published  every  three  months.-The  State 
ceases chartering departmental banks.-The  Bank  keeps  the  rate  of  discount 
at 4 per cent.  Too high a rate.-Capital  is cheap. 
The Revolution of  1830 did not  injure in the least the 
particular credit of  the Bank.  Government stock did not 
even pass through the fluctuations usual in such circum- 
stances.  But this is not true of  commerce and industry 
in general.  To relieve the embarrassment of  several local 
markets it was necessary  to adopt unusual measures. 
As the Bank took paper only with three signatures, the 
Government  used  its  influence  and  had  a  credit  of 
30,000,000 francs voted by the Chambers on October 17, 
1830, to be applied to discounting commercial paper eith 
two signatures.  A provisional establishment was opened 
a few days after the voting of  this credit to handle these 
loans.  It bore  the  name  of  Comptoiv d'Escovzpte,  and 
lasted from October 26, 1830, to September 30, 1832, or 
twenty-three  months.  It had  received  from  the State 
1,760,000 francs out  of  the appropriation  of  30,000,000 
francs.  The city of  Paris was authorized furthermore to 
go  security for this  provisional bank  with  the Bank of National  Monetary  Cornnzission 
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France  to the amount  of  4,000,000 francs.  It was  an 
intermediary between  commerce and  the Bank; it fur- 
nished the third name, and rediscounted its paper at that 
establishment  of  issue.  In these  twenty-three  months 
it  discounted  more  than  37,000  bills, valued  at  over 
20,000,000 francs.  This  Comptoir  discounted  paper  on 
Paris at 4 per cent; on the provinces at 5 per cent. 
Banks of  the same nature were organized in answer to 
the same needs in certain maritime centers or ports, such 
as  Rouen,  Nantes,  Rochefort,  and  in  certain  manufac- 
turing towns, such as Reims, Troyes, and a few others. 
This was  not  a monetary crisis, like the one of  1818, 
when France had to pay the foreign armies camped on her 
soil, and also the war  indemnity  exacted by the allies. 
The crisis of  1830-31,  which lasted until about the middle 
of  1832, had a political cause.  The Government of  July 
was not thought to be firmly established, and the ease with 
which  the  Revolution  of  I 830 had  been  accomplished 
aroused continual fears of  a new change of  rule. 
The Bank suffered much from this state of things.  In 
1832 the maximum figure of  its commercial discounts did 
not amount to more than 30,000,000 francs.  Its reserve, 
however,  was  very  high,  and  reached  a  maximum  of 
282,000,000 francs, and a minimum of  2 17,000,000.  The 
maximum circulation in I 832 was 258,000,000 francs, and 
the  minimum  202,000,000 francs.  Therefore  its  bank- 
notes  in  circulation  represented  for  the most  part  the 
metallic reserve.  If  the Bank  was not  of  more  service 
then,  it is because intermediaries  were  lacking-that  is 
to say, bankers who  by  adding their own  names to the 
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bills discounted by them, and already bearing two names, 
could rediscount this paper at the Bank of  France.  With 
a system in which a single bank  has the exclusive privi- 
lege of  issue, accepting for discount paper with three names 
only, or with two names accompanied by collateral secu- 
rity, intermediary banks of  discount are necessary.  We 
shall see this inevitable tendency develop little by  little 
in the organization of  French banks.  Even at the very 
beginning,  the  Bank  of  France  was  a  bankers'  bank. 
Later, we  shall see it become the bank patronized by the 
credit associations when its privilege had been  extended 
to  the whole of France.  As business expanded, the general 
activity of  banking  operations  naturally expanded  also. 
We shall see, too, that the Bank of  France became in this 
way the pivot on which revolves the whole credit system 
of  the country. 
The statutes of  the Bank had  permitted  it heretofore 
to make  loans only on  short-dated  state securities;  the 
law of  May  17, 1834, authorized loans on all state securi-  - 
ties without stipulation as to maturity.  From this time 
on  the  Bank  made  loans  against  deposits  of  French 
government  stocks. 
After  1835 new  departmental banks were created.  In 
1835 a departmental bank was founded at Lyons with  a 
capital of  2,000,000 francs, and a twenty-year privilege of 
issue.  The Bank of Marseilles, with a capital of  4,000,000 
francs, was chartered the same year, and was very success- 
ful.  In 1837 another one was opened at  Lille, with a capital 
of  2,000,000 francs.  The same year  that of  Havre was 
chartered  and  in  1838  the Bank  of  Toulouse,  with  a National  Monetary  Commission 
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capital of  120,ooo francs, and the Bank of Orleans, with 
a capital of  I ,ooo,ooo francs. 
This was  the last  to be  created, as  the Government 
refused  to charter  any  others.  We  have  already  said 
that the Bank of  France was  naturally suspicious of  the 
founding  of  these  establishments,  although  its  own 
privilege was  limited  to Paris.  In the beginning, how- 
ever, the Bank was inclined to be favorable to the open- 
ing  of  these  departmental  institutions  of  issue,  but 
afterwards it tried to keep them from multiplying, and 
set about organizing branch offices in the departments. 
These nine departmental banks were well administered 
and performed much useful service.  It has been  ascer- 
tained that in the very unfavorable  year  of  1847  these 
banks, with a total capital of  2~,~oo,ooo  francs, discounted 
commercial paper to the amount of  85o,ooo,ooo francs- 
in other words, thirty-two times their capital, whereas the 
discounts of  the Bank were  only twenty-seven  times its 
capital. 
These departmental banks,  therefore,  subsisted  under 
very  nearly  normal  conditions,  by  virtue  of  rendering 
services.  They  might  have  come  to an  agreement  to 
make  their  bank  notes  interchangeable,  but  no  such 
thing came about. 
The  Bank  of  France,  from  1835 on,  opened  branch 
offices in certain towns, and kept on increasing their num- 
ber,  always with  the sanction of  the State.  They soon 
came under the provision of  the law of  March 25,  1841. 
Branch  offices could  not  be  formed  without  a  state 
charter.  They  were  under  the direction  of  the Bank. 
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The general council of the Bank fixed the rate of  discount. 
The  Bank  had  the  exclusive  privilege  of  issue  in  the 
towns where branches were  established.  The notes had 
to be manufactured at Paris and furnished by the Bank 
in  denominations  of  not  less  than  250  francs.  Each 
branch  office had  to  redeem  its  own  notes;  but  the 
redemption of  a note from the central Bank in Paris by 
a  branch  was  optional;  the  same  was  true  for  Paris 
regarding the effects of  the branches.  The directors and 
censors were  named by the Bank;  the governor by the 
State.  As  a result of this law, I 5 branches were opened 
between  1841 and  1848. 
The crisis of  1837 was caused by events in the United 
States.  President  Jackson  was  engaged  in  a  bitter 
struggle with the Bank  of  the United  States, a central- 
ized  and  single  bank  of  issue.  A  business  disturbance 
resulted, which made itself  felt  in France and England. 
It was  a  monetary crisis.  The coin  which  had  left  the 
country during the last  months  of  1836 returned  grad- 
ually  toward  the  end  of  1837.  The  crisis  was  not  a 
serious one, and was met without much difficulty by the 
French  credit institutions. 
The privilege of  the Bank  of  France, granted at first 
for  fifteen years, was extended by the law  of  April  22, 
1806, to  twenty-five  years,  making  forty  years  in  all. 
The  Bank  began  in  1838  to ask  for  renewal,  but  the 
question  was not  taken up in  the Chambers until  1840. 
The departmental banks, profiting by the fact that a law 
for the Bank of France was under consideration, tried to 
get more latitude for their own transactions.  They were National  Monetary  Commission 
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subjected  to  very  narrow  regulations,  which  cramped 
them  and made  it impossible  for  them  to perform  the 
services which  might  normally  be  expected.  No  heed 
was paid to the representatives of  these banks or to the 
protest  that they made. 
The law of  May  2 I, 1840, continued until December 31, 
1867, the privilege of  the Bank, which was to expire in 
1843.  This extension was  granted with  the  reservation 
that the privilege could  be changed  or even withdrawn 
on  December 31, 1855, if  a  law  passed  in one of  the 
two preceding sessions of  the Chamber of  Deputies should 
so decide.  The capital of  67,900,000 francs was officially 
recognized;  this  sum  could  neither  be  increased  nor 
diminished except  by  law.  The  Bank  was  authorized 
to make  loans  on  French  Government  effects of  any 
kind  whatsoever. 
The question  of  complete privilege, extending  to the 
whole of  France, it is seen, does not figure in the law of 
May  2 I, I 840.  It  was understood that the privilege was 
renewed  for  Paris  only, and when  the Bank  wished  to 
found  branch  offices  it  must  obtain  special  permission 
from  the Government.  That question  was  avoided;  it 
was  not  mentioned  in  the discussions carried  on  in the 
Chambers. 
Strangely enough, the necessity of  publishing quarterly 
reports was  made  a matter of  debate, though  it would 
naturally  seem that the first  duty of  a credit establish- 
ment, especially one enjoying a privilege, is to keep the 
public informed of its operations.  It was decided, then, 
that the Minister of  Finance should publish every three 
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months the statement of  the Bank averages for the pre- 
ceding  trimester,  and  every  six  months  the  result  of 
operations for the half  year, including the dividend rate. 
It should  be  mentioned  that  from  this  day  on  the 
State issued  no  more charters for departmental  banks. 
The Bank  of  France,  on  the other  hand,  increased  its 
branch  offices.  A  certain  number  were  opened  each 
year from  1841 until  1846. 
During  the whole  period  from  184-1846  there were 
no  disturbances  or  difficulties  of  any  kind.  The busi- 
ness  of  the Bank  prospered, its  credit  extended.  The 
departmental  banks,  in  spite  of  the requests  of  their 
representatives,  failed  entirely in  their  attempt  to get 
more  liberty  in  their  operations. 
The  circulation  of  the  Bank  continued  to  increase 
from  1840 to  1846.  In  the  latter  year  it  reached  a 
maximum  of  311,ooo,wo francs  and  a  minimum  of 
243,000,000 francs.  But, on  the other  hand,  the com- 
mercial  discounts  were  not  on  the increase.  As for the 
specie  reserve,  it amounted  in  1846 to a  maximum  of 
252,000,000 francs and a minimum of  15o,ooo,ooo  francs. 
It is  true  that  there  was  at that time  a  dearth  of 
business  transactions,  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
Bank  held  its  discount  rate  at too  high  a  figure, con- 
sidering  the  abundance  of  capital  from  1840  to  1846. 
Even the State, finding it cheaper  to borrow elsewhere, 
did little business with the Bank from 1837 to 1846. 
However, in spite of  this calm, France  was  about to 
be visited by a succession of  panics, which  had  various 
causes, in the midst of which the Monarchy of  July was 
destined to go under. Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
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CHAPTER  V1.-The  beginnings  of  the  railroad  industry- 
Panics of  1846,  1847, 1848-The  departmental  banks of 
issue are  incorfiorated  with  the  Bank  of  France, which 
becomes the sole  bank of  issue. 
Delay in constructing railroads in France.  The period from  1823 to  1839.-The 
extension of the railway system in France.  The law of  June  11,  1842.-Call  for 
credit for the  construction of the railroads.-Bad  crops in 1846.  Wheat famine 
in France.-The  panic of 1846-47.-Measures  adopted by the Bank.-Error  of  the 
Bank.-End  of  the financial  crisis of  1847.-The  Bank resumes the 4 per cent 
discount  rate  December,  1847.-Bills  for  200  francs.-Political  crisis  of  1848. 
Panic.-Able  and courageous attitude of the administration of  the Banlc of  France 
(1848).-Forced  currency.  Decree of March 15, 1848.-Notes  of small denomina- 
tions.  TSeir advantages and  disadvantages.-Comparison  of  the crisis of  1848 
with that of 1846-47.-Elements  of  time and place which must be considered.- 
Several departmental banks issue bills for 25  and 50 francs.-Duty  of  a bank of 
issue in panic times.-Weekly  publication of  the Bank balance  sheet,  hitherto 
published  only  once  in three months.-No  clearing house  (chambre de com- 
fiensatzon)  in Paris at that time.-Departmental  banks.-Ditfrculties  experienced 
by departmental banks.  Possible solutions of these dif8cuities.-Incorporating  of 
the departmental banks of issue with the Bank of  France on April 27  and May 2. 
1848. 
Capital was abundant and idle in France from 1840 to 
1846; the rate of  interest had consequently lowered.  On 
the other  hand,  the construction of  the  new  means  of 
transportation-railroads-had  not gone on as rapidly in 
France as in certain other countries.  From February 26, 
1823, when the first  grant was made, until  1840, a  little 
over ~oo,ooo,ooo  francs had been used for building rail- 
ways.  In  1837  there  were  in  France  only about  149 
kilometers of  railroad of  general utility and 27  kilometers 
of  industrial railroads.  At the end of  1841 the Govern- 
ment  had issued concessions for 805 kilometers of  indus- 
trial  railroads;  it  had  itself  built  78  kilometers.  In 
reality, at the end of  1841 there were only 575 kilometers 
of  lines of  general utility being operated and 65 kilometers 
of  the industrial lines. 
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The critics  in the Chambers who  blamed the Govern- 
ment for not  favoring and making easy  the construction 
of  the railways, added to the fact that money was cheap, 
induced the Government to take action.  The law of  June 
I I, 1842, was  made for the purpose of  hastening the ex- 
tension of  railways in France.  It should be mentioned that 
the State intervened as the associate of the companies. 
In 1842 the number of  miles of  railroad for which grants 
had been made was 947 kilometers, and 4,133 kilometers 
at the end of 1847.  The lines in operation had risen from 
665 kilometers at the end of  1842 to 1,927 kilometers at 
the end of  1847. 
After going too slowly at first there was now a tendency 
to go  too  fast.  The  obligations  resulting  from  grants 
made, added to the sums  already  spent, amounted  to a 
total of  nearly 2,000,000,000 francs at the end of  1846. 
The companies had  appealed  for large sums, and peo- 
ple gradually got used to loans that would not have been 
thought  so  easy to  carry  through  a  few  years  before. 
And it was at this  moment above all that the real char- 
acter of  the French people was revealed; in a word, their 
resolute love of  economy, which may be best summed up 
by  the word  prudence.  This has been the mainstay  of 
France for the last fifty years  or more,  and that is why 
recovery came quickly  after the disasters of  the war  of 
1870-71.  But if the spirit of  prudence is a useful factor 
in the wealth of  a country, it has one disadvantage when 
it is  an only factor: It destroys  or lessens initiative; to 
a certain degree it paralyzes action; it does not dispose to 
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The  call for capital had lessened the supply in the French 
market.  Another cause of  hard times arose, too, in 1846. 
That year the crop  of  cereals was  poor  in most  of  the 
European countries, especially in  France  and  England. 
These  two  countries  were  obliged  to purchase foreign 
grain.  The purchase of  this product abroad increased the 
figure of  current imports and had to be paid for in specie. 
The Bank of  France would, therefore, have to be prepared 
to see its metallic reserve diminish. 
The extent of  the famine was understood and foreseen 
as  early  as the spring.  From  that time commerce set 
about making foreign purchases.  However, the Bank did 
not feel the effect of  these operations until July.  From 
1846 until the end of  January,  1847, the reserve dimin- 
ished  by  173,000,ooo francs.  On  December  31,  1846, 
the  specie  in  the coffers was scarcely 71,000,ooo francs. 
During the preceding month of  October 53,000,ooo francs 
had been paid out at  the Bank, in  November  more  than 
43,000,ooo  francs;  or nearly  ~oo,ooo,ooo  francs in two 
months.  This  demand for  specie ceased  at the end  of 
January, because that was the time of  the annual return 
of  specie, caused by the falling due of  payments on sales 
made by exporters. 
The Bank then resorted to unusual means.  It  collected 
at great expense about 2,000,000 francs in specie from the 
departments, and sacrificed its government stock to make 
the purchase of  about 45,ooo,ooo francs' worth of  bullion. 
These  measures were  excellent  in  principle  and due to 
the prudence of  the Bank's management, but they were 
not  all  equally  useful.  At  any  rate  the  surrender  of 
50,000,ooo  francs  capital in  the form  of  government  5 
and 3  per  cents, payable  in  Russia, was  not  necessary, 
for  at that moment  the reserve had  gone up again  to 
~~o,ooo,ooo  francs.  This  transaction  with  the  Russian 
Empire  resulted,  however, in  making  a  better  rate of 
exchange for the French importers. 
The Bank made the mistake of  increasing too late the 
rate of  discount.  It had  maintained it at 4 per cent for 
a long time, when the current  rate was  less.  Then  the 
Bank kept the rate at 4 per  cent during the whole time 
of  the panic and put it up to 5 per cent January 14,1847. 
It should have raised it sooner and not  at the time when 
all  the  metallic  deposits  were  commencing to flow  in. 
Without  any question, a  privileged  bank,  for  the very 
reason that it is privileged, ought not in time of  crisis to 
limit discounts  in  order  to save its reserve at all costs. 
It ought to serve commerce and not tend to restrict its 
issue.  It  should supply credit  abundantly; the privilege 
makes this  a  duty.  This being the case, the Bank came 
to the rescue too late. 
The  failure  of  three  railroad  companies  lessened  the 
expenditures on great public works. 
All the operations of the Bank at the time of  the panic 
just  described,  together with the slackening of  work  on 
the  railroads  (and also the gradual disappearance  of  the 
difficulties coming from the grain famine of  I 846), helped 
to restore business to its normal course.  At  the end  of 
December, 1847, the  Bank  resumed  the 4 per  cent dis- 
count  rate that it had  always maintained  since  1822. 
This stability may well seem strange, because  in the space National  Monetary  Commission 
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of  twenty-five  years  the  price  of  capital, even  in  a 
calm  market, must  necessarily vary.  A fixed  discount 
rate  has  certain  important advantages; it enables com- 
merce  to  calctilate  the  price  of  discount  in  advance 
and to make a very nearly exact forecast of  costs in its 
plans.  But, on the other  hand, a bank  of  issue, placed 
in a position to see the fluctuations of  capital and the needs 
of  commerce,  should  warn  the  merchants,  its  patrons, 
and the whole body of  people having business interests, of 
the change in the state of  credit.  It should signal any 
degree of  scarcity  by  raising  the rate of  discount.  At 
times  this  increase is  nothing  more  than a  warning,  in 
which  case  it should be  slight.  In certain  other  cases, 
when  money  is  easier,  the  Bank  must  not  hesitate  to 
lower  the rate of  discount.  In fact, the discount  rate 
of  a bank of  issue, especially if  it is the only one and with 
a privilege, is a  sort of  official barometer  which private 
banks consult in fixing their own disount rate.  As  these 
private banks may rediscount their commercial paper at 
the bank  of  issue, they usually follow its discount  rate. 
This was especially the case  until  the great credit com- 
panies began  to make discounts on a vast scale with the 
large deposits that the public gradually entrusted to them. 
The law of  June 10, 1847, reduced the denomination of 
the smallest bill  issued  by  the  Bank of  France  to zoo 
francs.  These bills were not put  in circulation until the 
28th of  the following October. 
If  the Bank of  France was no longer seriously disturbed 
by the crisis, the trouble was not entirely at  an end for com- 
merce, which was still straightening out business entangle- 
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ments and  asking for credit and specie from the private 
banks. 
When the revolution of  1848 broke out, on February 24, 
these private bankers lost  their heads completely.  They 
wrote  to their correspondents  in the provinces that they 
were  obliged  to stop business  and  go  into  liquidation. 
This decision increased the panic in Paris, and caused  it 
to spread  to the departments, where commerce and the 
banks had  been disposed to stand up against the shock. 
The Paris merchants, seeing this defection, applied to 
the  new  government  for  aid.  The  latter  decreed  on 
March 7, I 848, the formation of  the discount bank (Comp- 
toir d'Escompte) which we shall study later. 
Meanwhile, the Bank of  France alone was left standing 
to bear  the brunt  of  the crisis.  It faced the situation 
with  courage and ability.  The Paris bankers, we  have 
said, were overcome by fear, and having already rashly 
engaged their resources, could not come to the aid of  com- 
merce.  The Bank, well  advised at this conjuncture, did 
not  restrict  discount  and did  not  increase the discount 
rate, which still remained at 4 per cent.  In sixteen week 
days, from February 26 to March 15, the Bank discounted 
bills  for  I ~o,ooo,ooo  francs.  The Treasury happened  to 
need  money and  withdrew the sum of  77,000,ooo francs 
from its current account, where it had a credit balance of 
I 25 ,ooo,ooo  francs.  The provincial branches followed the 
same course.  In the same space of  time they discounted 
commercial bills for 43,000,ooo francs, and in addition put 
I I ,ooo,ooo francs at the disposal of  the public services for 
the most urgent needs. National  Monetary  Commission 
Meanwhile,  the  Bank  of  France  found  itself  in  the 
presence  of  a  political  panic  which  no  argument  could 
calm.  It resisted the shock without flinching.  Between 
February  26  and  the  evening of  March  14 the ~netallic 
reserve fell from I 40,000,ooo francs to  70,000,ooo francs ;  on 
the evening of  the I 5th it had fallen to gg,ooo,ooo francs. 
Under these conditions the general council -of the Bank 
asked  the Government  (I)  that the bank  notes  should 
have forced currency (or  forced rating)-that  is to say, 
that  the  Bank  should  no  longer  be  obliged  to redeem 
them in specie; then, that they should be considered legal 
tender  throughout  the whole  country-in  other  words, 
that every creditor should be obliged to receive them in 
payment  of  a  debt, private  individuals  as  well  as  the 
financial agents of  the state; (2) that the Bank of  France 
be permitted to issue 100-franc notes (zoo-franc notes had 
already been  authorized, as we  have  seen, by the law of 
June 10, 1847).  In panic times when coin is either scarce 
or hoarded  the advantage of  small notes is considerable, 
since they make  it possible to settle small transactions. 
It was even  proposed to issue  bills of  still smaller de- 
nominations,  such  as  50  and  25-franc  notes.  But  the 
general council of  the Bank objected, saying that the issue 
of  bills  for  50  and  25  francs  would  send  the  metallic 
money  out  of  the country, causing it to be  exported. 
This problem can not be solved a priori.  It is important 
to know in time of  crisis whether the scarcity of  coin  is 
caused by a  serious  lessening  of  the  national  metallic 
supply, brought  about, for  example, by  unfavorable  ex- 
changes over a considerable space of  time, or by an excess 
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of  speculation.  In the latter case the supply of  metallic 
money may not have diminished, but as transactions can 
no  longer be  settled  except  in  coin in a large measure, 
coin  is  more  in  demand  and  becomes  scarce.  Rut 
if  the scarcity of  coin  is due to a political panic, as in 
1848, when everyone was  afraid  of  being  dispossessed of 
his property, then it is a question of  hoarding.  The hold- 
ers of  coin hide as much precious metal as they can, judg- 
ing that this is wealth  par excellence, the wealth that can 
be taken along in case of flight to a foreign country. 
In 1848, the crisis was political rather than commercial. 
It had not the same causes as the one of  1846 and 1847, 
which was produced by  the flow oi coin  abroad to pay 
for wheat  bought in Russia and elsewhere as a result of 
the grain  famine  in  France.  The famine  extended  to 
England, so that both the Paris and London markets were 
deprived  at the same  time  of  their  supply  of  metallic 
money  for their foreign payments.  In 1848 it was the 
political  panic  that made  people hide  crowns  and gold 
pieces. 
But in a land where the memory of  assignats was barely 
50 years old, people were terrified, and it would have been 
useless to issue 50  and 25-franc notes;  in any case, can we 
reproach the Bank for not consenting to the issue of  small 
notes?  We do not thinkso.  At this time the Bank had not 
yet the privilege of issue for the whole of  France ; it was face 
to face with a provisional government; the existing means 
of  information and communication did not make it possi- 
ble to keep precise track of  affairs in provincial France and 
in foreign countries.  The members of  the general council 
thought  that the  100-franc notes  were  probably  small 
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enough, for the reason that they viewed bank notes pri- 
marily as paper money for the use of  bankers or merchants, 
while bills of  the denominations of  50  and 25 francs were 
intended for private individuals-for  the small trade which 
was not friendly to credit paper  and was more easily agi- 
tated and thrown into a panic.  However, it should be 
pointed  out that in  1848 it was the biggest bankers  in 
Paris who took fright and suspended payments. 
Questions of  credit, both in normal and abnormal times, 
involve  psychological  elements peculiar  to each  nation, 
and  these  must  be  carefully  taken  into  account.  The 
compass of  credit which normally points due north runs 
wild and is no longer a guide in panic times. 
However, it is worthy of  note that the representatives 
of  the Government in the provinces, having been invested 
in  some  sort  with  dictatorial  powers,  gave  the depart- 
mental banks permission to issue notes for 50  francs, and 
even  for  25.  These  bills  were  circulated,  especially at 
Marseilles,  not  only in banking  and commercial  circles, 
but  also  among  the public.  But  if  the Bank  did  not 
consent to issue small bills, it had nevertheless the good 
sense to give specie for the payment of  workingmen and 
employees, as well  as for the purchase of  provisions.  It 
made use of  its notes for  current  commercial needs, for 
settling accounts, for credit transactions. 
The  general  council  of  the  Bank  asked  permission, 
besides,  to  increase  the  issues  to  a  maximum  of 
350,000,ooo francs.  This was the necessary complement 
of  the first two measures.  Moreover, it is not in panic 
times that the total of  the issues of  a bank of  circulation 
Evolution  Credit  and  Banks 
should be  reduced or rendered  stationary.  Its function 
is  more  useful  at this  moment  than  at any other; the 
bank should create credit with its notes, being careful to 
discount  nothing  but substantial commercial paper.  In 
this way  commercial houses which  are worthy of  credit 
are saved from sudden liquidation. 
The  Bank  realized  the  necessity  of  not  cutting  off 
supplies  from  commerce  and  industry at  the  critical 
moment.  It  came to the rescue intelligently, and had no 
occasion to regret it.  In this time of  general confusion 
the Bank was ably directed. 
Nothing is more calculated  to inspire  confidence in  a 
credit establishment than the frequent publication of  its 
true situation.  This is its bill  of  health, and it ought 
to state its condition with  great  accuracy.  For if  the 
balance sheet indicates a falling off  in one general direc- 
tion, or an unusual increase in another, the public is fore- 
warned, and this establishment may be justified  by these 
facts in adopting measures which the public  would  not 
otherwise understand. 
There  was  no  clearing  house  in  Paris  at that time. 
The one which exists to-day was not founded until 1872. 
Checks were used little or not at all; their clearly defined 
legal  existence hardly  antedates the law  of  August  14, 
1865.  The departmental banks,  being  also  affected by 
the panic of  1848, asked for a forced currency for their 
notes and an increase in the total of  their issues, which 
had been fixed by law without regard to their capital. 
These measures were  a mistake,  because these depart- 
mental banks could not circulate their notes except in the National  Monetary  Commission 
towns  where they  were  severally  located.  These  notes 
were nothing but local currency :  forced currency, there- 
fore, of no use in bringing about a transfer of  specie from 
one town to another.  The financial agents of  the State 
could not take these notes, since they were not current in 
Paris; they could not send them to the Minister of  Finance. 
The Bank of  France, on the other hand, through its branch 
offices,  which  used  its notes,  could  make  these  moves. 
For the departmental banks they were  disastrous; they 
created difficulties which brought  about their disappear- 
ance and their merging with the Bank of  France.  The 
mistake of  the departmental banks in asking for a forced 
currency  was  in  not  asking  at the  same  time  for  the 
unification  or  uniformity  of  their  notes.  Inasmuch  as 
their  currency became forced and their maximum issue 
was fixed by the State, and inasmuch as bills were noth- 
ing but paper  money, it would  have been  necessary to 
make  them  identical  for  all  the banks.  But  the best 
operation of  all would  have been to have their comrner- 
cial paper rediscounted by the Bank of  France in return 
for its bills.  Then, when depositors came to these estab- 
lishments to ask back their funds, they could have been 
reimbursed in money which was legal tender everywhere. 
There was  an undoubted  error and lack of  foresight on 
the part of  the departmental banks.  They had failed to 
use  the  most  elementary  prudence  in  not  arranging 
among themselves for the exchange on demand of  their 
notes. 
This fusion was accomplished by two decrees.  The first 
authorized the merging with the Bank of  France of  the 
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banks of  Rouen, Lyons, Havre, Lille, Orleans, Toulouse, 
and Marseilles, and the decree of  May  2 merged the banks 
of  Nantes and  Bordeaux. 
Here are a few figures relating to these nine banks to 
show their importance  as a  whole.  Their total capital 
amounted  to 23,350,000 francs. 
[Million francs.] 
l  l 
Year. 
Average 
They had all made profits for shareholders.  The bank 
of  Lyons yielded a dividend of  nearly 29 per cent in 1847. 
The crisis led  to their disappearance, and established, 
in fact, the monopoly  of  the Bank of  France as a bank 
of  issue.  The latter owed  this advantage to the ability 
of  its administrators,  to the lack  of  cooperation among 
the departmental banks, and, finally, to the tendency of 
the French  to centralize everything. Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
CHAPTER  VI1.-A  brief  survey of  the general  course of  busi- 
ness during the first  half  of  the nineteenth century-Credit 
and  industrial beginnings. 
Influence of  individual directors in the administration of  a bank.-The  influence of 
M. J. E. Gautier, deputy-governor of  the Bank, on the preceding events.-A  glance 
backward.-Comparison  of  French foreign  commerce before the Revolution and 
during the first thirty years of the nineteenth century.-Railroad  beginnings.-Eco- 
nomic movement created  by  railroads.-Forelgn  trade develops.-It  doubles in 
seventeen years.-Progressive  increase of the operations of the Bank of  France.- 
Kind of  credit to be given by a bank of  issue.  Commercial credit.-Loans  on secu- 
rities.-The  kind of  credit a bank of  issue should not give.  Industrial loans.-Dan- 
gers of  certain  inconvertible funds for banks of issue.-Foundation  of  industrial 
loan banks (commasdzte).-The  Caisse Ghnhrale du Commerce et de lVIndustrie, 
founded by La5tte.-Issue  of  sight bills to bearer and to order by J. Laffitte.-Inevi- 
table disappearance of this concern in the panic of  1847.-Services  rendered by 
La5tte's bank.-Other  establishments, modeled after the Caisse La5tte.-These 
establishments disappear.-Causes  of their failure.-Panic  of  1848.  Founding of 
Comptoirs  d'Escompte  by  the  provisional government of  1848.-The  Comptoir 
d9Escompte of  Paris  and  the  provincial  Comptoirs.  Their  basis.-Loans  on 
collateral.  Creation  of  surety  companies.  (Sozcs-comgtozrs  de  0arantze)- 
Beginnings  of  the  Comptoir  d'Escompte  from  March 4 to  August 31,  1848.- 
Provincial Comptoirs.-Important  fact.  The general warehouses. 
The  Bank  of  France  became  a  sole  bank  of  issue, 
much more as a result of  unforeseen circumstances than by 
reason of  any consistent plan or fixed policy.  Singularly 
enough, it  was a revolutionacy government which in actual 
fact was largely responsible for handing over to  the Bank of 
France its complete monopoly.  It was during a political 
crisis when the theories most subversive to capital were 
put forward that the directors  of  the Bank showed  the 
most decision and daring.  To be sure, the directors had 
before them the example of  past panics.  However, it is 
important, too, to take into account the moral and tech- 
nical worth of  the men who direct an establishment.  At 
the time of  the panics of  r 846, 1847, and 1848 the gov- 
ernor  of  the Bank  was  Count  d'Argout,  who  had  been 
nominated  September  5,  1836, and  remained  in  office 
until June  10, 1857.  It would  seem that this personage 
was not remarkable, at least in a business way.  But he 
had  with  him  a deputy  governor named  J. E. Gautier, 
who had  formerly been a deputy from la Gironde  and a 
peer  of  France.  Gautier was very  well  up in affairs of 
credit.  He had been nominated first deputy governor in 
1833, and held the post until August, 1857.  He published 
astudy  of  the first order entitled : "Banks and Credit Insti- 
tutions in America and Europe,"" in which are found the 
true qualities of  a banker who is thoroughly well informed 
in the proper  duties of  a  bank  of  issue.  J. E. Gautier 
published this study in  1839, six years after entering the 
Bank; without any doubt he had a  predominating influ- 
ence on the conduct of  affairs at difficult moments. 
The French Revolution was the bankruptcy of  royalty 
much  more than the bankruptcy  of  France  itself.  The 
state finances were in a disastrous situation, but French 
society, considered in its economic elements, was flourish- 
ing, although hampered by  narrow and antiquated  legis- 
lation.  These obstacles, -imposed by  the ancient  mould 
of  a decrepit organization, were all the more felt because 
France experienced the same need of  expansion that was 
beginning to torment the other great civilized nations of 
the world at that time. 
As for foreign commerce, according to trustworthy esti- 
mates, it might be fixed at the end of  the reign of  Louis 
XVI at about ~,ooo,ooo,ooo  francs, probably even a little 
more.  Under  the First Empire,  with boundaries  much 
--  - - p- 
a Des Banques et des znstztutions de crkdzt en Am&rique et  en Europe, pub- 
lished in the Encyclop6die du  Droit.  Vol. 11. National  Monetary  Commission 
wider, it amounted to only  g33,ooo,ooo francs.  Under 
the  Restoration, if  general commerce  is  considered, it 
reached that figure only in 1825.~  At any rate during the 
whole Restoration period special commerce did not reach 
a  billion.  Its highest  figure  was  987,ooo,ooo francs  in 
1829. 
Let  us  note  that  the  imports  which  furnished  the 
country  raw  materials  for  manufactures  did  not  equal 
until 1830 the total of  imports of  1788 ; that is, 573,ooo,ooo 
francs. 
So  it took  Prance  forty  years  to regain  the ground 
that it had lost in the world's  market.  It is enough to 
tell briefly  why  this recovery  was  so  slow  and  tedious 
after the terrible years  of  the Revolution.  The reasons 
are : 
The wars of  the Consulate and the Empire, which ga-~e 
little  opportunity  for  establishing  lasting  international 
relations. 
The restrictive measures adopted by Napoleon against 
foreign commerce (continental blockade, etc.). 
The changes of  government and the two invasions of 
1814 and  1815. 
The  payment  of  indemnities  to  the  allies,  and  the 
process of  recovery of  the country after the defeat  and 
the struggles of  the various political parties. 
The  ultra-protectionist  measures  adopted  by  the 
Restoration. 
-- 
a General  commerce  (commerce  gknkral)  includes:  (I) Special  com- 
merce; (2) transitory  commercethat  is,  merchandise  which  merely 
passes  through  the  country.  The  precious  metals  are  not  included  in 
these figures. 
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In  1830 the  usefulness of  railroads  begins  to  dawn 
and, the possibilities of  the steam engine.  In France the 
new  method  of  transportation  found  many  opponents. 
It was  not  until  1841 that  the  railroads  began  to 
have  an  economic  effect  on  transportation  and  trade. 
Here  is  a  table  which  shows  their  slow  advance until 
I 847 : 
Year  l Number of l  Gross re- 
kilometers  ceipts. in 
in opera-  million  1  tion.  francs. 
It  is plain that the influence of  the new transportation 
upon the movement of  merchandise was very slight, since 
in  1847 these  railwavs  had  transported  only  3,500,000 
tons.0 
But the construction of these lines had brought  about 
great business activity in the matter of  borrowing capital 
and  purchasing  the  raw  materials  necessary  for  the 
building as  well  as for  the purchase  or  construction  of 
equipment.  The  railroad  was  not only a  stimulus  for 
commerce and industry, but it was itself an industry, and 
one  of  the largest,  even,  in  each  country  by  virtue  of  -- 
the  capital  engaged  and the horsepower  of  its locomo- 
tives.  In  other  directions,  through  new  inventions, 






Number of  1 
passengers /  merCh? 
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through  the increase of  comfort  under  the Government 
of  July  (I  830-1 848), domestic  trade  was  developed  at 
the same time as foreign trade.  Industry was influenced 
by  this  fact ; it became  concentrated ; large  enterprises 
were  founded; moderate-sized  enterprises  consolidated 
in response to the new  conditions of  the manufacturing 
industry  in which steam engines and power  looms  were 
henceforth the chief  factors. 
Here are figures giving the increase of  our foreign com- 




Year  /  Spec~al  commerce. 
General 
commerce.  I ,  Exports  /  Imports. 
Total 
Commerce, then, doubled in  seventeen years-general 
commerce as well as special commerce ; there was a falling 
off  in 1847 only because of  the crisis.  However, the im- 
portations in 1847 and in  1846 increased because of  the 
purchase of  foreign grains during the famine.  What were 
the principal transactions of  the Bank of  France during 
these seventeen years?  The interesting point is to see the 
total of  its yearly discounts and the discount rate.  We 
will give merely the figures for each five years, except for 
the last two years, 1846 and 1847-at  the panic time. 
Discount of  comntercial  paper 
[M~lhon  francs.] 








The total of  discounts in 1848 Was,  however, less than 
that of  1847, and amounted to only 1,544,000,ooo  francs. 
The  average  reserve,  which  was  145,000,ooo francs  in 
1830, was  in  1840 nearly  247,000,000 francs;  in  1846, 
2 ~o,ooo,om  francs, and fell in I 847 to I 22,000,000 francs, 
then went up in 1848 to an average of  I 76,000,000 francs. 
As for notes in circulation, their averages were:  In 1830, 
223,500,000 francs ; in I 840, 2 23,500,000 francs (the same 
figure) ; in  1846, 271 ,ooo,ooo francs; in 1847, 251 ,000,000 
francs; in I 848, 342,000,000 francs. 
The signs of  an increasing economic movement were not 
lacking.  However, the Bank of  France, a bank of  issue, 
ggve-and could give in that period of  industrial and com- 
mercial growth  nothing  but so-called commercial credit, 
discounting con~mercial  paper having a maximum matu- 
rity of  three months.  A bank of  issue, which must always 
redeem its notes on demand, would be taking risks if  it 
immobilized or rendered inconvertible its capital in other 
uncertain operatians,  There is, indeed, one other opera- 
tion, that of  loans on securities, but here everything de- 
pends on the nature of  the securities and the sum loaned National  Monetary  Commissiora  Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
in  relation  to the quoted  value  of  the security  on  the 
Bourse.  This operation may be a  good  one, or  it may 
serve as a pretext for very risky transactions, for there is 
a tendency here to tie up capital if  the security deposited 
as collateral has not a current value on the stock market 
and can not be easily sold or realized on if  need be. 
Therefore, a bank of  issue can only make advances on 
securities  of  recognized  value,  which  are not  likely  to 
depreciate easily.  In reality, a bank  of  issue must not 
and can not  finance  (commandite) industrial enterprises; 
that is to say, lend capital, in any form whatsoever, to 
create or transform an industry.  This kind of  operation 
demands many months  and even years, usually, to give 
results.  Meanwhile, the capital is tied up, and can not 
be used in case of  need  to redeem the bank notes, which 
should above all represent  (I) either specie in the vaults, 
(2)  or  commercial discounts which  can be speedily con- 
verted into money, or, finally, (3)  negotiable securities, but 
for small sums only. 
Also, when banks  of  issue hold  government  securities 
to represent their notes, they have in reality nothing but 
inconvertible funds.  For, in case of  a panic, they would 
hesitate  to flood  the  market with  a  quantity of  these 
securities all at one time; securities or government stock 
would  depreciate  as a  result  of  being  offered  suddenly, 
thus diminishing the credit of  this particular Government, 
most probably, too, at a moment of  political crisis or war, 
exactly when the State needed all its credit. 
The Bank of  France did not depart from this  line of 
conduct.  If in  1848 it helped industry to some extent 
during the panic, it was with prudence. 
There was a lack, therefore, of credit concerns in France 
to aid the progress of industry in general, and the railroad 
industry in particular. 
Several of these concerns were founded under the pres- 
sure  of  surrounding  circumstances.  People  began  to 
realize vaguely  that new  economic  conditions  were  de- 
manding  new forms of  credit.  But it will  be seen that 
these establishments, although they were useful, were not 
fitted for the part they were supposed to play. 
One of  the most important of  them was the one called 
the Caisse GPnPrale du Commezce et de l'lndustrie, founded 
by Jacques  Laffitte, who for a  long time had had a com- 
mercial bank, and then had  been ruined by engaging in 
politics.  He  then gave up  public affairs and worked  to 
found a  bank  of  a  new kind, intended  to aid industrial 
development. 
Like all the concerns of  this kind  founded  then, it was 
chartered under the form of  a limited liability stock com- 
pany (socibt6 en  commandite par actions), since the Council 
of  State was unwilling  to charter banking concerns under 
the form of  joint-stock companies.  The Caisse GBnkraZe 
du  Commerce  et  de  l'lndustrie opened  its offices October 
7, 1837.  Its nominal capital was 55,000,ooo francs; the 
capital paid  in was  only 15,000,ooo francs, itself  a very 
large sum for that time.  The foundations of  this credit 
concern  were  very  broad, too  broad  even,  for  it was 
to engage  in  all  kinds  of  financial  operations, take all 
kinds of  risks.  This was  a  new idea,  and  demanded  a 
well-defined  and rigorous method  of  procedure-the  use 
of its own capital to the exclusion of  deposits in running National  Monetary  Commission 
accounts, which are too  mobile to be used  for backing 
up and financing industries.  This house made discounts 
and  collections,  received  running  accounts,  made  loans 
on  securities,  and  advanced  funds  for  silent  partner- 
ships  in  industrial  enterprises,  handled  state loans, etc. 
In spite of  the monopoly of  the Bank of  France, Laffitte 
also wanted to issue a  sort of  credit paper  of  his own, 
with a view to aiding the operations of  his house.  To get 
around  the difficulty, he  decided to issue  sight bills  to 
bearer and to order.  As for time of  maturity, there were 
several kinds, such  as five, fifteen, and thirty-day notes. 
These bills bore  an increasing interest, according to the 
length of  time  of  maturity.  They could not circulate ex- 
cept with an indorsement in blank.  For interest-bearing 
notes, the interest to date was added at each transfer. 
This circulation was neither as simple nor as quick as 
that of  the bank note proper, but because the notes were 
interest-bearing  they were readily accepted.  In 1837-38 
the  total issue of  this paper went beyond 6o,ooo,ooo  francs a 
It fluctuated  afterwards, until  1843, between ~~,ooo,ooo 
and  58,000,ooo  francs.  Laffitte  died  in  1844  and  was 
replaced  by  three managers.  From  this time the issue 
rose to 8o,o00,000 francs.  In 1847 the Caisse Generale 
du Commerce  et de  1'Industrie ceased  operations, being 
ruined  by  the panic.  This  was  a  natural result,  given 
the method pursued and the multiplicity of  risks incurred 
by the bank. 
Nevertheless, it had been useful.  In 1837-38 the number 
of  bills  discounted  was  220,000, representing  a  sum  of 
more than 2~6,ooo,ooo  francs.  These figures grew larger 
a The average circulation was about xg,ooo,ooo francs. 
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and in  1844, the year when Laffitte died, the number  of 
bills discounted was 476,000, making a total of  358,000,ooo 
francs. 
'I'he  Comptoir GSnkal  du Commerce, called the Caisse 
Ganneron, was  founded April  17, 1843  ; then the Caisse 
Centrale du  Commerce et des Chemins de fer was organized 
with a capital of  7,500,ooo francs, under the management 
of  M. Baudon.  Still others, the houses of  Bechet, Dethomas 
&  Co.,  with  a  capital of  ~~,ooo,ooo  francs,  and Cusin, 
Legendre & Co., with 2,000,000 francs capital, followed this 
movement, etc.  All these banks suspended payments in 
the crisis of  1847.  We have told what a panic burst out 
in  Paris and  the provinces as a result  of  their  sudden 
decision to close their doors. 
In  reality  these  banks,  some  of  which  negotiated 
railroad  securities,  should  not  have  made  discounts, 
received  deposits from merchants, or consented to open 
running  accounts; they  had  another  mission  to  fulfil 
with  the  capital  belonging  to  them.  The  crisis  would 
scarcely have affected them at all if  they had kept within 
the limits of  the functions for which they were intended, 
and which were to be especially assigned to them later. 
We  have  said  above  that the greater  number  of  the 
Paris bankers had suspended payments during the panic 
of  1848, so that there was  no  longer  any  intermediary 
between the Bank of  France, which accepted only securi- 
ties with three names, and the commercial public.  Now, 
the third name had been added by the intermediary banks. 
The provisional government, ten  days after the revolu- 
tion of  February 24  had  put  it in  power, hit upon  the 
idea of  founding a Comptoir d'Escompte in Paris.  The 
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decree establishing the Comptoir is dated March 4.  This 
concern was  to be  called the Dotation du Petit Commerce. 
On March 7 a decreee was passed creating discount banks 
(comptoirs  d'escompte)  in all the industrial towns of  France. 
The basis of  all  the comptoirs  d'escompte  established 
in France in  1848-49  is  the same.  Their capital was to 
be formed by the cooperation  (I) of  private individuals, 
(2) of  the State, (3) of  the municipalities;  each to furnish 
a third  of  the required  capital.  The first  third  was  to 
be entirely paid by private individuals (shareholders) ;  the 
second third, furnished by the State, was represented by 
Treasury notes ; the completing third by municipal obliga- 
tions.  In addition the State  gave the greater part of  these 
comptoirs a loan of  specie, which was to bear interest at 
4 per cent.  As a matter of  fact, these loans were mostly 
paid  back by the end of  three years.  The comptoirs ac- 
cepted bills on longer time than the Bank of  France; they 
had a maximum maturity of  one hundred and five days ;  a 
the comptoir at Lyons allowed only forty-five days. 
As may be seen, the State and the municipalities  fur- 
nished guaranties by their securities: Treasury notes and 
town obligations; the State even  loaned funds; and  yet 
the State stipulated no  profits either for itself  or for the 
towns.  The profits were to accrue implicitly and entirely 
to the shareholders-a  singular  proceeding, truly, for  a 
popular Government which had come into power for the 
express purpose  of  combating  the financial oligarchy of 
the Government of  July.  This may well seem a paradox. 
a  This extreme limlt, fixed by the decree of  March 7, was disregarded by 
certain comptoirs, the one at Metz went so far as to accept 150-day paper, 
and the one at Nancy 180-day paper. 
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The duration of  the Paris Comptoir was  limited,  it is 
true, to three years.  It was,  according to the intention 
of  the Government, a transition measure. 
The capital of  the Comptoir de Paris-capital  paid  in 
by  shareholders-was  got together with difficulty in the 
midst  of  the panic.  People bought  the shares as they 
would  lottery  tickets,  and  the  first  shareholders  were 
insurance companies, the association of  notaries and attor- 
neys,  and charity organizations.  Only  about  1,587,000 
francs could be collected, and the State gave a subsidy 
of  I ,000,000 in addition to its third, making a little more 
than 2,500,000. 
But it soon became necessary to extend the operations 
of  the Comptoir which, according to its principle, was to 
make discounts and collections only.  The crisis was acute 
and there was a demand for loans on collateral also. 
By the decree of  March 24 this sort of  loan was intelli- 
gently organized.  Sous-comptoirs de  garantie  were insti- 
tuted.  These sous-comptoirs loaned on pledges of  mer- 
chandise, on storehouse warrants, and finally  on certifi- 
cates and securities.  Their capital was furnished entirely 
by  private industry.  There were  seven  of  these  sous- 
comptoirs in  Paris, as follows:  (I) The Comptoir of  the 
Book Trade;  (2) the Comptoir of  Metals;  (3) the Comp- 
toir of  Builders and Contractors;  (4) Comptoir of  Colonial 
Commodities; (5) Comptoir of  Dry Goods;  (6) Comptoir 
of Textiles;  (7) Comptoir of  Railroads (founded 1850). 
Until August 31, 1848, these  sous-comptoirs had pre- 
sented  to the Comptoir  d'Escompte bills valued at only 
a little more than 58,000,000 francs. National  Monetary  Commission  Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
As  for  the Comptoir itself, it had made the following 
transactions up to August 3 I : 
Francs. 
Discounts on bills  --.____---..---------------------  80,378,326 
Discounts on warrants for merchandise -----------..-.------  6,924,  166 
Collections-  _ _-  _-  _  _ --  -  - - - --  - - --  --  - --  --  --  - - - --  --  15,904,956 
Rediscount of  commercial paper at the Bank of  France- --  -- 5g,389,2  15 
In the provices the number of  comptoirs was 67 in the 
beginning,  with  a  total nominal  capital  of  130,500,000 
francs.  In reality, the capital subscribed and paid  was 
somewhat more than z5,ooo,ooo francs.  The State sub- 
sidies amounted to a little over ~o,ooo,ooo  francs, giving 
an actual working capital of  35,000,ooo francs. 
These comptoirs, with this limited capital, did in three 
years the following business : 
fact,  through  the  development  and  various  phases  of 
this institution that we shall follow the evolution of  credit 
in France. 
It  was to the provisional government of  1848 that was 
due the establishing of  general warehouses in Paris and the 
principal cities of  France.  (Resolution of  March 26, 1848, 
confirmed by the decree of  August  23, following.)  For 
the  first  time  the  French  Government  took  measures 
relating  to those institutions which were  to make easier 
in the future collateral  loans, by  means of  warrants or 
receipts of  goods in storage.  This was a measure fertile 
in advantages for the commercial credit of  France. 
-- 
Year. 
These  comptoirs  came  into  existence  through  special 
circumstances.  They had been  established in an abnor- 
mal way, with particular advantages.  These advantages 
were destined to disappear together with the needs which 
had caused them to be granted.  In June, 1853, a decree 
brought  the comptoirs under  the common law.  Twelve 
of  them in the provinces were reorganized either as joint- 
stock  or  as  limited  liability  companies  (sous  forme  de 
commandite)  .  The Comptoir  d'Escompte  of  Paris  was 
reorganized in 1854.  We shall study it later.  It is, in 
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INTRODUCTORY. 
We now enter upon  a  new phase of  credit in France. 
Industrial progress, especially  that in  railroad  construc- 
tion; the  extension  of  commerce, in  spite  of  political 
events; the future so full  of  promise from the economic 
point of  view, thanks to new  discoveries; the ease with 
which capital has  already been collected for railroad con- 
struction; the fact of  the existence  of  a single bank  of 
issue which recommends itself to the majority of  people of 
the period ; the trend of  public opinion toward industrial 
and commercial enterprises under the impulse of  certain 
new  theories,  especially the  doctrines  derived  from  St. 
Simon; the attainment  of  universal  suffrage, which,  it 
was believed, would  be  the end  of  all revolutions;  this 
sum of  financial, economic, and  political  events created 
a new atmosphere, a new environment. 
The Bank of  France  continued  its  r81e  as a  bank  of 
issue in  a  prudent  enough  manner;  it fortunately con- 
tinued  to  be  much  more a bankers' bank  than a state 
bank, although it had  frequent  relations with  the State 
and rendered it real services.  In spite of  its being on a 
smaller scale and  having  much  less  importance than it 
was to have later (i. e., a few years after 1870,  when credit 
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societies  are  widening  their  scope), it was  already the 
center of  relief in case of panic, and the support on which 
rested the whole system of  French credit.  Circumstances 
made it thus, without  any preconceived  theory; and it 
turned out to be the point of  departure for the present 
organization of  credit in France.  You might conceive of 
another organization perhaps better; this one is the result 
of  the historical evolution which we are trying to set forth. 
Furthermore, during this period, between I 848 and I 870, 
the Bank of  France did not deviate too far from its fun- 
damental attributes as a bank of  discount.  Although it 
allows collateral loans, which began to increase very per- 
ceptibly from  1852 on, it did  not enter into the danger- 
ous path  of  either the direct or indirect  commandite of 
industries.  Hence  came  as its reward  in  1867 the re- 
newal of  its privilege almost up to the end of  the century 
(end of  December, 1897). 
But in this function which it ought not  to fulfil, which 
it does  not  fulfil,  of  entering  as  a  silent  partner  into 
industries or of  favoring their creation, other institutions 
are going to take its place.  These will not undertake, as 
did Laffitte or Ganneron or certain others (whose attempts 
and relative  success we  have already  seen), to practice 
all kinds  of  banking  operations together-discount,  col- 
lections,  silent  partnerships,  etc.;  but they will  involve 
themselves  in  speculation  without  preliminary  study, 
without  taking  into  account  the true  vital  conditions, 
which banks  of  this kind  should conform to in order to 
live.  So we  are going to witness the collapse of  the bank 
which  sums  up  their  aspirations  and  faults: the Crddit 
Mobilier. 
CHAPTER  I.-The  Bank of  France the sole bank of  issue-Its 
operations  with the State-The  founding  of  institutions 
called  "  Haute  BanqueM-Industrial  loans  and  specula- 
tion-The  Cridit Mobilier  and  the Pereires. 
Liquidation of  the panic of  1848.-The  credit of the Bank's notes.-Renewal  of  the 
privilege of  the Bank up to 1867.-Wldening  out of  the list of  securities admissible 
as co1lateraI on loans.-The  Bank widens the scope of  its operations.-Changes  in 
the rate of  discount.-Revival  of buslness under the influence of  four reasons.- 
The Crimean war interrupts  this boom,  1855.  Rise in the discount rate.-The 
right remedy.-A  wise measure.-Buying  of  specie by  the Bank, 1855-1856.-Re- 
newal of the charter of the Bank of  France (law of June 9,1857).  New conditions.- 
Increase of capital.-Loan  to  the State.-Fifty-franc  notes.-The  result of  small 
bank notes.-The  Bank's  freedom in regard to  discount rate.-Establishment  of 
brench  banks.-The  great panic of  1857.-Measures  taken by  the Bank.-Dis- 
count  rate  proportioned to  the length  of  terms of  payment.-Reaction  after the 
panic.-Operation  called "high finance."-Loans  on securities previous to sale.- 
Ample credit of France at this time.-The  creation of  capital by saving.-Character- 
istic facts regarding the elements of French finance.-Number  of  issues of  rail- 
road bonds sold by the Bank.-Dangers  of  such precedents. 
After  the great  crisis  of  1848, which  was  above  all, 
a  political  crisis-although  the  political  situation  still 
gave some cause for alarm-public  opinion, on top of  this 
rough shaking up, as often happens under similar condi- 
tions,  looked  on  the  future  with  greater  confidence. 
When order was  reestablished  after the days of  June, a 
reaction set in.  There was indeed a  panic in 1851 at the 
time of  the coup d'dtat, but it was not, as in 1848, a sud- 
den  and  unexpected  change.  The  event, besides,  had 
been discounted by the business world. 
Meanwhile, business was  slack  in  consequence of  the 
panic  which  had  followed  the  economic  crisis  of  1847. 
The Bank was anxious to carry on business, and all the 
more because its capital, on account of  its absorption of National  Monetary  Commission 
the departmental banks, had  increased  from  67,goo,ooo 
francs to 93,250,000 francs.  Because of  this, too, its max- 
imum limit of  circulation, which was 350,000,000 francs, 
was raised  to 452,000,000 francs.  It liquidated  its dis- 
honored bills rather  successfully. 
During the year  1848 it lent rather large sums to the 
State, directly by opening subscriptions for the loan, like- 
wise to the cities of  Paris and Marseilles, to the Department 
of  the Seine, to the hospitals and asylums of  Paris and of 
Lyons.  Here are the figures: 
Mar. 31 : Lent to the State without interest on  treasury cer-  kancs. 
tificates-- -----  ----.  ----------------- 50, WO,  000 
May  5: Lent to the Bank of  Deposits and Consignments  on 
transfer of  government securities  -------------- 30, m,  ooo 
June  3:  Opening to the State of  a credit of  15o,ooo,o~  of 
which the State took- ---  --- 50,000,000 
July  24:  Subscription to the state loan  22, OW,  ow 
Lent  to the city of  Paris, to Lyons, to the Depart- 
ment of  the Seine, etc  ---- ----------------.----  20, WO,  000 
Finally,  the Bank  going  beyond  its  usual  functions, 
had lent to different metal works about 3q,ooo,ooo francs 
on mortgages in order to enable them to execute the orders 
given  them by  the  railroad  companies.  For  all these 
operations, the  Bank  issued  a  much  larger number  of 
notes,  especially  in  zoo  and  roo  franc  denominations. 
Soon commercial discounts worked easier in private banks, 
and calm succeeded this storm in  which  panic-an  evil 
counselor in this special case--had  been the chief cause of 
the trouble. 
To sum up, the Bank of  France managed very skilfully 
in this difficult time, and was able to clear up this situa- 
tion  most  honorably.  Its notes  suffered no  deprecia- 
tion during these disastrous months. 
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It may be said that on this occasion the notes of  the 
Bank  went  through  the test  of  fire, and  so from  that 
moment  forth they enjoyed unquestioned  credit; and to 
such  a  degree that when  quiet was  restored, and when 
coin minted in large quantity that year was very plentiful 
and the Bank's reserve was very high, the public preferred 
the notes-although  they had forced currency-to  specie, 
and that toward  the end of  1848.  This explains why a 
law authorized an increase in the amount of  issue from 
452,000,ooo  to 525,000,ooo francs.  The  Bank,  besides, 
had very  skilfully resumed specie payment as soon as it 
could  at the end  of  1848.  Forced  currency  was  sup- 
pressed by law on August 6, 1850. 
The following years can scarcely be  said to have any 
history. 
Here are the average figures relating to reserves, issues, 
and the figures relating to the total discounts during the 
years from 1849 to 1853: 
[Million francs.] 
I  I 
Year.  /  (Notes in  /  htal 
average),  circulation  discounts 
average).  (average). 
The average reserve, therefore, increased from 1849 to 
1852,  then it decreased, and we have to wait until  1859 for 
it to reach ~7o,ooo,ooo  francs.  As  to issue, it had a general 
tendency  to  increase without  much  fluctuation.  The 
average of  notes issued in 1851 was less than the reserve. 
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At  one  time  in  that  year,  October  2,  the  reserve 
reached 626,000,ooo francs, and for a few days it exceeded 
the circulation by I ~o,ooo,ooo  francs. 
On March 3, I 852, a decree renewed the charter of  the 
Bank up to 1867, and this same decree authorized  it to 
make loans on the shares and bonds of  French railroads. 
A few days after, the decree of  March 22 gave it the same 
authorization for the bonds of  the city of  Paris. 
That was necessary, for the Bank needed to extend its 
operations in order to utilize its power of  issue.  Besides, 
it had a large reserve;  indeed, the average reached in 1852 
nearly 585,000,ooo francs.  Furthermore, railroad securi- 
ties had become widely  distributed  in the hands of  the 
public. 
The Bank, or  at least  its  directors, understood  that 
new times require new  methods.  They changed the rate 
of  discount, which  had  remained fixed  for thirty years, 
except in 1848, when it was raised to 5 per cent.  They 
lowered it for a certain time in 1852 and in 1853 to 3 per 
cent.  They made it vary oftener, according to the needs 
of  the money market, and they showed themselves alive 
to the real  spirit  of  banking.  But they  became really 
free in their movements in  this matter only when,  as a 
result of the law of  June  g, 1857, there  disappeared, as 
far as the Bank was concerned, the absurd limitations on 
the rate of  interest fixed by the laws against usury. 
Business picked up at this time for several reasons:  (I) 
Because, the form of  government  in  France being  defi- 
nitely  settled  since  I 852, public  opinion was  reassured ; 
(2)  because the Bank of  France had made the conduct of 
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its affairs more flexible;  (3) because at that time two in- 
stitutions were  founded  destined  to give a  stimulus to 
business-the  Crddit Mobilier, which we  are going to take 
up, and the Crddzt  Foncier, the development of  which we 
shall examine in another section of  this work;  (4) finally, 
because  the  Comptoir d'Escompte  de  Paris, which  was 
destined to be merely provisional, because it was founded 
during the crisis of  1848 to take the place  of  the banks 
whose failures had  left such a great  void,  now gradually 
freed itself from state control, rendered real services to the 
middle-sized and small  trade, and became an important 
banking house, devoting itself  especially to so-called com- 
mercial operations.  It is important, furthermore, to keep 
in mind a cause that had been active for the past twelve 
years-the  extension of  railroads.  At that time, in 1853, 
more than 4,000 kilometers of railroads were in operation, 
supplied with more  than  I ,200 locomotives.  Now, these 
railroads were destined  to double in seven or eight years. 
It seemed as if  business  would go  on growing in this 
way, when the Crimean war broke out.  This war necessi- 
tated large loans, which rose to about I ,540,000,m francs. 
That diminished capital on which industry 2nd commerce 
were making urgent demands.  The Bank raised the dis- 
count rate to 5 per cent, then to 6 per cent.  Its reserve 
fell in November to 2 I I ,ooo,ooo francs, while its discounts 
were in October 48o,m,ooo francs-that  is to say, double 
what they had been at the same time in I 854.  The Bank 
then lowered to seventy-five days the limit for payment 
of  the bills it discounted.  In 1856 it extended the limit 
to ninety  days and lowered the discount  rate to 5 per National  Monetary  Commission 
cent; but these measures were not kept up in the face of 
the events that followed. 
Matters were hastening  to a climax.  Precious metals 
became more and more scarce.  In November, 1856, the 
reserve  fell to 164,000,000 francs, and discounts  rose to 
520,000,000  francs.  The cause was the war, which in pay 
and food for the army had absorbed specie estimated  at 
about 8oo,ooo,ooo  francs.  Adding to this other causes for 
the exodus of  capital, we find that at least  I ,ooo,ooo,ooo 
francs went out of  the country. 
Was  the  remedy  to raise  the  rate  of  discount  and 
shorten  the  time  of  maturity  on  bills?  To  a  certain 
extent,  yes.  But  as  in  this  case  a  sudden  export  of 
about a third of  our metallic stock had taken place, the 
Bank should have turned  its attention to  getting back this 
lost  stock.  And  it did.  It bought  254,500,000  francs 
in specie, which cost it, with the premium and transporta- 
tion, 1% per  cent.  This happened  in 1855.  In  1856 it 
imported  560,000,ooo  in  specie, which  cost  it  1%  per 
cent. 
It was  easy to foresee that the privilege  of  the Bank 
of  France whuld be renewed.  It was to expire in 1867, 
and  the  law  of  June  g, 1857, prolonged  this  privilege 
to  December  31,  1897.  This  law  doubled  the  Bank's 
capital  by  the  issue  of  91,250  new  shares,  which 
were  assigned  to the holders  of  the old  shares.  This 
doubling of  the capital, which had become too  small for 
the  Bank's  increasing  business, was  a  safeguard.  The 
capital then reached  182,500,000 francs. 
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But out of  the increased capital, ~oo,ooo,ooo  francs dur- 
ing the year 1857 had to  be turned into the public treasury, 
which  gave the Bank  in return government  3 per cents 
at the very  high price of  75  francs.  The State made a 
good thing by it.  In reality these roo,ooo,ooo  francs were 
used to diminish the debit balances  of  the Treasury  and 
helped reduce the figure (which was very high, as it hap- 
pened) of  the floating debt. 
The Bank was authorized to issue so-franc notes.  An 
excellent innovation in principle, but the Bank only used 
this privilege in  1864, seven years later.  Now, in times 
of  panic this kind of notes, like those of  IOO francs, econo- 
mizes  coin  in  current  transactions;  and  in  prosperous 
times, as they are easier to handle than specie, these small 
bills  tend  to  replace specie  in circulation  and  force it 
back into the coffers of  the bank of issue.  Scotch banks 
which  have  issued  and  are still  issuing  notes  for  one 
pound  sterling have seen  all the metallic  money  of  the' 
country flow into their coffers. 
This law of  June g, 1857, gave  the Bank  the right  of 
raising the interest  rate as much as it judged  necessary, 
whereas before it could not exceed  6  per  cent.  It took 
advantage of  this  liberty soon after.  But  the Bank  of 
France  alone had  this  advantage  by  law;  other banks 
were not authorized  to do likewise.  It is true they went 
beyond  their right without being disturbed. 
Finally, ten years after !he  law of  1857, the Bank could 
be  compelled  to establish  branches  in  the departments 
where they did not exist.  The Bank  was in no hurry to National  Monetary  Commission 
found these branches.  In 1867, although ten years after 
the law, 25 departments were still unprovided for. 
The panic  of  185 j  began  in  the  United  States.  We 
shall not enter into the details of  its origin and develop- 
ment, but content  ourselves with  merely indicating  two 
of  its causes-one  has to do with  our  subject, the other 
with  the  commercial  relations  of  North  America  and 
Europe in 1857. 
The first of  these causes is that many American bankers 
had advanced money, made loans to industries, especially 
to railroads, out  of  their deposits.  They had  thus tied 
up  capital,  and  when  the  panic  came  they  did  not 
have  the free funds that they  would  have had  if  they 
had  used  their  capital  in  short-term business,  such  as 
commercial  discount.  The  truth  is  there  was  over- 
speculation. 
The second of  these causes-for  panics, especially large 
ones, always  have several causes-was  that  Europe  in 
1857, thanks to an excellent harvest, did not  buy grain 
of  America.  So the United  States did not export any to 
the Old World.  Hence the rate of  exchange was unfavor- 
able  to America, and the United  States was  obliged to 
send  specie over to pay  for  its importations, from  Lon- 
don, Germany, etc. 
The panic was terrible in September.  Its reaction was 
felt most  of  all  in  England, then in  Germany, and  to 
some  small  extent  in  France.  In this  latter country 
especially  people  felt  the  hard  times,  which  affected 
London and the principal  business  centers  of  northern 
Germany. 
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Now  we have to concern ourselves here only with what 
happened in France and with what the Bank did to meet 
the crisis. 
The Bank of  France took the standard method; it raised 
the discount rate.  At the beginning of October it raised 
the rate to 6 per cent; on October  13 it raised it to 6.5 
per cent; on October 2 I it raised it to 7.5 per cent; finally, 
on November I I, it was fixed at 10 per cent. 
The  Bank  of  England  had  reached  that  figure  on 
November  10.  The  Bank  of  France  devised  a  rather 
ingenious plan.  It made a scale of  three rates I  per cent 
apart, in proportion  to the time  to run  until  maturity, 
and it continued to apply this system until December 20. 
It did not try by other means to diminish discounts, and 
from  the very  start  it  calculated  what  the extent  and 
the duration  of  the crisis  in  France  would  be.  So, as 
early as December  21, it returned  to the 6 per cent rate 
established at the beginning of  October. 
As  usually  happens  in  like  cases,  there  was  much 
unemployed capital after the panic-business  was slack. 
In  1858  the  average  reserve  in  the  Bank  rose  to 
460,000,ooo francs, a figure which  had not  been  reached 
since 1853.  In 1859 and 1860 the same thing was true, 
as appears from the fact that the average figure of  the 
reserve went up to 570,000,000 francs in 1859 and in 1860 
to  5  I 3,500,000 francs; the average balances due to individ- 
uals on running accounts, which before had been fluctuat- 
ing around I ~o,ooo,ooo  francs, rose, during these two years, 
to 23 j,ooo,ooo and 209,000,ooo francs, respectively, a sign 
of  business depression.  The same phenomenon  may be National  Monetary  C omnission 
observed  on  the  eve  of  crises.  Capitalists,  witnessing 
great speculations and large business enterprises and fore- 
seeing a setback, keep their capital in reserve.  This takes 
place especially in France.  . 
THE: BANK OF FRANCE DISPOSES  OF SECURITIES (1858-1861). 
Up to this time we  have seen the Bank for the most 
part occupied only in commercial banking-discount  , loans 
on  conservative  securities,  transfers,  and  of  course  the 
issue  of  bank  notes.  When  it has  engaged in  making 
advances  or  loans  which  did  not  really  enter  into  the 
business of  commercial banks, it has been because it was 
dealing with the State, to which it owed its charter.  But 
at the  time  we  have  now  reached  the  great  railroad 
enterprises had got well under way;  they saw how bright 
their prospects were for the future.  So they began looking 
around  for  capital to extend  the half-finished systems, 
to finish the important  lines, to better their equipment 
and  organization.  This  very  busy  period  in  France- 
.which was  busy, too, in  other countries-extended  from 
the revolution  of  1848, or  rather  from  the election  of 
Prince Napoleon as President of  the Republic, almost to 
the end of  the Empire. 
There was no lack of  capital for railroad undertakings in 
France at this time.  France, which has been called the 
land of  the "  woolen  stocking,"" because of  its character- 
istic thrift, could easily furnish all the resources needed for 
railroad construction and operation.  However, the com- 
panies did not then, as now, call upon the public directly; 
arhis expression comes from the use made of  woolen stockings as purses 
for hoarding money in the country. 
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and they did not sell bonds at all their ticket offices.  They 
had  recourse to intermediaries.  For five years past the 
SocietC GenCrale du CrCdit Mobilier  (founded in 1853 by 
the  Pereire  Brothers  and  which  we  shall  discuss later) 
had  already  been  undertaking  operations  in  "high 
finance9'-marketing  of  securities,  silent  partnerships 
in  industrial  companies  etc.  Was  it  the  example  of 
this company which induced the Bank of  France at that 
time to follow the same course?  It is rather difficult to 
say.  It really issued securities in 1858, either in its cen- 
tral establishment in Paris or in its branch banks.  And it 
did not do so cautiously in  its capacity as simple inter- 
mediary,  contenting  itself  with  being  only an  interme- 
diary, selling on commission; it advanced before any sale a 
rather large  sum on  the obligations it was to dispose of. 
This advance amounted to ~oo,ooo,ooo  francs at a time 
when  the proceeds  of  the marketing  of  bonds  of  eight 
companies-the  Mediterranean,  Dauphin&,  Midi, Geneva, 
Orleans, West,  East, and Ardennes-were  to amount to 
about 246,000,000 francs. 
In 1858 it sold in this way 617,766 bonds at an average 
price of  276.60 francs.  It had left 272,769 bonds, which 
it disposed  of  by  subscription  and  with  great  success. 
They rose  in  Paris  to  562,298  and  in the provinces  to 
424,589, making a total of  986,887. 
The  price  of  issue  was  274.50  francs.  During  the 
remainder of  the year 1853 the Bank adopted the method 
of selling which it had used  at first  and began to sell a 
great  many  bonds  over  its own  counters  and  those  of 
its branches;  but the price of  these bonds had gone up 
more than 10 or  12 francs. National  Monetary  Commission 
It  disposed in this  way  of  881,952  bonds  for  287.50 
and  288.75  francs. 
New sales, this time by subscription, were made in 1860 
and 1861.  This method  facilitated the sale and the rise 
in price of  the bonds.  One can estimate from what then 
happened France's power to save and accumulate capital. 
Thus  in  1860 the Rank  offered  to subscribers  a  much 
larger  number  of  bonds  than  formerly, no  less  than 
I ,023,ooo.  The subscription rose to I ,627,817 bonds. 
They  were  issued  at  the price  of  292.75  francs.  In 
1861  there  was  a new  offer  by  subscription  of  786,000 
bonds.  The public rushed  in;  the issue was  subscribed 
for  almost  four  times  over.  More  precisely, bids  were 
sent in for  2,972,449 bonds. 
These facts show what are the elements at the basis of 
French  credit  to-day,  and  how, by  the very  nature of 
things, France has been led to adopt it. 
Indeed,  not  only  did  large  capitalists  take up  these 
bond  issues, but the mass  of  middle-sized  savers.  And 
it is because of  these middle-sized and, later, small savers, 
who  create and supply the great bulk  of  capital in this 
country, that the institutions of  credit have been obliged 
to regulate their progress in a conservative way, because 
their depositors and a large number of  their clients have 
themselves  the inborn  prudence  of  all  those  who,  pos- 
sessing only a little capital, do not wish to run any risks 
with  it. 
At any rate, during these four years the Bank of  France 
invested in this way for the benefit of  the eight companies 
which  we  have  mentioned  an  actual,  fully  paid  cash 
capital of  more than I ,200,000,000 francs. 
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This sum, a large one  at  that period, did  not  bring 
about a lower price for the bonds.  The public had from 
that time forth a field for its investments.  The Bank of 
France  realized  splendid  profits  in  these  operations. 
People have asked if  it ought to have done so, if  it con- 
formed to its statutes in  thus  engaging in  the business 
of  marketing  securities.  There  were,  even  among  its 
directors,  men  who  criticised,  while  excusing,  these 
operations  in  high  finance.  In order  to  explain  the 
conduct of  the Bank of  France at this time, people have 
said that the circumstances  were  exceptional;  then the 
convention  of  1859  with  the railroad  companies  had 
given them the special  help  and  warrant  of  the State. 
The Bank was on too good  terms with the Government 
not  to allow  itself  to indulge in  operations  which  were 
unusual, but profitable, to it.  Nevertheless it is best not 
to let a bank of  issue create a precedent of  this sort;  for 
taking its point  of  departure in this first  evasion of  its 
statutes, it might later give itself up to operations of  that 
kind,  dangerous and uncertain  to the last  degree for a 
bank  of  issue. CHAPTER  11.-The  Socidtd  Gdndrale du CrQdif  Mobilia and 
the Pereires  (1853-1864). 
St. Simon's teaching.  Its  influence on  developing business  in France.-The 
Pereire brothers.  The part  they took  in creating the French railroad systems.- 
Creation of the Credit Mobilier 1852.  Its right to  issue bonds.  Useless restric- 
tions.  No censorship.-Aim  of the Credit Mobilier.  Its contemplated scheme.- 
The principle of action of an investment and speculative bank.-What  the Credit 
Mobilier did during its first years.  Services rendered.  Its aid in railroad con- 
struction.-Large  profits. Difficulties  caused by an enormous dividend.-Decline 
after 1855.-Grandiose  and dangerous ideas of its founders.-The  plan of  issuing 
a single type of bonds.-Uncertain  guaranties of  the issues.-Spread  of the system 
to foreign countries.-No  relations between the issues of bank notes and the issues 
of credit mobilier bonds.-Note  on the institution of M. Mir6s.-Trial  of  strength 
against the Credit Mobi1ier.-The  Societb Genetale pour  favoriser le developpe- 
ment du Commerce et de 1'Industrie en France. 
The year I 852 was a remarkable one in the development 
of  a  credit organization in France because of  the found- 
ing of  two dissimilar institutions, each answering to dis- 
tinct needs : the Crddit Foncier-which  made a specialty of 
giving credit on mortgages-and  the Socidtt'  GinCale du 
Crddit Mobilier Fran~ais. 
This latter institution of  credit was founded by Emile 
and Isaac  Pereire.  They were  brothers  from  Bordeaux 
and came when quite  young to Paris.  The elder was a 
stockbroker  at first, the other an accountant in a bank. 
Isaac got acquainted with St. Simon, the famous head of 
the school to which has been given his name, and was a dis- 
ciple of  the master.  He influenced his brother Emile who, 
in 1830, went into the offices of  the Globe, a newspaper of 
St. Simon's.  In  1831 both  brothers  went  over  to the 
National, and soon separated from St. Simon.  But from 
their connection with him they imbibed the general ideas 
of  his  school regarding  the future and  development  of 
industries. 
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The ideas on  an industrial civilization destined to take 
the place of  warlike and priestly  civilization opened  up 
new  paths  to  many  thoughtful  young  men.  Many  of 
them gave up the theoretic and in some sort religious side 
of  St. Simon's teachings to enter into business.  Most  of 
them were successful.  They went especially into the new 
industry of  railroading.  One of  them, Talabot, succeeded 
another St. Simonian named Enfantin, as director of  the 
Paris-Lyons-Mediterranean  Company.  The  first  enter- 
prise  undertaken  by  the Pereire  brothers  was  the rail- 
road  from  Paris  to  St. Germain, begun  in  1833.  The 
capital of  5,000,ooo francs was  furnished  by  the houses 
of  Rothschild, d'Eichtha1, Davillier, etc.  Later the two 
brothers  started  the  Northern  Railroad.  Soon  after 
Emile Pereire became manager  of  the Paris-Lyons Rail- 
road.  He  obtained  the  concession  for  the  railroads 
of  the south, together  with  the canal parallel  with  the 
Garonne River.  In, brief, the Pereire  brothers played a 
very important part in the creation  of  French railroads. 
But their  most  famous  achievement  was  the Crddit 
LWobilier  Fran~ais,  whose firm name was Socidtd  Gdndrale 
du Crddit Mobilier Fran~ais. Since that time it has been 
called simply Credit Mobilier. 
The  Crddit  Mobilier  was  founded  with  a  capital  of 
60,000,ooo francs, divided into shares of  500 francs each. 
The charter of  its foundation is dated November 18, 1852. 
The subscription for shares was made by series of  400,000. 
The first subscription gave the right to the second, share 
for share; in the third subscription the subscribers to the 
first two  series  benefited  in  the proportion  of  one  new 
share for two old ones; these two old shares could belong 
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either to the first or second series or to  both.  This scheme 
was not a new one, having been used by Law. 
This society had obtained the right to  create obligations 
for  a  sum  equal  to ten times  its  capital,  namely,  for 
600,000,ooo francs.  Only  one  restriction  was  imposed, 
and that, moreover, a rather  hard one  to enforce.  The 
society was not allowed to have in  its  liabilities a total 
sum of  more than  120,000,000 francs, that is, double its 
capital, in the form of  deposits  in  current  accounts  and 
of  obligations payable.in less than a year.  An important 
fact to note  is  that  no  "council  of  censorship"  was 
created  for  this  joint  stock  company.  There  was  no 
general supervision.  Why?  Perhaps they had purposely 
forgotten  this machinery, which  might  have been  con- 
sidered  as  an awkward check, if  it really  worked,  and 
as  a  useless  device  if  it merely  registered  tamely  the 
wishes of  the board of  directors.  Now, in  a  joint  stock 
company,  supervision  is indispensable  and  it must  be 
exercised as far as possible by independent men, without 
hindering the progress of  the company.  What, then, did 
the founders of  this new institution of  credit aim at?  Its 
principal  founder, Isaac  Pereire, defined its object thus: 
The Credit  Mobilier  is at one  and the same time  (I) a 
society engaging  in  commandites ; (2) a financial society ; 
(3) an investment bank for lending and borrowing;  (4) a 
bank of  issue. 
As a society engaging in  commandites it had to put its 
resources and its credit at  the disposal of  important indus- 
tries and use them to promote large enterprises which it 
backed and helped to direct. 
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As  an investment bank  for lending and borrowing, it 
had to negotiate loans and investments, whether in regard 
to public credit or industrial credit; it made its interven- 
tion felt whether by opening subscriptions for loans or by 
lending directly, or  else  by marketing  the obligations of 
different  companies,  or  by  operations  on  the  Bourse: 
"  Carry-overs," purchases, sales, etc. 
As  bank  of  issue,  it had  to issue its own  obligations 
representing securities of  every kind: state funds, bonds 
of  industrial companies, etc., in which it was authorized 
to trade. 
It was a delicate matter to undertake these operations. 
Speculation is useful, and banks of  this sort are indispen- 
sable in the modern credit organization of  a country.  But 
it is of  great importance for these operations to be carried 
on with the private capital of  the bank that undertakes 
them.  To issue bonds representing securities in the bank's 
possession  is  to  call upon  the  general  public  to put 
money  into enterprises difficult to learn about and judge 
wisely.  Such capital is the vanguard in industrial enter- 
prises and it runs great risks.  It  is  true that because of 
these risks it makes large profits possible.  Then, too, this 
credit society with its speculative operations, and founded 
as it was without any adequate system of  supervision, was 
absolutely sure to make mistakes. 
During the first year,  1853, it carried through the fol- 
lowing transactions : 
I. Subscriptions to the state loan of  250,000,000 francs 
for the Crimean war. 
2. Marketing of bonds of  the railroad companies of  the 
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3. Marketing of  the bonds of  the CrCdit Foncier. 
4.  Loans on "  contangos "  on the Bourse which made the 
interest rate on these "  contangos " drop from I 2 per cent 
to 3 per cent. 
That year it declared dividends equal to 13.4 per cent 
on the paid-in capital. 
The second  year,  1854, it continued its business  as a 
financial society; it offered to take up a  quarter of  the 
state loan  of  ~oo,ooo,ooo  francs for the Crimean  war; it 
advanced  to the stockholders of  the railroad  companies 
(who were  to pay  for  their  shares  in  instalments) the 
sums needed  to meet  the successive payments.  It also 
marketed railroad bonds.  But it began to play on a very 
large scale  its part as a  society engaging as silent  part- 
ner in great industrial enterprises. 
It  patronized  a  real  estate  construction  company- 
the ConzQagnie IrnrnobilzL~e  de Paris-especially  founded 
to lengthen  the Rue de  Rivoli, and to cooperate, while 
making profits,  in beautifying Paris. 
It created  a  maritime  or  navigation  company,  with 
schemes  for  foreign  commerce, colonization, and arma- 
ment. 
Its directors founded the Austrian Railroad Company. 
France began from this time on to carry its credit and 
some of  its capital to foreign countries. 
The year I 855 marked the summit of  success and power 
of  the Cr6dit  Mobilier.  It continued  to give very sub- 
stantial help to French railroad companies.  It marketed 
their bonds; but also underwrote  their loans, advancing 
in this way 18,000,ooo francs in return for 65,000 bonds to 
the Western Company, which had been formed by a merger 
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with  several  small  roads.  In  1854  it  had  helped  to 
incorporate into one company several different companies 
which  managed  the omnibuses  in  Paris.  In the same 
way it brought about the merging of  all the gas-lighting 
companies of  Paris. 
'I'he  part the company played  in  regard  to  railroads 
was  excellent.  Thanks to the Credit  Mobilier, the rail- 
roads during  the  years  from  1855 to 1857 were able to 
go on with their construction work, in spite of  the latent 
crisis caused by the Crimean  war, and the constant calls 
on public credit  made by the State, which in  1855 nego- 
tiated a third war loan of  750,000,ooo francs. 
This year,  1855, was very  productive, and one might 
say very prosperous for the Credit  Mobilier.  The profits 
amounted to no less than 28,000,ooo francs.  The direct- 
ors tried  to use a  portion of  the dividend, and  instead 
of  paying it all, to give only a fraction of  it to the share- 
holders in order to avoid an unusual rise in the price of 
shares.  But this arrangement  had  to be abandoned  on 
the advice  of  the Government, and 40  per  cent on  the 
shares was distributed as dividends. 
In 1856 the CrCdit Mobilier turned its efforts to foreign 
countries, especially to railroad enterprises.  It  was inter- 
ested in Austrian, Russian, and Spanish railroads. 
From 1855 on,  the reports  of  the SociCtC  du Credit 
Mobilier  became  much  less  detailed  and  explicit.  Its 
decline  was  beginning.  This  society  sought  too  much 
after concessions  and  monopolies  and only  rarely  took 
part in  affairs  which  had  no  political  connections.  It 
turned  its attention especially  to privileged  companies, 
such as railroading, navigation, or general transportation 
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in cities.  From another point of  view it was too anxious 
to subscribe to state loans.  Its head men, it seems, were, 
moreover, on excellent terms with the public authorities. 
That led the CrCdit Mobilier to take part in the operations 
we  have  already  mentioned,  of  a  real-estate  company 
working to beautify Paris.  The Credit Mobilier tied up 
a lot of  capital in this undertaking.  In its balance sheet 
of  October  31,  1857, it carried  a credit  in  its favor of 
80,000,ooo francs against that real estate company. 
The CrCdit Mobilier was not able to carry out the first 
intention  of  its founders in regard  to  issuing  notes  as 
they had wished.  Their desire would have been to issue 
a  single  type  of  bonds  representing  all  the  securities 
quoted  on  the  Bourse.  This  special  type  of  bonds 
would  have presented  only  a  difference relating  to the 
terms of  payment.  Some, short dated, would have cor- 
responded  to the temporary investments of  the society; 
the others, long  dated,  would  have been  equivalent  to 
the securities which the society had successively acquired 
and which had  no  set terms of  payment, such  as state 
funds  and industrial  shares.  The single  type of  bonds 
was to have the advantage of  facilitating business on the 
Bourse,  and  was 'to  "assume  the  characteristics  and 
play  the rble  of  paper money,"  as  the founders of  this 
institution expressed it. 
The danger of  such operations is patent.  It  is issuing on 
an issue.  In such  an  emergency how  could the public 
be assured that the industrial or other values represented 
by the Credit Mobilier bonds  really stood for industrial 
wealth, such as raw materials, machinery, factories, mer- 
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chandise?  How  could  this  same  public  know  if  these 
industrial values would earn revenues to pay interest to 
the holder of  CrCdit Mobilier bonds?  Further, admitting 
that the very difficult management of  such an institution, 
working under  such risky conditions, had  been  the best 
possible,  it would  have been  necessary that the capital 
securing  these  operations should  amount  to more  than 
that of  the Credit Mobilier, which was 60,000,ooo francs. 
Now, as we  know, its founders would have liked to issue 
6oo,ooo,ooo francs in bonds.  A  capital of  one-tenth of 
that, certainly,  was  not  enough  to cover  the risks  of 
decline and especially of  intrinsic  loss  in  the securities 
owned by the society.  In any case this capital ought to 
have been invested safely and in such a way that it could 
be available on the first alarm and when needed. 
This  was not  all.  Its founders  hoped  to  spread to 
other  countries their idea  of  the mobilizing of  securities 
by  the one kind of  bond.  They tried to found a crddit 
mobilier in Austria and succeeded in establishing one in 
Spain.  They had ambitious aims, and thought that they 
could  unify  the  circulation  of  securities,  not  only  in 
France, but also in Europe.  In this way they thought 
no capital would remain unproductive. 
But in matters relating to credit, and especially credit 
tied  up  in  silent  partnerships.  "there's  many  a  slip 
'twixt cup and lip."  The risks in industries and also in 
stock-exchange speculations are too great to allow of  such 
hopes.  If  the issue of  a  bank  note,  properly  so called, 
offers every  security,  it  is  because  it represents  short- 
dated  commercial paper,  bills  which  are  the  result  of National  Monetary  Commission 
operations already transacted, the real security of  which 
(although  not  acknowledged) is merchandise  of  current 
sale and consumption.  Short terms of  payment  (fifteen 
days, one,  two,  or  three months)  give  continual  assur- 
ance of  available funds; the certain operation of  the sale 
of  a piece of  merchandise, which sale will allow the pay- 
ment of  a bill falling due, is  likewise safe, when  the dis- 
count of  paper  is submitted to an enlightened examina- 
tion.  There is then no connection between the issue of  a 
bank note, which represents  bills of  commerce, or cash, 
and  the  issue of  bonds representing state  securities, or indus- 
trial securities, the safety of  which is not of  a kind to allow 
their circulation to such a wide extent.  To be sure, these 
bonds were to  be paid on maturity, whereas the bank note 
must be paid on sight.  Nevertheless these bonds were sub- 
ject to the ups and downs of  the market, and at the times 
they were due, they had to be paid, and, what is more, to 
have their interest  guaranteed  each year.  With  what? 
With the income on industrial shares and state funds, and, 
even then, it was necessary to allow these bonds a higher 
interest than that on state funds.  Otherwise how could the 
public be expected to prefer the bonds?  As  to industrial 
shares, their dividends were destined to be an important 
resource.  But in that case it is dangerous to enter as a 
partner into a new industry the fate of  which you can not 
foresee.  You should therefore become a partner only in 
those enterprises already on the road  to success, but then 
partnership  banks  (banques  commandztaires)  were  not 
established  for such  enterprises  which  find credit easily 
enough in commercial banks, since their capital is already 
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raised,  and they  need  funds only for running  expenses. 
Hence it follows that partnership banks, useful and nec- 
essary in industrial countries, are not  destined  to follow 
the  methods  devised  by  the  founders  of  the Credit 
Mobilier. 
Besides, this method fortunately was not applied on a 
large scale by the founders of  the Credit Mobilier.  Never- 
theless the speculations  carried  on by it and under  its 
influence caused many  failures.  The growth of  specula- 
tion in France dates from this time. 
Finally, the first condition for a partnership and invest- 
ment  bank  (banque commandztaire et  de  placement)  is  to 
have  enlightened  directors,  acquainted  with  industrial 
conditions in such a way that they will not be carried off 
their feet by  the enthusiastic reports of  engineers or in- 
ventors, and risk capital in impossible enterprises or those 
predestined to failure.  To this end there is needed a staff 
of business men, both well informed and practical, with 
no  pretensions  to being  universal  or  ubiquitous.  Now, 
these were not the particular qualities sought after by the 
Credit Mobilier in choosing the directors for its industrial 
companies.  The fact may be  cited that in  1863 one of 
these directors belonged to the administrative board of  19 
companies, engaged in almost as many different  kinds of 
business, and calling  for very  wide  and  different  apti- 
tudes.  The capital of these companies represented three 
billion and a half francs. 
After having tried in vain to have the Bank of  Savoy 
continued  (Savoy was annexed to France in  1865) ; con- 
sidering that they would not be able to use this bank, as National  Monetary  -  Commission 
they hoped,  for issuing bank notes; and having need then 
of  capital, they doubled their capital, raising it in  1866 
from  6o,ooo,ooo to I~O,OOO,OOO francs.  But that was  a 
bad year.  The fiscal year of  the CrCdit Mobilier showed 
a net loss of  nearly 8,000,ooo francs.  In 1867 there was 
great embarrassment and growing difficulties.  The found- 
ers  retired.  On  November  30,  1867,  their  sLccessors 
stated that the losses then amounted to 47,500,000  francs. 
From that time on the Credit Mobilier virtually entered 
into liquidation. 
Since that period  no  houses  of  that kind  have been 
founded on those same principles in France.  Many small 
banking houses meanwhile have done business in disposing 
of  securities, but they have not had the ambitions or the 
importance  of  the Credit  Mobilier.  Since then  a  large 
establishment,  the Banque  de  Paris et  des Pays-Bus, car- 
ries on this business of  an investment bank, and of  helping 
to create new  industries, chiefly those  on a  large  scale; 
. it also negotiates  public  loans.  But this  bank  has  not 
attempted, any more than the Banqque  de I'Union Parisi- 
enne  (which carries on the same operations) to take up 
again  the  system  of  issuing  bonds  representing  the 
securities it possesses. 
The three successive institutions established by M. Mires 
all rested, almost exclusively, on the idea of  speculation. 
Hence the operations consisted in buying and selling on the 
Bourse public securities, industrial and railroad shares, etc. 
M. MirPs's first establishment'was called Caisse des Actions 
Rkunies.  It  was founded on the principle of  the commandite. 
Its original capital was  g,ooo,mo francs,  in  1,000-franc 
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shares, which could be subdivided into share coupons of  500 
francs.  Its success was  rather  marked  during its early 
years.  M. Mirks wanted to  extend its field of  operations, and 
under the name of  Caisse et Journal des Chernins de fer," he 
enlarged his first house, increasing thecapital to 12,ooo,ooo 
francs.  This time he tried to imitate the Credit Mobilier, 
which had just increased its capital.  He wanted soon to 
be as large as the CrCdit Mobilier and increased his capital 
to 50,000,ooo francs.  The establishment was called Caisse 
Gkndrale  des  Chemins  de  fey.  M.  Mirks  had  not, like 
Messrs. Pereire, any very firm friends in the Government 
at that time; the higher administration did not favor his 
operations.  He was active in outside schemes and took 
part in the Spanish loan of  8oo,ooo,ooo reals;  he under- 
took to float the Roman railroad company, and the Turk- 
ish loan, etc.  Soon his institution went under.  He was 
an energetic man, but had founded banks on a false idea 
of  industrial credit.  He did not render any services, but 
rather helped to spread the taste for gambling and specu- 
lating in France. 
Here I must mention another establishment founded in 
1862 after the disappearance of  the Caisse G6nCrale des 
Chemins de fer.  The  lucrative workings of  the Cr6dit 
Mobilier, which  had  up to that time revolutionized the 
methods of capitalists and acquired a real vogue, forced 
a certain number of  Paris bankers and large capitalists to 
found a  house on the model of  that established by  the 
Pereire brothers.  It could  not start out as a joint-stock 
company.  It  needed an authorization which it could not 
"He had  founded in  1842 the Journal  des  Chemzns de fer,  a financial 
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get, because  the Credit  Mobilier  stood  in  its way.  It 
ended by getting its authorization in 1864.  The Govern- 
ment had become more liberal in this respect, and the law 
of  May  23, 1863, on limited liability companies, was the 
beginning of  hoped-for legislation still wider in scope.  The 
statutes of the Socibtt?  pour 2e  DbvelopPement du Commerce 
et de l'lndustrie en France were then approved.  The nomi- 
nal capital was 12o,ooo,ooo francs, and the actual capital 
60,000,ooo francs.  A fact to remember is that this bank, 
aiming to be a partnership and investment bank, also car- 
ried  on all the other operations of  commercial banks.  It 
did not practice the division of  risks;  on the contrary, it 
mixed them up just  as did  the Maison Laffitte-Gouin, of 
which we  have spoken.  This  point of  departure needed 
to be dwelt on to show the evolution followed later on by 
the French credit societies. 
CHAPTER 111.-The  first Comptoir d'Escompte  and the de- 
velopment of commerce-The  laws of May 23-29,  and July 
24, 1867, on companies. 
Review of  the chief reasons for creating the Comptoir d'Escompte at the time of  the 
panic of  1848.-Certain  comptoirs d'escompte continued  to exist after the panic of 
1848.  That in Paris develops.-The  interesting study of  the Paris Comptoir d'Es- 
compte in its relation to the history of  French credit.-The  Comptoir d'Escompte 
de Paris.  Lengthening the existence of this society to  1857.-The  increase of  the 
original capital in 1853.  The Comptoir dlEscompte of  Paris gradually loosens its 
ties w~th  the State and the city of Paris.-Lengthening  the existence of  the Comp- 
toir d'Escompte.  It pays back the State and becomes freer.-The  Comptoir d'Es- 
compte is authorized to advance money on titles and subscriptions.-Development 
of  the Bank.-The  treaties of 1860 w~th  England.  Extensionof commerce.-Special 
commerce of  France with foreign countries before and after the treaties of 1860.- 
Widening the field of  operation of  the Comptoir d'Escompte.-It  is allowed to start 
agencies in France, in the French colanies, and in foreign countries.-Facilities 
and guaranties for new operations.-Founding  of  agencies in Asia.-Its  capital 
doubles.-State  guardianship of  credit  companies.-The  Comptoir  d'Escompte 
helps the colonial banks.-Services  rendered by the Comptoir in As~a.-It  starts 
other  agencies  in Asia.-Increase  in  business.-The  capital, doubled  again, 
reaches 80,000,000 francs.-The  laws of  May 23 and 29,1863, andof July 24,1867.- 
Law of  1863.-Law  of  1867(SociBtBs en Commanditepar Actions).-These  laws were 
Indispensable in view of the evolution of industries  and the growth of  important 
enterprises.-Growth  of savings in France.  Capital is created there.-The  Comp- 
toir d'Escompte enlarges its business. 
We have just  described the founding, the working, and 
the decline followed  by  the disappearance  of  the Credit 
Mobilier, an institution of  the so-called partnership  and 
investment type.  We have seen the causes of  its fall; the 
mistakes it committed, and also to a certain extent the 
services it rendered.  Now we are going to trace the evo- 
lution of  a bank  of  commerce, properly  speaking, prac- 
ticing  the fundamental  business  of  that kind  of  bank, 
namely, discount.  Besides, it is the origin of  the large 
credit companies, which appear in embryonic form, with 
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In  1830  there  had  been  an  ephemeral  Comptoir 
d'Escompte, which a crisis at the close of  1830 and 1831 
had caused to be founded under  almost  the same condi- 
tions  as the one we are going  to talk  about.  Its capital 
had  been furnished by  the State.  Its operations lasted 
two years.  Its creation had been agreed upon so that it 
could  serve as  intermediary between  merchants, manu- 
facturers, etc., and the Bank  of  France.  Other private 
banks had raised the rate of  discount.  Now, the Bank of 
France  accepted  only  paper  or  commercial effects with 
three signatures; it was rather expensive to get the third 
signature.  This establishment, then, was started for the 
purpose of  making the third signature cheaper. 
The  Comptoir  d'Escompte,  founded  in  1848, in  the 
midst  of  a  panic  more serious  than  that of  1830--31, 
grew out of  conditions not unlike those which  gave birth 
to the ephemeral Comptoir d'Escompte of  1830. 
We have, moreover, traced above the facts which led to 
the organizing of  comptoirs d'escompte by the provisional 
government  of  1848.  We have seen what services they 
rendered.  It was supposed that, like the Comptoir d'Es- 
compte of  1830-31, they were destined to disappear when 
the panic was over.  Now, to note a rather curious fact, 
this creation of  the State's, which had  received  its first 
modest capital like a sort of  charity collection, which had 
above all owed  its organization and earliest resources to 
the State and to the city of  Paris, did not disappear, nor 
did  certain  other Comptoirs  in  the  provinces  founded 
under  the  same  conditions.  The  Bank  in  Paris  was 
destined  little  by  little  to rise  and  free itself  from its 
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connections with the State and city of  Paris which had 
been  necessary at  the  start; then  to overcome  many 
prejudices in order to improve its statutes, and to have 
these improvements accepted by the public authorities. 
It is an interesting subject for study because it was the 
opening wedge, if  one may so express it, for those insti- 
tutions  which  later on, under  the name  of  Grandes So- 
cibtb de  Crbdit, modified  so  fundamentally  the general 
organization of  credit in France.  Better still, it has served 
to a certain extent as a guide in this evolution.  Several 
of  these credit societies, indeed, started by  being  banks 
more given to speculation and investment than to com- 
mercial  operations.  The  Comptoir  d'Escompte,  on  the 
contrary, has always fulfilled the functions which  its firm 
name indicated and its origin had given it.  Though  it 
happened  to  deviate  momentarily  from  this  line  of 
conduct  in  order  to speculate  in  the  most  dangerous 
way  imaginable  for  a  credit  company,  and  though 
it  disappeared  in  the  storm  it  had  started,  the  new 
and  reorganized  Comptoir  d'Escompte  took  up  again 
the good traditions  of  the old one,  and was  able at its 
organization  to apply all the improvements  necessitated 
by the needs of  modern commerce and industry.  So the 
Comptoir d'Escompte  is  the type of  the  French  credit 
institution.  It stands  all through the latter half  of  the 
nineteenth century to the present day as the sign post on 
the road followed by credit institutions in France. 
In 1850 the first lengthening of  the term of  existence of 
the Comptoir dlEscompte de Paris  was made to extend 
to March  I 8, 1857.  Its capital was still about the same National  Monetary  Commission 
as  at  the  start-that  is, very  unimportant-and  rose 
to 4,200,~0  francs.  But it had  at its  disposal  about 
8,000,ooo francs in  deposits  and  current  accounts, and 
the Treasury continued  its subsidiary  loan  of  3,000,000 
francs.  Bills of  all kinds discounted  in  1850 rose  to a 
total of  nearly 128,000,000 francs.  That year the share- 
holders felt that they  had  achieved something  not  only 
for the public  good, but  also very profitable  for them- 
selves, since they received  a  dividend  of  7  per  cent of 
the  nominal  capital.  Success  increased  in  the  years 
following. 
In 1853 the capital was increased to 20,000,000 francs. 
Whv?  Because the original capital of  6,500,000 was too 
small to offer  a sufficient guaranty, since the business of 
the Discount Bank had increased very greatly.  In 1852 
the discount  of  bills  with  two signatures, that of  war- 
rants or receipts of  merchandise, bills coming from branch 
banks, made up a total which, with the addition of  foreign 
securities, rose to more than 2~8,000,ooo  francs; and the 
Comptoir d'Escompte had, according to the statement of 
June  30,  1852, 15,000,ooo francs  in  current  credit  ac- 
counts-that  is  to  say,  ~g,ooo,ooo  francs  in  deposits. 
Adding  the non-negotiable  guaranteed  capital  to these 
2o,ooo,ooo of  accumulated  capital-capital  furnished  by 
the State and the city of  Paris-the  whole capital reached 
33,333,000  francs. 
But this gradual transformation of  an institution sup- 
ported  by  the  State  which,  as  it  grew,  was  freeing 
itself  little by  little from  this  protection,  was  destined 
to bring  about a lessening of  the guaranties sanctioned 
by  the State and the City of  Paris.  The share capital 
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increased at the same time that the guaranteed capital 
remained stationary.  It was then decided to reduce the 
guaranty of  the State and the City of  Paris from a third 
to a fifth of the total capital.  Moreover, the Government 
announced to the directors  of  the Comptoir d'Escompte 
that the issue of share capital was to be carried out before 
December  31,  1854, so  as  to allow  the  cancellation at 
that date  of  the  guaranties  and  the repayment  of  the 
3,000,000 francs loaned by the State. 
This decision took  on  a  general character  in  the law 
of  June  10,  1853,  for it was  applied  to the Comptoir 
d'Escompte  of  Paris and those  of  the departments. 
These  measures  were  necessary  because  in  1853  the 
discounts reached more than double what they had been 
in  1852-that  is  to say, ~oo,ooo,ooo  francs. 
While  taking  back  its guaranty,  the State prolonged 
for a term of  thirty years, beginning March 18, 1857, the 
duration of  the SociCt6 du Comptoir d'Escompte.  Thus 
the Comptoir d'Escompte became free.  Formerly, indeed, 
the directors nominated by the Minister of  Finance repre- 
sented the State's interests.  They supervised all opera- 
tions, since these  could  not  be  carried  on without their 
authorization.  The Minister himself alone authorized the 
sending  out  of  dividends  to  the  shareholders.  Three 
delegates of  the Paris municipal council represented  the 
interests of  that city and took  part in  the meetings  of 
the council  of  administration  and the general meetings 
of shareholders. 
New  statutes  were  drawn  up  and  approved  by  the 
decree of  July 28, 1854.  The directors were in future to National  Monetary  Commission  -- - 
be  nominated  by  the general  meeting  of  shareholders. 
The  Minister  of  Finance  had  nevertheless  reserved  for 
himself  the  right  of  approval.  Its operations  became 
more  extended.  To all  those  which  it was accustomed 
to  carry on  were  added  others, such  as  advances  on 
government  securities,  on  shares,  and  bonds;  the 
opening  for  a  third party, and at a commission agreed 
upon, of  subscriptions to public loans, or to loans issued 
for  the capital needs of  all joint stock companies, always 
subject to the authorization of  the Minister of  Finance. 
In spite of  this interference the Bank, which from that 
time forth was called the Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, 
carries on its business under  its new statutes. 
Here, finally, is a table of  the operations in discount of 
this  institution  from  I 853-54  to 1859-60 : 
Financial  year. 
The number  of  commercial bills  discounted increased, 
but  the  sum  total  in  million  francs,  after  having 
increased,  too,  until  1855-56,  went  down  in  1856-57. 
You see, nevertheless, what services the Comptoir rendered 
to trade; the average of  each bill in  1856-57  was found 
to be  723 francs in  round  numbers.  The falling off  of 
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the sum  total of  discounts  during the last  year  has  to 
do with the crisis of  1857.  The crisis lasted until  1859, 
for we  see the figure representing  the total of  discounts 
going  down  to  665,000,ooo  francs  in  1857-58,  and  to 
663,000,ooo francs  in  1858-59.  The  rise  began  again 
in  1859-60.  The  current  credit  accounts  did  not  in- 
crease  and  show  rather  a  falling  off  from  1853-54  to 
1858-59.  It has  been  said  that  at that  time  capital 
was  being  absorbed  by  public  loans  and  by  loans 
to  large  railroad  companies.  We  must also note  that 
the Bank was not allowed to accept in current  accounts 
a  sum  more  than  one  and  a  half  times  the net  cash 
capital.  This  clause  prevented  the  current  accounts 
from  increasing,  and  at bottom  this  measure  favored 
the Bank  of  France.  In any case this restriction dimin- 
ished public confidence. 
COMMERCIAL  TREATIES  OF  1860. 
We have seen the movement of  high finance set in mo- 
tion in France between the years  1849 and  1865 by the 
public  loans for wars  or needs  of  the budget, and loans 
made  by  the  railroad  companies.  The  review  of  the 
Crbdit Mobilier has enabled us to trace in its development 
the important  part played  by  these  two chief  causes in 
the accumulation of  capital and its circulation in France 
during  this  period  of  fifteen to  eighteen  years.  These 
facts emphasize the phenomenon of  the creation of  capital 
by saving,  and  it is  a  striking  point  that France, even 
at that time, was  sending money out of  the country to 
finance industrial enterprises, especially railroads. Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks  Natiortal  Monetary  Commission 
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But  if  these  elements  of  productive  power  were  the 
cause  of  a  general  economic  activity  in  France, they 
did not have such an immediate effect on commerce and 
international exchanges as the treaty with England, con- 
cluded on January 23, 1860.  France giving up the narrow 
protective system followed until then, threw wide open its 
frontiers to English trade.  The country did not have to 
repent  it.  The following table shows the movement  of 
special commerce during the five years  before the com- 
mercial treaties of  1860 and the years which followed until 
the war of  I 8  70--7 I : 
[Million francs.] 
French railroads. 
Total net  ,":&y:;o-  Number of  1 Number  1 x~~~~  procFds  ini  ceeds, in  1 passengers,,  tons of  Year  merchan- 
kilometers.  F:,",":  thousand  b~o~~l-  dise,in mil- 

















The Comptoir d'Escompte of  Paris did its best to profit 
by the revival of  trade destined to follow the conclusion 
of  the treaties of  January  23,  1860, with  England, and 
helped  o'n by the development of  French railroads. 
First of  all, it was important  to extend the workings 
of  this  credit  establishment both  at home  and  abroad. 
So it had  to win  a  little more  liberty, and not remain 
under  too  narrow  a  charter.  The  State, indeed,  had 
only conceded  under  restricted  conditions its  right  to 
become  a  stock  bank  under  the  title  of  Comptoir 
dlEscompte  de  Paris.  This  time  the  Government 
did  not  refuse  to  back  up  the  plans  of  the  institu- 
tion.  The decree of  May  25,  1860, approved the modi- 
fications  of  the statutes  put  forward  by  the  directors. 
These  modifications  were  the  authorization  to  start 
agencies in France, in the French colonies, and abroad, 
with the approval of  the Minister of  Finance.  Further, 
in order to carry on operations made  necessary by these 
agencies, the Bank was authorized to accept orders, drafts, 
and letters of  exchange which should be secured by trans- 
fers of  bills of  lading and bottomry;  to discount up to a 
term of  one hundred  and eighty days sight commercial 
bills backed up by bills of  lading. 
Now, here are some statistics showing the general com- 
mercial development of  railroads between the years  I 855 
and 1869.  We have not given the figures for every year, 
thinking that those given are enough to show the enor- 
mous growth of  length of  lines and of  the movement of 
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A few days later  two  agencies  were  founded, one in 
Shanghai, China, the other in Calcutta, India. 
On  August  30,  1860, the  Comptoir  d'Escompte was 
authorized  to  double  its  capital  from  20,000,000  to 
40,000,000 francs.  The issue of  40,000 new  shares was 
entirely successful. 
Let us point  out here this fact, that an institution of 
credit must be authorized, as we  have just seen, in order 
to increase its capital.  The management of  institutions 
of  credit  founded  as joint  stock  companies, or  even  in 
the  form  of  silent  partnerships,  was  under  the  pro- 
tection  of  the  State.  So  it is  not  to be  wondered at 
that  a  greater  number  of  important  credit  companies 
are not founded.  Except for the unexpected  revolution 
of  1848 and the panic which resulted from it the Comptoir 
would  probably never  have existed.  It  was, indeed, the 
first credit  society in  France which  attained  its defini- 
tive form from the start, that of  a bank  of  commerce- 
that is  to say, of  discount  with  all the operations that 
go with it. 
About the same time, in 1860, the Comptoir d'Escompte 
helped  with  loans  of  money  certain  colonial  banks 
(those  of  Martinique,  of  Rgunion,  and  Guadeloupe). 
These  banks  of  issue were  obliged  to put their  capital 
into  government  securities  as  a  guaranty  for  issuing 
their  notes  for  equivalent  sums.  Now,  their  power  of 
credit was soon spent.  After having turned into money 
the securities which they held-that  is to say, put into 
circulation  that part of  the state debt which they pos- 
sessed-nothing  was left them to do business with.  The 
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Comptoir  d'Escompte  guaranteed  credits  for  them  or 
loaned them  money,  and later  it extended  this opera- 
tion to the banks of  Guiana and Senegal. 
And so the Comptoir was established in the Far East, 
and its influence was felt in our colonies.  It  soon showed 
that  its  agencies  were  useful.  The  one  in  Shanghai, 
besides its current business, collected the war indemnity 
due  the French  Government  after  our  Chinese  expedi- 
tion.  Moreover, the new treaty gave French merchants 
the right of  opening up relations with the Chinese Empire. 
So it was  a  valuable  help  to our countrymen.  In Cal- 
cutta  the economic  movement  took  on  all  the greater 
importance  because  the civil  war  in  the United  States 
made India the center of  the cotton supply for Europe. 
These first successes caused new Asiatic  agencies to be 
founded  in  1861  and  1862  in  Bombay,  India; Salgon, 
Indo-China ; and  Hongkong  . 
During  this  time  the business  of  the Comptoir  was 
spreadifig and taking on an importance little in keeping 
with  its capital.  It had  extended  greatly its activities 
in  the provinces, in  the principal  French cities, having 
accounts  with  the  bankers of  these  cities  and  keeping 
their  accounts  in  turn.  Profits  were  good.  For  the 
financial  year  1865-66  the dividend  was  12.7  per  cent 
on the capital.  It is true that the discount and banking 
operations  had  been  I ,000,800,000 francs  for  that year 
and that in Indo-China business had  amounted  to more 
than 700,000,000 francs. 
The capital then  was  increased  to 80,000,ooo  francs. 
The  subscription  succeeded  admirably,  which  was  not 
surprising. 
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THE  INFLUENCE  OF  MORE  LIBERAL  LEGISLATION  ON 
BUSINESS IN GENERAL AND ON CREDIT IN PARTICULAR. 
In the period from 1863 to 1867 new laws were passed 
which  have had  a very  great influence on  the develop- 
ment  of  large  industries  and  credit  institutions.  We 
shall  take these  laws  into  account  only  so  far  as  they 
concern the latter. 
Before the law of  May 23-29,  1863, no joint stock com- 
pany could be founded without  the authorization of  the 
ruler  and without  his approval of  the act which consti- 
tuted the society.  This law did away with this authori- 
zation,  but  stipulated  that  the  capital  of  the  society 
could not  be  more  than  20,000,000 francs.  The shares 
forming the capital fixed on by the founders were to be 
completely subscribed for, but the law required that only 
a quarter of  the capital issued  be paid  in.  The  direct- 
ors nominated  by  the  general  assembly of  shareholders 
(which  approves  the  statutes)  must  own  in  equal  lots 
one-twentieth  of  the  society's  capital,  and  the  shares 
forming  this twentieth were  not  to be  sold.  They were 
personal  and  untransferable.  One  article  of  this  law 
stipulated with reference to supervision that the general 
assembly  of  shareholders  should  pick  out one  or  more 
special commissioners to report  to the general assembly 
on the condition of  the society.  Then certain measures 
for publicity were enacted (the registering of  the statutes 
and  amendments  of  these  statutes  in  the court  record 
office) and other measures of  order and procedure for the 
general assembly of  shareholders. 
The law of  July 24,  1867, repealed the law of  June 23, 
1863.  This  law  of  1867  treated  with  limited  liability 
partnerships  issuing shares  (socibtt?~  en  cornrnandite par 
actions) and joint-stock companies.  It no  longer  limited 
the capital stock of  companies and it increased the pub- 
licity by requiring the statutes or changes of  statutes to 
be inserted in at least one newspaper, specified for receiv- 
ing  legal notices.  As  in  the law of  1863, the  directors 
were to be chosen for six years, but they were eligible for 
reelection.  The number  of  shares which they may own 
was determined by statute.  Finally this law, while organ- 
izing  a  sort  of  parliamentary  system  for  joint-stock 
companies, of  which the general assembly of  shareholders 
was  the foundation, gave real  freedom, a  more flexible 
instrument than the law of  1863, to industry, trade, and 
banking. 
The law  was  indispensable because  of  the growth  of 
large industries, and the natural concentration of  capital. 
The old mould had to be broken in order to keep up with 
the general  economic movement marked  by the control- 
ling influence of  new scientific inventions and their appli- 
cation  to industry.  The steam  engine, the locomotive, 
the beginnings of  electricity-all  revolutionized the condi- 
tions  of  industry.  Concentration  of  capital was becom- 
ing necessary even then, and a mathematical function, as 
it were, of  the tendency of  industries to concentrate. 
Besides, this capital did not belong to large capitalists; 
capital was being collected also in the middle classes and 
all ranks of  society. National  Monetary  Commission 
Here  is  an  indication  of  this  fact,  as  shown  in  the 
development  of  savings banks 
Year. 
l  -- --  -- - 
aThis low  figure is due to the  panics of  1847, 1848, 1849. and also to the political 




In the year  1869, preceding the Franco-Prussian war, 
the balance due to depositors rose  to 71 I ,ooo,ooo  francs. 
That  was  only  an  indication.  The  middle  classes 
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were  investing  their  money in railroad  and  city bonds 






the other  institutions of  that kind  did  not  create  the 
taste for saving money in France;  they only directed it 
toward  transferable securities.  It is  even  a  fortunate 
accident that the Crddit Mobilier gradually disappeared, 
succumbing  under  mistakes  which  opened  the  eyes  of 
the least  farseeing  to  the danger  of  speculative  crazes. 
1.e  in France have not always been immune from these 
crazes since then, but the attacks for most of  the savers 
have been  only  temporary.  The great majority  of  the 
very  numerous  persons  who  accumulate  capital  has 
always after the storm taken up again the patient, per- 
sistent  work  of  saving. 
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Now  that we  have set forth these reflections and these 
facts  to show  in  what  surroundings the  French  credit 
institutions  developed and what  laws helped in this de- 
velopment, we  may return  to the Comptoir d'Escompte. 
The Comptoir d'Escompte had  in  its general meeting 
of  December 8, 1866, raised its capital to 80,000,ooo francs 
and established a reserve fund of  20,000,000 francs. 
In 1867 it enlarged its sphere of  action by establishing 
new agencies.  In France it founded one at  Nantes (1867), 
at Lyons  (1868), and  at Marseilles  (1869).  Abroad  it 
established  those  at London  (I  867), Yokohama, Japan, 
and Alexandria, Egypt.  The Comptoir had as wide inter- 
ests in foreign countries  as in France. 
Its agencies at Nantes  and  Marseilles, both seaports, 
put it in touch with firms having business with our colo- 
nies, or with those numerous and often rich firms which 
had business with Egypt, India, and the Far East.  Finally, 
the agency at Lyons was very efficacious because of  the 
accommodations  it gave silk merchants for extending in 
that city the silk market which it had succeeded in wrest- 
ing from London a few years before. 
In 1869-70,  on  the eve  of  the Franco-Prussian  war, 
the total business of  the Comptoir reached 3,086,000,ooo 
francs, an enormous sum for that time, and this business 
was made up as follows: 
Francs. 
Discounts-_  ..  I, 187,000,ooo 
Foreign agencies-- - _  _ _.  -.  .  .__.  ._-  ._.  .  .-.  .-_.  _ _.  _.  ._.  I,  096, ooo, ooo 
Home agencies ---.  .__.  .--.-__.  .__  .. .  -.  .  .  .  _.  .. .  _-_.  ..  438, ooo, ooo 
Other operations ---_----..---.-.-..-...-..-.....--..  365,000,ooo 
Total- _ - - - -.  - -.  _ - - - - - - - - - - -.  .  .  -.  .  - -.  .  - - - .  - - -  3,086,  ooo, ooo 
The dividend that year rose to 9 per cent. 
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We are far from the modest beginnings of  the Comp- 
toir; indeed, we  have seen its first capital formed  like a 
charity  collection, at the  most  distressing  time  of  the 
panic of  1848, when it was started.  It had always been 
true to its purpose of  a discount bank, and soon found 
itself  brought  into business relations with  the most  dis- 
tant foreign countries.  Circumstances forced this, as, for 
instance, the  first war with  China and the difficulty at 
that time of  competing with the provincial banks which, 
since the increase in the number of  branches of  the Bank 
of  France, found help in this great issuing establishment, 
which  rediscounted  their  commercial  bills  for  them. 
Nevertheless, in  the  last  period  we  have  gone  over,  it 
founded agencies in the most important French cities.  It 
is  none the less  the pioneer  in  the  founding  of  foreign 
agencies. 
CHAPTER  1V.-The  Bank  of  France from 1860 to 1875. 
Tendency of  the Bank to have a large cash reserve. Unproductive circulation.- 
Difference in the evolution of  the Bank of  England and the Bank of France.-The 
Bank of  France gradually becomes the depository of  French specie.-Gold  pur- 
chases as a means of increasing the reserve.-The  panic of  1864.-Its  causes.- 
First symptoms.-Acute  period of  the crisis.-The  Bank buys gold.-The  interest 
on loans on securities becomes different from the rate  of  discount.-The  law of 
March3,1852, in regard to loans on railroad securities.-Its  consequences.-Panic 
of  185657.-Panic  of 1862-64.-The  interest onloans on securities was the same as 
the discouct rate.-The  Bank establishes an increase in interest on loans on securi- 
ties as compared with the discount rate.-The  issue of  bank notes representing 
loans on  securities.  Dangers of  its exaggeration.-Issues  and discounts  of  the 
Bank from 1864 to  1870.-Note  on a  fact seemingly paradoxical;  differences  in 
1865-66  of  6 per cent between the dlscount rate of  the Bank of  England and the 
Bank of  France.-The  panic of  1865-66 in London in its relation to the Paris money 
market.-Moral  obligations of  the Bank toward  the Government.  Its financial 
help in war time.-Legal  currency and forced currency (August 12,  1870).-The 
right to increase the issue.-Bank's  loans to the State.-Loan  to the city of  Paris.- 
Precautions taken by the Bank.-Disadvantages  of a state bank in time of war.- 
Forced payments to the Paris Commune.-Increase  in discounts.-Services  ren- 
dered by bank notes.-Growth  in economic activity after the war of  1870-71.-Col- 
lection of  bills the time of  payment of which had been extended.-The  loss in the col- 
lection of  extended bills is very small.-Dee9  lying causes of commercial customs.- 
Increase in the limit of  issue for the Bank of France.-Flexibility  of the system 
subject to the intelligent action of the public authorities.-Comparisons  with the 
Bank of  England.-Terms  of  payment of  the war  indemnity.-Method  of  pay- 
ment.-Interest  in explaining these operations.-Secondary  conditions.-Loan  of 
2,000,000,000 francs in June, 1871.-Loan  of  3,000,000,000  francs in July,  1872.- 
Success of  the loan of 1872.-Loan  by the Bank of  France to the State.-Agreement 
with a syndicate of bankers.-France's  progress in the knowledge of  the conditions 
of  credit. 
I.-BEFORE  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR. 
Let us return to the Bank of  France, which we  left in 
1860 after its operations of  marketing railroad securities. 
We know that it had already increased the number of  its 
branch  banks. 
The following table shows the development of  its op- 
erations; it will  help  us  on  several points  to make  the 
observations which certain figures call for; we divide the 
interval before the war into periods of  two years each. National  Mo~zetary  Commission 
[Million francs.] 
l  (____- 
I  I  /  l  !   erc cent. 1 PW cnrt. 
Year. 
We see first  of  all that the reserve  has risen in this 
space of  time from  368,0o0,000 to nearly  I ,2oo,ooo,ooo 
francs-that  is, it has more  than tripled.  The circula- 
tion of  bank  notes has also increased, but has not quite 
doubled.  The discounts have not increased, as is  shown 
~~~~ 
in the column containing the average  total of  the com- 
mercial  "portfolio,"  which  in 1869 was  the same  as in 
1863-568,000,ooo  francs.  The notes in circulation, then, 
! 
in large part represent  specie-that  is, the reserve. 
If  we  deduct from the average total of  circulation the 
average total of  commercial bills, we have left 786,500,000 
francs, which  are  an  important  part  of  the circulation 
representing specie and having nothing  in common with 
the credit through issue; this is called unproductive cir- 
2%:' 
culation  in  institutions  of  issue.  To  be  sure, we  must 
(ion. 
take  into  account  advances  on  securities; but  during 
these  nine  years  the  average  total  of  collateral  loans, 
which  reached  nearly  181  ,ooo,ooo  francs  in  1861  and 
I 66,000,ooo francs in  I 862, fluctuated after that between 
9?E 
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discounted. 
It is  a  strange thing, and at first  sight almost  para- 
doxical, that when the very strict law of  1844 forced the 
Bank of  England not to issue, over and above a certain 
figure, anything but gold certificates, the Bank of  France, 
without  the intervention of  any law, but simply by the 
course of  events  and the spirit  of  economy  among  the 
French  people,  saw  this  very  idea  of  the  law  of  1844 
carried  out  without  any  government  interference.  In- 
deed, not only were the French as a nation saving money, 
but their savings flooded the money market because they 
were  not  being  used  either  in  industries at home  or in 
the colonies, as was the case at that time in England. 
To be sure, the Cr6dit  Mobilier sent French capital to 
Austria, Spain, Russia, etc., to build railroads; in France, 
too,  the  railroads  had  already  required  several  billion 
francs for their construction; but our capacity for accu- 
mulating capital gives us an extra amount of  cash capital, 
of  which the Bank of France gradually becomes the deposi- 
tory.  Aside from the great and far-reaching panic caused 
by the Franco-Prussian war, in  proportion  as the Bank 
spread  its  influence through  France  by  means  of  its 
branches  this phenomenon  took  place more  and  more. 
The consequence was that the Bank tried means different 
from those it had applied before to protect its reserve. 
In for~ner  panics in  1847 and  1855-1857  the Bank of 
France bought gold to keep up an adequate reserve.  In 
this last panic it had recourse to this method  to the sum 
of  almost  I ,3oo,ooo,ooo francs, purchases which cost it a 
little over  I per cent.  Henceforth it no longer needed to 
t,sU,Foof 
biUs dis- 





Rates of discount. 
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use this method to any extent except during the panic of 
I 864. 
Where did this panic start?  It  started in America.  The 
War of  Secession was the immediate cause.  The panic, as 
is always the case, was first felt in England because of  its 
important relations with the United States, and then in 
France. 
The War of  Secession greatly  disturbed  the supply  of 
certain products which Europe got from America.  The 
American cotton merchants called in at the beginning of 
the  war  the  money  due  them  and  fot~nd  themselves 
obliged to refuse the orders which had been given them, 
and it was impossible for them to deliver those which they 
had  already  accepted.  In order not  to shut down, the 
European factories had to buy cotton in India.  All this 
caused great changes. 
The beginnings of  the panic were felt as early as 1861. 
The preceding table shows that in comparison with  1859 
the average reserve went  down from  570,000,000 francs 
.to 368,600,ooo francs;  the discount went  to 7 per  cent, 
with a minimum of  5 per cent.  In 1865 there was a still 
greater falling off  in the average reserve.  It  went down to 
305,000,ooo francs.  The minimum in November was even 
as low as 200,000,000 francs.  It did not drop lower than 
that figure during  the worst period of  the panic, but the 
discount  rate went  to 7 per  cent, as in  1861. 
In 1864 the panic was at its worst at  the time of  foreign 
payments, the end of  April  to May,  and September  to 
October.  During  the first  period the reserve fell  below 
16o,ooo,ooo  francs in spite of  a rise in the discount rate to 
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8 per cent.  In the face of  a greater and greater number 
of bills presented for discount, the Bank directors, because 
of the growing demand for coin, decided again to buy gold. 
Thus  the  Bank  purchased  gold abroad  to the sum of  a 
little  less  than  240,000,000 francs.  In September  and 
October  the discount  rate, which  had  been  lowered  for 
some time, was raised to 7 per cent, then to 8 per cent, 
with a special view to reestablishing the reserve.  At the 
end of  the year the discount rate fell back to 4% per cent. 
The Bank had been authorized since 1834 to make ad- 
vances on securities to private individuals.  Up to about 
1851  these  operations were not very important, because 
this kind of  securities was limited to those of  the State or 
of  cities.  From the moment when the Bank  could con- 
sent to advance money on a larger variety of certificates- 
that is to say, transferable securities-when  it could lend 
money  on  stocks and  bonds of  railroads, of  the Crkdit 
Poncier, etc., this side of  its business  took on  large pro- 
portions.  The following table shows this progress.  We 
give only five-year intervals from I 834 to I 851, and after 
that every year up to I 870: 








5r.900.  ooo 
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I  Loans  on  securities. 
I 
-  -- 
Year.  Total  sums  Average. 
advanced.  ,  portfolio. 
-  p---- 
Francs.  --- 
Francs. 
...........................................  1855--  671,700,  ooo  105,  zoo,  ooo 
........  18~6..  ...................................  834,800,000  :  81.  zoo,  ooo 
Let us remark again before  drawing conclusions from 
these figures that the law of  June 30, 1840, had  allowed 
all  public  securities  as guaranty  for  commercial  bills 
presented for discount with two signatures. 
--"- 
.............................................  1857  '  353,600,000  52.500,ooo 
1858  .............................................  599,  .500.000 1  9~.000.000 
..........................................  185g--.  684.  zoo,  000 /  II~,IOO,OOO 
- 
.First of  all we  note  that in  1852  the total loans for 
the year  rose  to  523,500,000 francs, whereas they  were 
only  51,900,ooo francs  in  1851 ; in  the  same  way  the 
average of  the "portfolio"  went  from  10,800,000 francs 
...........................................  1860---  651,600,  ooo  l 
1861--.  ...  ........................................  472,~oo.  ooo 
............................................  1862-  I,  303,600,  ooo 
............................................  186~-  i  ggg.  2oo,000 
..........................................  1864---  423,300,000 
...........................................  186s-.  401,800,ooo 
...........................................  1866--  420,400,000 
to  68,300,ooo  francs.  The  movement  went  on  and 
increased  in  1853.  The reason for this was  the law  of 
March 3, I 852, which extended the loan operations of  the 
1~2,800,  ooo 
88,  ZOO,  000 
180,600,  ooo 
166,100,  ooo 
84,  200. 000 
74,000,ooo 
77,400,000 
Bank  to  railroad  stocks  and  bonds,  whereas  by  the 
terms of  the law of  May  17, 1834, the Bank could make 
loans  only  on  French  government  securities.  After 
dropping in  1854 these figures rose, and during the panic 
of  1856 reached almost 835,000,000 francs for  the tatal 
............................................  1867-  445,700,000  85,  BOO. 000 
1868  ............................................  433,400,000  I  84.100.000 
.........................................  1869---  480,000,000  1  94,  zoo.  000 
1870 ............................................  542,  ooo,ooo /  121,600,  ooo 
- 
l  -- 
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loans and 81,000,ooo francs for the average  during that 
year.  The panic had caused a call for loans to be made by 
the holders of  securities who needed  cash capital or bank 
notes.  Next we see a falling off  in the total and average 
loans in  1857, then  they  went  up  in  1858 and reached 
a  total of  nearly  6oo,ooo,ooo francs and an  average  of 
97,000,ooo  francs.  In 1862 the total of  collateral loans went 
up  to a figure unheard of  till then, almost  I ,304,000,ooo 
francs, and  the average  to  180,500,ooo francs; the fol- 
lowing  year  we  find  respectively  almost  I ,ooo,ooo,ooo 
francs in one column and 166,000,000 francs in the other; 
it was another panic-the  cotton panic brought about by 
the War of  Secession-which  called forth this demand for 
cash or bank notes.  It was also the time when the Credit 
Mobilier started out to market railroad securities.  Every- 
one used  what  means  he  had to obtain credit and bor- 
rowed on securities when the discount on commercial bills 
was not  enough, railroad  securities  having become  very 
numerous on account of  repeated  borrowings. 
Now, the Bank of  France made its loans at the same 
rate as that which it fixed for discount.  In view of  the 
numerous demands for loans during these two years, 1862 
and 1863, the Bank understood  that it was necessary to 
establish a higher rate for the interest on collateral loans. 
Its directors saw rather late the usefulness of  this measure. 
In reality, transferable securities, stocks or bonds  de- 
posited  as collateral  for promissory notes, are not  easy 
to realize  on  by  the  depositor  even  when  the need  is 
urgent.  Too many obstacles prevent their being  quickly 
negotiable, even  assuming  that the loan has fallen due. National  Monetary  Commissiort 
-  - -  -- 
It is  understood  that the margin  between  the market 
quotation of  the security at the moment of  the loan and 
the value below the quotation which the banker fixes for 
the loan,  guaranties  the banker  against  all risk  if  this 
margin  has been  cautiously  worked  out.  But here  one 
might say that the sureness of  the guaranty is in inverse 
ratio to the availability of  the capital loaned.  Granting, 
then, that payment has fallen due, you will call upon the 
debtor to pay his debt.  But he may fail to obey this call, 
especially  in a  panic.  Here you can not  use the rapid 
methods of  procedure thought out for bills of  commerce. 
It is a collateral loan, so you have to reach the point of 
using the right to sell the collateral.  Now, selling govern- 
ment and railroad securities, etc., in time of  panic, throw- 
ing  great  quantities  of  them on the market, necessarily 
causes a decline in these securities and others of  the kind 
allowed  as  collateral  on  loans.  To  issue  bank  notes 
against securities  that can not  be quickly realized on is 
something a bank of  issue ought not to do without cau- 
tion.  The problem was new at  that time, and it was only 
the heavy loans of  1862 and 1863 that began to alarm the 
bank  directors. 
The method to employ was simple; it consisted in rais- 
ing the interest on loans in comparison with the discount 
rate.  This is what  the Bank  did.  The effects  of  this 
measure  were  immediately  felt; the  total  of  loans  re- 
mained around 400,000,000 to 450,000,ooo francs.  Here, 
as a  document  that bears  on  this measure, is a table of 
the differences in favor of  discount demanded by the Bank 
up to 1870. 
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Extra interest  on loans as compared with discount ate. 
[Discount rate and interest on loans the same before March  aq, 1864.1 
Per cent. 
From March 24,  1864, to May 5,  1864- --  - -.  - --  - - - _  _  _ --  - - - -.  .  .  .  - --  I 
From May 6,  1864, to May 25,  1864 ------------.-._..___...._.__  o 
From May 26,  1864, to September 8, 1864- -  _ -- -.  _ _.  .  .  _.  _.  .  .  .  - - --.  I 
From September g,  1864, to November 2,  1864  ---.-.._..-.L.-.--..  o 
From November 3,  1864, to March 8, 1865  ._  .._-__..  .  _--  ...  I 
From March g,  1865, to May 31, 1865 ---.--_--..  ._...._....__.  ._ 
From June I, 1865, to October 8, 1865 ----_-----..  .  ..--....-._.  I 
From October g,  1865, to November  I, 1871  _----__  .___..  X 
If  we  go back now to the table before this one, we see 
that during the years which follow the panic of  1863-64 
the metallic reserve rose by degrees.  In 1869, on the eve 
of  the Franco-Prussian war, it rose on an average to about 
I,  19o,ooo,ooo francs,  or,  more  precisely,  I,  189,800,000 
francs;  the  circulation  of  bank notes  exceeded  on  the 
average  I ,354,000,ooo francs.  In  I 868,  moreover,  the 
average  reserve  already  reached  I,  I 74,000,ooo  francs, 
and  the circulation  rose  to  1,233,000,ooo francs.  The 
amount  of  the reserve  almost  equalled  the circulation. 
The difference was  less than 60,000,ooo  francs.  But is 
that a  sign  of  prosperity?  To  prove  that this  sign  is 
fallacious it suffices to follow the fluctuations of  the fig- 
ures relating to discounts collected in the following table: 
Year. 
---p 
Average  $zEfg 
discounts.  discount. 
Francs.  /  Per cent. National  Monetary  Commission 
Hence beginning with 1856, the year when the average 
discounts reached a figure till then unknown, we  see the 
discounts rising in a few years to figures which fluctuate 
around 6oo,ooo,ooo francs.  Then from 1867 this average 
goes  down  to only  458,500,000 francs  in  1868 ;  at one 
time even  the discounts showed  in that year a minimum 
of  q~o,ooo,ooo  francs.  The falling  off  in  business  pre- 
vious to 1870 was  directly  connected  with  fear  for  the 
political situation in Europe.  Since 1866, since Sadowa, 
war  was  thought  to  be  probable  between  France  and 
Prussia, and  this  fear  checked  business  transactions; 
people did not dare to invest capital in industrial concerns. 
You  notice this in looking over the average balance  of 
individual  current  accounts  at  the  Bank  of  France. 
After  having  exceeded  200,000,000 francs in  1859  and 
1860,  it  had  fluctuated  from  1861  to  1865  between 
165,000,000  and  18~,ooo,ooo  francs.  But  from  1866 
it went up as shown by  the following table: 
Average balance of  individual current accounts. 
Francs. 
.................................................  1861  164,200,000 
.................................................  1862  186,100,ooo 
.................................................  1863  170,800,ooo 
.................................................  1864  146,500,000 
1865  ................  ................................  176,800,000 
.................................................  1866  267,600,000 
................................................  1867  311,300,000 
.................................................  1868  407,300,000 
.................................................  1869  348,600,000 
.................................................  1870  402,600,000 
REMARKS. 
London experienced in 1865-66  a financial crisis in the 
form  of  a money  shortage, which  was  one of  the most 
severe that market ever had.  There were several reasons 
for it; one fundamental cause was the heavy demand for 
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gold  in  India;  another  cause  of  weakness  was  in  the 
mechanism of  the Bank  of  England, which, beyond  its 
loan to  the State,  can not issue notes without having their 
value in gold in its treasury;  finally, an unprecedented 
public  panic  forced the closing of  the most trustworthy 
credit  firms which  operated  only  in  the most  conserva- 
tive way, like the joint-stock  banks.  The curious thing  - 
is that the discount rate went  up to 10 per  cent at the 
Bank of  England;  it stayed three months at that level, 
whereas  that of  the  Bank  of  France  did  not  exceed  4 
per cent during this period, and even fell to 3.5 per cent. 
This shows that gold was not being exported to England 
from France.  How can we  explain that these two mar- 
kets so near to each other should be so little subject to 
the  regulative  law  of  supply  and  demand,  while  no 
restrictive law in France opposed at that time the trans- 
portation or sale of  gold to foreign countries? 
Let us retrace first the fluctuations in the discount rate 
at the Bank  of  England  and the Bank  of  France from 
October, 1865, to July, 1866. 
/  Discount rate. 
Date. 
-- 
-p  p-------. 
Bank of  Bank of 
England.  France 
-  pp  i  l 
Per cent. 
~865-October  z...--------------------------------..-..- 
October5 ......................................... 
November 12 ...................................... 
December 28 ...................................... 
.......................................  1866-January  4.. 
March IS ........................................ 
May3 ............................................ 
May8 ............................................ 
May 11 ........................................... 
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The reason for this state of  affairs seemingly so abnor- 
mal is that the panic of  1866 in 1,ondon was purely local. 
The English public greatly exaggerated the shipments of 
gold  to India.  Passing  troubles,  which  at other  times 
would not have been noticed, made depositors in certain 
joint-stock  banks  lose  confidence.  The public  made  a 
mad rush, and the result was that some of  these houses 
suspended  payment.  It was  a  genuine  panic,  which 
brought  about what we  call to-day  a  run on the bank. 
What happened  next?  These joint-stock  banks, like all 
London banks, helped to make at the clearing house, for 
their own account and that of  their clients, compensatory 
payments  and balancings  of  checks.  These  substitutes 
for coin failing suddenly so far as these banks were con- 
cerned,  a  money  scarcity  followed.  The  machinery  of 
the clearing house  is really  very  delicate  and sensitive. 
If  it has  just  suffered  a  slackening  or  a  sudden  jerk, 
the whole  mechanism of  London  credit  is  affected.  So 
the Bank of  England  was called  upon.  Thanks to the 
suspension of  the act of  1844, this bank  could issue an 
extra allowance of  notes amounting to  £6,ooo,ooo, and 
save  its situation  by  gradually raising  the discount  to 
10 per  cent.  Its reserve, which  was  S~q,ooo,ooo,  went 
down  to only  £11,8oo,ooo on  May  23,  being a  diminu- 
tion of  £z,zoo,ooo.  AS  for  London  exchange on  Paris, 
which varied  then  from  25.12  to 25.30,  it went  down 
during the worst of  the panic to 25.10.  The exchange, 
then, showed that it was rather  more advantageous for 
Paris to buy gold in London.  In reality, the 10 per cent 
rate of  discount maintained by the Bank of  England was 
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kept up perhaps a little longer than necessary.  In any 
case London's rate of  exchange at that time was not dis- 
advantageous  relatively  to  Paris  and  other  European 
markets,  such  as Amsterdam,  Hamburg, etc.  The rate 
of  exchange went up only on Calcutta. 
At  that  time  the  intercommunication  between  the 
European  money markets was  not  as finely adjusted  as 
it is  to-day.  At  the present  time  and  under the same 
conditions the rise in exchange would have been momen- 
tary, but it would  have been felt just  the same.  There 
are  sympathetic  crises,  just  as  there  are  sympathetic 
pains, which  the  delicate sensitiveness of  the organisms 
explains.  Thus the crisis of  1866 had for its chief cause 
the pains aroused by a slightly abnormal demand for gold 
in  India and especially by the increase  in the needs for 
actual  cash  caused  by the  suspension of  the banks of 
which we  have  spoken.  On  the other  hand, the other 
European markets had either a silver standard or bimet- 
allism; so  it  is  likewise  easy  to  understand  why they 
thought so  little  of  protecting  themselves  and showed 
so  little  anxiety,  since  the  London panic  in  its  worst 
period  was  characterized  by  a  demand for  gold.  We 
have  seen  that this  demand  was  not  very  great, since 
the continental  markets  did  not  have  to export gold, 
and  the  Bank  of  England  itself  had  only a little over 
£2,ooo,ooo less than its normal reserve. 
The Bank  of  France, bound to the State and holding 
its privilege from  the State, was  naturally  destined  to 
play a very active part in connection with  it during the National  Monetary  Commission 
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war.  The  war  that  broke  out  in  July, 1870-it  was 
declared  by  the  legislative  body  on  the  night  of  July 
14-1 5-was  to show what an important financial machine 
this  establishment was for the  Government, as well  as 
the aid it was to give it. 
At  the beginning  of  hostilities  the Government  had 
recourse to  it, and as early as July 18 borrowed 50,000,ooo 
francs. 
On ~u~ust.12  a law decreed that the notes of  the Bank 
should have legal currency  and forced currency-that  is 
to say, that every creditor should be obliged to accept the 
notes  instead  of  coin  and at the same value as current 
coin;  and by forced currency it is scarcely necessary for 
us to explain that we  mean the right of  the Bank which 
issues  the notes  not  to redeem  them  in  specie.  The 
same  law  raised  the  maximum  of  bank-note issue to 
I ,8oo,ooo,ooo  francs; then it authorized the circulation of 
25-franc notes. 
On  August  14  the  total  issue  was  increased  to 
2 ,4oo,ooo,ooo  francs, and  later to 2,800,000,000 (Decem- 
ber 29, 1871). 
The first  defeats of  the French armies brought  about 
the fall of  the Imperial Government.  A provisional gov- 
ernment  formed  by  the  Paris  deputies  followed.  As 
it was  composed  of  well-known  political  men,  and  as 
prominent  men of  several  parties  gave  it their  support 
in order to preserve domestic order, in the presence of  an 
invading  enemy,  the Government  of  September  4  was 
accepted and obeyed.  The Bank continued to act in its 
relations  with  it as  it  had  toward  the regular  govern- 
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This new Government sent a delegation into the prov- 
inces to organize armies.  Most  of  its members lived  in 
Paris, which was occupied a few'days later (September 19, 
1870) by the Germans. 
The Bank followed a similar course.  M. Rouland, the 
governor,  remained  at Paris with  Deputy Governor  M. 
de  Ploem;  and  M.  Cuvier,  the  other  deputy governor, 
accompanied by  M.  O'Quin, went  to Tours, where  the 
delegation of  the provisional government  was sitting. 
During this terrible period the Bank helped the State, 
both  in  Paris and  in the provinces, by  means of  loans. 
Here we  give the list: 
Advances of  the Rank of  France to the State at the time  of  the Franco-Prussian 
war, 1870--71. 
1870-July  18-__---__..-..-.._.-----.--..-.--..-..- 
August 18 -----.._----.-..-.-----..---...-..-- 
August 19_---.__.--.._-.__-----.-----.-.--.-- 
September 24----.---..-----.----------..-..-. 
December 5 (Paris) - - -._.  .____  ..  ___-  ---._.__  .. . 
December 5 (Tours) - - - - - - -.-.  ---._----.-..  _ .. . 
1871-January  11 _-__..._---_.__.-.------.--.----.-. 
March  13--.--..--------._----.-------------.- 
April ~g---.-------------__--.---------.---.-.- 
May  17--------._---..--.--.-..--.----.-..-.. 
May 30 ...................................... 
June ~o--_----------..--.-------------.--.--- 












150, m,  OOO 
90,000, ooo 
50,0w,ooo 
30, 000, ooo 
2I0,000,000 
Total  - - - - -.  _ - - - - -.  - - - -.  - - --  - - - - - -.  - - -.  -  I, 470,000,000 
Almost 1,5oo,ooo,ooo francs. 
a  The Bank  also paid  into the Treasury in  1873,  15o,ow,m  francs in 
gold.  (Treaty of  June 2,  1873.) 
ment. 
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The interest on these loans was fixed at first at 6 per 
cent, which was the discount  rate at that time.  After 
January  22, 1871,  the interest rate was lowered to 3  per 
cent.  The guaranties of  these loans were treasury notes. 
First of  all in the treaty of  January 22, I 871, it was agreed 
between  the Government and the Bank that the Govern- 
ment should reimburse the sums loaned it out of  its first 
available resources, either ordinary or extraordinary.  But 
circumstances were such that these sums were paid  back 
only at the end of  a certain time. 
In  the  same  way  the  Bank  advanced  a  sum  of 
200,000,000 francs to the city of  Paris  (after its surren- 
der on  January  28,  1871) to pay  the war  contribution 
due according to the terms of  the surrender.  This  loan 
which, together with the expenses incurred in negotiating 
it, rose  to 21o,ooo,ooo francs, was  arranged  at the dis- 
count rate, and the sum was to be redeemed by the city 
of  Paris in six months.  This debt was really cancelled 
only in  1875. 
These facts show that the Bank was able to play  its 
part in these difficult times and to act effectively to help 
the public authorities in the hard and painful task they 
had  to perform. 
As  a  precautionary measure, as soon as the occupation 
of  Paris was feared, the Bank had  sent to the provinces 
part  of  its  cash, the plates for the bank notes,  and the 
new  notes in a great many  boxes which were labeled in 
such a way as  to disguise  their contents.  This measure 
was far from being useless, both against the foreign enemy 
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and  the domestic  mob.  The foreign enemy, it is  true, 
could not, because of  the private character of  the Bank, 
consider its wealth as spoils of  war,  without  trampling 
under foot international law.  The case would  have been 
entirely different had the Bank been a State bank.  This 
is an advantage not to be neglected, and it is not taken 
into  account  often  enough when  the other  numerous 
and  certain  disadvantages  of  a  state  bank  are  being 
enumerated. 
As  to the insurrection which  broke  out  in  Paris  on 
March  18, 1871, which  set up  a  government  called the 
"Commune  of  Paris,"  it turned for financial help to the 
Bank.  It was  only  because  they were  forced  and con- 
strained  that the Bank  directors, living  then  in  Paris, 
gave successively several million francs to the delegates 
of  the finances of  the commune.  The sum thus turned 
over reached  16,000,000 francs.  The city of  Paris then 
had a credit of  g,4oo,ooo francs  at the Bank.  In  the 
end  the  State  and  the  city of  Paris  made themselves 
responsible for a part of  the amount, and the Bank had 
to charge  the rest to profit and loss.  At any rate the 
Bank should consider itself  rarely fortunate in not having 
been  systematically looted  by the insurrectional  govern- 
ment of  the commune. 
But these are abnormal conditions and not to be too 
much  insisted  on.  They  must  simply  be  taken  into 
account for the moral prestige which they gave the Bank 
and which it deserved in this circumstance National  Monetary  Commission  Evolution  of  Credit  a?zd  Banks 
Let us  now  review  as a  whole  the operations of  this 
institution  during  the  "terrible  year."  To  do  this we 
need only give the figures of  the chief accounts during the 
critical years; that is, until 1874, when the reserve at the 
Bank  went  back  to its average  figure before  the war. 
This table will also help us to explain the panic of  1873. 
In this period, too, the large war loans of  June, 1871, and 
July,  1872, were made. National  Monetary  Commission 
The two columns of  the sum total of  discounts and of 
average discounts clearly show the rble  in financial and 
economic credit  which  the Bank  then  fulfilled.  Before 
1870,  and during 1870 even (for the first quarter), the sum 
total of  discounts  fluctuates between  6,ooo,ooo,ooo and 
6,~oo,ooo,ooo  francs; the average of  discounts fluctuates 
around  ~00,000,000  to  6oo,ooo,ooo francs.  After  I 8  70 
the sum total of  discounts  increased  and reached  over 
I ~,~oo,ooo,ooo  francs in I 873 (a panic year), and naturally, 
too,  the average discounts rose in  the same proportions 
and attained to almost 2,300,000,000 francs in 1873.  The 
average reserve went down on the contrary ; in I 87 I  it was 
half what it was in 1870.  It  reached the figure it attained 
before the war  only in  1874.  But in contrast to it, the 
circulation made rather rapid  progress; in 1872 it reached 
2,400,000,000 francs.  This same  year (1872) the law of 
July I g authorized the Bank to raise its maximum of  issue 
to 3,200,000,000 francs.  That was a useful measure, be- 
cause in I 873 the preceding limit of  2,8oo,ooo,ooo francs 
was found to be surpassed by the average amount of  cir- 
culation.  During these difficult years the issue of  bank 
notes rendered great services both as a monetary measure, 
properly so called, and as a means of  discount: 
As  a  monetary  measure  in  that the  Bank  had  been 
authorized by the law of  August 12, 1870, to issue 25-franc 
notes, and later by the law of  December 29, 1871, to issue 
10  and  5-franc  notes.  We  were  no  longer  at a time 
when in the midst of  a panic-as  in 1847-@-the  Bank 
was  afraid  of  issuing  50-franc notes.  These  notes  cir- 
culated  without  difficulty; at the beginning of  the war, 
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it is true, when  the law of  August  14, 1870, raised  the 
maximum  issue of the Bank to 2,~oo,ooo,ooo,  there was 
indeed a difference of  15 per cent between the notes and 
coin, but that was not for long.  The loss of  the note in 
comparison with gold quickly fell to I  and even one-half 
per cent.  In reality these notes, especially those of  small 
denominations-25,  20,  10, and  5  francs-always  circu- 
lated at their face value. 
The increase in discount is explained, moreover, by the 
great activity in  economic production which followed the 
war.  France had not lost her vitality.  She had suffered 
trials.  Much capital had been destroyed in unproductive 
ways.  She had to fill up the void.  It  is a sort of  natural 
law  of  upbuilding  which  acts  on  occasions like this  for 
social organisms which  are still healthy, just  as it does 
for physical  organisms. 
The following table shows the progress  of  our foreign 




I  Imports. 
-_  --l 
1870 ---__-_----_--.-.----....-.-..-.-.--.----  1  2.861.4 
1871-.--.---.-------------------.------.-.-.-  3,566.7 
1872-.-..----.-------.-.--.-.-..-.-..-.-.----  '  3.510.3 
1873- -.  ....----.-..-.--.-.-.-..-..---.-.----.  l  3.554.8 
1874-.--.------------------.-.-..---.--------  /  3.507.1 
--  - --  l 
This growth in our foreign commerce, which in 1873 was 
nearly  1,7oo,ooo,ooo in  comparison  with  1870  (a year 
which  shows  about  the  average  of  the  ten  preceding 
years), is all the more significant in that France had lost 













7,342.  I 
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This commercial progress, together with the investment 
of  French  capital abroad  (making France a  creditor  of 
many  foreign  countries  for  the interest  on  very  large 
sums),  explains  how  it  was  possible  to meet  the  war 
indemnity  of  j,000,00o,Ooo francs  without  paying  more 
than a small balance in actual coin and without  depriv- 
ing  the country  of  specie. 
The market at home was not  less active than foreign 
trade; the discounts of  the Bank are an evidence of  this. 
In spite  of  the terrible  crisis  the country  had  passed 
through  credit  was  not  affected  a  single  instant.  An 
example of  this is in the Bank's almost complete collec- 
tion  of  the  commercial bills,  the time  of  payment  on 
which  had  been  extended, and which  in the provinces, 
as  well  as  in  Paris,  amounted  to  a  total  of  nearly 
900,000,000 francs.  The extending  of  the time  of  pay- 
ment had been  a necessity.  When France was invaded 
by  the  enemy,  when  all  able-bodied  men  were  in  the 
army, during the months when Paris was occupied, trade 
and industries  concentrated all their efforts in providing 
for everybody in general and for the troops in particular. 
So payments had to be postponed, and  laws and decrees 
were  made to extend  the  rights  of  creditors up to the 
1st  of  July,  1871.  The  Bank  of  France  seemed  des- 
tined  to be  affected by these  measures  and to run the 
risk  of  heavy  losses.  The commercial bills, which  were 
part  of  its "portfolio,"  and payment  of  which  was  ex- 
tended from August I 3, I 870, to July I 2, I 871, amounted 
in Paris to 630,000,ooo and in the provinces to 238,760,000 
francs. 
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There were other additions in 1873 and in 1874, but in 
the end  the Bank  lost  not  more  than  7,000,000 of  the 
Repayments made before the expiration of the last ex- 
tension -...-----...-----.---------------------.-- 
Remaining due with additions in 1872  ---- - ---------.-- 
Repayments in  1872  _-.__-----  -.  ..................... 
Remaining to be collected ..................... 
868,000,000 francs of  bills on which the time of  payment 
had been extended.  That represents a loss of  about 0.8 
per cent which, under  the circumstances, was very small. 
Assuredly it is  well  to note that the Bank of  France 
discounts only first-class paper, with three signatures, or 
two  signatures  with  collateral  security.  Many  of  its 
commercial  bills  were  bills  rediscounted  for  bankers. 
Still, in view of  the disasters France had then suffered, it 
361.000.  ooo 
273.3  12,  ooo 
~66,520,  ooo 
6,792.  ooo 





regard for meeting payments in commercial and industrial 
circles.  Discount, moreover, in France is always a very 
safe banking operation, provided it is carefully watched. 
The material for discount is good; as a result of  the qual- 
ities of  prudence inherent in the character of  the people, 
even the smallest shopkeepers are mindful of  the bills they 
have to meet and honor them. 
The Bank of  France-thanks  to the  successive  extension 
of  its  right  of  issue  to  1,800,000,000 francs,  then  to 
2,4oo,m,m francs,  soon  after  to  2,800,000,000, and 
finally to 3,200,000,000 francs in July, 1872-was  able to 
meet the monetary situation and the needs of  credit. National  Monetary  Commission 
The Government has never hesitated any more than the 
chambers to raise the limit of  issue higher and higher.  We 
may even ask what is the use of  this legislative restriction 
on  the maximun  of  issue.  In any case  as needs  arise, 
the Bank has been able to fulfil its function of  relieving 
commercial discounts  by  its notes  whenever  necessary. 
Placed under the same conditions, the Bank of  Bngland, 
saddled  with  the law  of  1844, could not  have rendered 
such services as has the Bank of  Prance.  It is true that 
in times of  panic in London they do not hesitate to loosen 
the shackles which  Robert Peel so unfortunately forged, 
and so there comes  about the curious paradox that the 
law of  1844, established to safeguard the Bank of  England 
in times of  panic, becomes during those very panics an 
awkward  check,  from  which  the  Bank  is  provisionally 
freed only to have the check put on again when times are 
normal and there is no use for it. 
We can see by examining the table inserted above, in 
which  are  given  the  average  totals  for  the  principal 
accounts of  the Bank, that the discount rate constantly 
rose from the last months of  1870 to 1874.  If  its maxi- 
mum did not rise above 6 per cent, its minimum did not 
go lower than 5 per cent during the years I 8  7 I  and I 8  7  2. 
In I 873, because of  the crisis that took place at  this time, 
the maximum  discount  rate exceeded  7 per  cent.  The 
fact to note here is that during the four years from 1871 
on, the average discount rate did not go below 4 per cent. 
Now, in the years preceding the war of  I 870-71, we must 
go back to 1864, a year of  acute panic, to find an average 
higher than 4 per cent.  The result is that from  1871 to 
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1874, inclusive, the dividends sent out to shareholders of 
the Bank reached figures unknown till then. 
Here  is  a  table  giving  the average  rate  of  discount 
and the net  dividend  per  share.  It allows us  to make 
a rapid comparison. 
Year. 
Average  /  disz,"~t  (  di$%nd. 









Only  superficial  minds  could  be  astonished  at  the 
contrast between the large profits realized  by  the Bank 
in  panic  times  and  the general  depression which  panic 
creates.  The  Bank,  a  house  of  refuge  for credit, pro- 
vided  with  the right  of  issue, but  having  to safeguard 
the underlying supply of  available  funds constituted by 
its metallic reserve, intervenes, to be sure, in panics when 
the  case  is  urgent.  Automatically  it gets  its  services 
paid  for through  the necessity of  protecting its reserve. National  Monetary  Commission 
When  the cause of  the panic  is  a  long  and costly  war 
like  that  of  1870-71 ; when  people  dread  very  serious, 
unforeseen events  (and they happened  in  this case), the 
Bank with the sole right of  issue must use but not abuse 
its  privilege.  This  is  what  the  Bank  did  in  1870-71 
and  1872.  It covered  the  risk  of  having  its  reserve 
depleted, and the risk which the extensions of  payments 
on bills might  have brought  about, by  keeping  its rate 
of  discount at an average rate, which does not seem  to 
have been  too  high,  given the average rate of  interest 
on money  at that time.  So there is  no occasion to be 
surprised at the large dividends of  the years  187 I, 1872, 
and I 873.  Do we reproach doctors and apothecaries with 
making  more  profits  in  times  of  an  epidemic  than  in 
normal times  ? 
111.-THE  LARGE  LOANS  AND  THE  PAYMENT  OF  THE 
WAR INDEMNITY. 
When the preliminaries of  peace  were  signed at Ver- 
sailles in February,  1871, it was  stipulated that France 
should pay  Germany  a war  indemnity  of  5,ooo,o00,000 
francs.  In article 7  of  the treaty of  Frankfort  (May  10, 
1871) the payment  of  this  indemnity  was  arranged  on 
the following terms : 
Francs. 
Thirty days after order is reestablished  in Paris- .. .  -.  -.  - - -  500,000,000 
During the year 1871 .------..--.-----.  --.  .. -.-  .-  .--  -.  I,  000, coo, coo 
May I, 1872 ---------..--------...-...--..--.--..-...  500,000,000 
March  2,  1874 ---.------..----.--....----.----...-...  3,000,000,000 
Total--. ---  - - - ---  - --  - - - --  --  -- -.  - - --  - - - - - - - - .  -  5, 000, ooo,ooo 
Besides this  the French  Government  had  to pay  on 
March  3 every  year  interest  at 5 per  cent  on  the  last 
3,000,000,000 francs, and at the same time it could  (by 
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giving  three  months'  notice)  make  advance  payments 
on the final payment due March 2, 1874. 
As to the method of  payment, it could be paid in gold or 
silver, in bank notes of  the Bank of  England, the Bank 
of  Prussia,  the  Royal  Bank  of  the  Netherlands,  the 
National  Bank of  Belgium, in bills to order, or in nego- 
tiable bills of  exchange of  the highest character for the 
full cash value on these same countries. 
Here we have to do with banking operations, real bank- 
ing  operations,  the  foundations  of  which are  both  the 
public credit, regarding the money borrowed by the State 
to pay off  its debt, and private credit, taking into account 
the situation of  France  in  this respect  both  with refer- 
ence  to the  domestic  and  the  foreign  money  markets. 
It seems  to us  that, in  a  treatise  of  this  kind  on  the 
evolution of  credit and  credit  institutions in  France, all 
these  operations  should  be  reviewed  in  their  essential 
points. 
The exchange for the thaler was fixed  at 3.75 francs; 
that of  the German florin at 2.15  francs.  It was  also 
arranged, after the treaty  of  May  10, that  125,000,ooo 
francs  could  be  paid  in  notes  on  the Bank  of  France; 
then it was agreed that 98,400 francs still owed by Ger- 
many to the city of Paris on the accounts of  the payments 
made by  Paris on the 200,000,000 francs of  the war  in- 
demnity  should be  carried over  to the  account  of  the 
French Government.  Part of  the railroad system of  the 
East  comprised in the annexed provinces having been given 
to Germany for the price of  325,000,m francs, this sum 
was also to be deducted  from  the  5,ooo,ooo,ooo francs. National  Monetary  Commission 
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The French Government  remained  in debt to the com- 
pany for that sum. 
The final amount to be paid to Germany may be shown 
thus : 
Francs. 
War indemnity ---.-----.  .  .-  ..  . .  .  ---.  ..  - .-.  .-  --.  .  -  ~,OOO,OOO,  000 
Payments made on account:  Prancs. 
Railroad Company of  the East-  ---  - --  - -  325,'ooo, ooo 
City of  I'aris .._____---.-----------  98,400 
325,098,400 
Payments made in notes of  the Bank of 
France-  - --  - - - - --- -.  I 25,000,000 
450,098,400 
Difference- _  _  _  _ - - -  .  . .  - -.  -.  -.  .  -  -  --..-  4,549,901  S  600 
These 4,549,901,600 francs had then to be paid in Ger- 
man money in a certain number of  payments; that meant 
that the payments made in English or Dutch money had 
to  be  converted  into  German  money.  The  exchange 
therefore  fell  upon  the  French  Government.  We  have 
been dealing as yet only with the principal.  We must add 
the interest, which was 301,145,078  francs, and this, added 
to the capital stated above, made a total of  4,85  I ,046,678 
francs. 
On this basis let us give the results of  the two loans made 
by the French Government to pay the indemnity. 
The first was authorized by the law of  June  20, 1871. 
It was  made  in  government  5 percents  and  by  public 
subscriptions.  The price of  issue was  82.50 francs. 
Whereas the State asked for subscription to ~~~,ooo,ooo 
francs  of  rentes,  representing  an actual  capital  of 
2,000,b00,000  francs,  296,821,760 francs  of  rentes  (or 
nearly  ~~~,ooo,ooo)  were  actually  subscribed for, repre- 
senting  a  capital  of  ~,8~~,~oo,ooo  francs.  Please  note 
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that this result was obtained in June, 1871, not long after 
the civil  war,  and while  the monuments of  Paris were 
still smoking from the fires set by the insurgents of  the 
commune. 
About a year later another loan was authorized by the 
law of  July 15, 1872.  The amount was for  3,000,000,000 
francs at 5 per cent.  It  was issued at 84.50 francs.  The 
success was much greater than that of  the first loan, the 
results of  which had surprised more than one experienced 
financier. 
By the loan of  July,  1872, France asked the public to 
subscribe  for  207,026,310  francs  of  rentes.  The  sub- 
scribers called for  the tremendous  sum of  2,592,668,435 
francs  (almost  2 ,6oo,ooo,ooo francs), which  represented 
a  capital  of  nearly  44,mo,ooo,ooo  francs.  The  share 
of  foreign  countries  in  this  enormous  total was  more 
than  ~6,ooo,ooo,ooo francs  ;  France's  share  about 
I 8,ooo,om,ooo francs. 
To be sure we  must take into account here the inflation 
of  subscriptions through  fear of  having them cut down. 
Already in the case of  the first loan subscriptions had been 
cut  down  more  than  half.  Still, while  making  allow- 
ances for this inflation, it is none the less true that the 
anticipation which gave rise to it showed what confidence 
financiers in all countries and the public in general had 
in the solvency and credit of  France. 
Now  the reason why  France  had  good  public  credit 
was because its private credit-bank  credit-had  remained 
so good; and because in a few months the country had re- 
acted with steady, vigorous, economic activity against the National  Monetary  Commission 
disasters it had suffered.  This was shown in its foreign 
trade and the receipt of  taxes. 
The first loan produced 2,225,000,000 francs; and out 
of  this sum  I ,561  ,000,000 (or 70 per cent) were turned in 
to pay the war indemnity. 
The second loan-of  course, after the cutting down of 
subscriptions-produced  3,500,000,ooo  francs,  of  which 
3,002,000,000  francs were used in payment to Germany- 
that is, 87 per cent of  this loan. 
The principal of  the indemnity was paid by these two 
loans as well as the expenses, which amounted to a little 
more  than  14,500,000 francs.  As  to the interest,  that 
was deducted from the general funds of  the budget.  We 
are going to enter into some explanations relating to the 
operations brought  about by  these  payments;  but  first 
of  all  we  must  review  in  a  comprehensive  table  the 
categories of  payments, which are three in number.  It 
will then be easier to understand how France prevented 
a large amount of  specie from leaving the country, and 




Money  in account with the Railroad Company of  the 
East--------------------------.---------------  325, 000, 000 
Money in account with city of  Paris  98, 400 
Total first category--- ------------------- ---  325,098,400 
a  The payments which were to have been made during 1871, then May I, 
1873, then March 2,  1874-as  we have said above-were  completed before 
that date; the deposits  for the payment  of  the last 3,000,000,000 francs 
were made between August 29,  1872, and September 5, 1873. 
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BANK  NOTES;  GERMAN  COIN;  SPECIE. 
Francs. 
Bank of  France notes ----_-----___---.----  -------  125,000,000.00 
German notes and coin, brought in by the invasion---  105,039,145 18 
Frenchgoldcoin_-_--_--------_---.--------------  273,003, 058.10 
French silver coin--- _  _ -- .-__--_-____.-----_--_--_  2399 29'9  875.75 
-- 
Total second category -.-----.---------------  742,334,07903 
LETTERS  OF  EXCHANGE. 
German funds in discharge of  indebtedness  ----------- 2,799,514, 183.72 
Funds other than German, including the marks banco-  I,  448,812,190.54 
Total third category -----------.------------  4,248,326,374.26 
General total of  three categories  --_-----------  5,315, 758, 853. 29 
As  we  see, out of  this  enormous sum  of  more  than 
5,315,000,000 francs only a little more than 378,000,000 
francs were  paid  in  French  coin.  And  in reality  only 
275,000,ooo  francs in French coin left our territory a directly 
for the indemnity, for France  bought  g3,ooo,ooo francs 
worth of  silver bars from the reserve of  the Hamburg Bank 
and had them minted in France.  These 378,000,ooo francs 
were paid in  gold  pieces  and silver coined  in 20, 10, and 
5-franc  pieces.  You  will  notice  that  the  number  in 
question is not an exact multiple of  five.  This anomaly is 
explained by the fact that in  this figure are counted the 
prices of  the money bags and sacks. 
The operation was conducted with skill and good judg- 
ment.  It would  have been difficult to avoid a monetarv 
crisis in France  if  the method  of  payment of  the third 
a We shall see later that this operation  caused nevertheless some rather 
heavy gold exports. 
b The price of  the money bags was fixed at  o.  10 franc, and that of  the 
sacks at 1.65 francs. National  Monetary  Commission 
category had not  been  resorted to.  Such a crisis would 
have been especially fatal to trade since at that time dis- 
counts were increasing in very large proportion~. At this 
point we  shall  recall  the  average  figures  for  the years 
187  1-72  and I 873 of the reserve, the notes in circulation, 







In regard to gold, a few purchases were made on the 
spot so successfully that the figure of  275,000,000 francs 
indicated  above  has  to  be  cut  down  again.  Barely 
250,000,000 francs were taken out of  active circulation in 
France. 
On this occasion the Bank of  France by an agreement 
of  May, 1873, lent 150,000,000  francs in gold to the State, 
which formed the greater part of  the sum paid in gold. 
It was not the payment itself  of  the indemnity which at 
this time made France lose a part of  her metallic stock, a 
part which seems to have far exceeded the sum of  250,- 
ooo,ooofrancs.  But we  shall see that by its rebound the 
payment of  the indemnity indirectly caused gold to leave 
the country. 
The third category of  methods of  payment is the most 
interesting, because it touches  most  closely  commercial 
credit and banking operations.  The method adopted was 
simple; it is the one any bank  or merchant would have 
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followed  in  paying  a  debt contracted  with  a  foreigner. 
Moreover, the Government from the start was beset with 
bankers and dealers in exchange, who came and offered 
foreign paper.  France sent as much capital as possible 
abroad by buying all paper for exchange, and all the pos- 
sible bills it could get, no matter on what country.  Then 
as soon as the capital was collected in the form of  these 
foreign  bills,  it sent  them  to Germany.  For  the first 
2,000,000,000 francs  Germany  had  the English,  Dutch, 
and other foreign paper  converted  into German paper at 
France's  expense.  France finding the cost  of  exchange 
too  high-it  was  more than  I I ,ooo,ooo francs-took  this 
business upon itself and gained by it.  This conversion was 
made easily enough at London, because Germany at that 
time was in debt to England  for loans made during the 
war in the form of short-term notes, and also for supplies. 
The number  of  foreign bills  obtained  by the French 
Government rose to more than I  20,000.  TO  find so many 
bills three means were used: 
I. The payment in foreign funds of  subscriptions made 
in France as well  as of  the anticipatory payments made 
at home  or  abroad  was  encouraged  by  the  loans  of 
2,000,000,000 and 3,000,000,000  francs. 
2.  The second means consisted in an arrangement which 
was made at the time of the borrowing of  3,000,000,000 
francs from several banking houses: an exchange opera- 
tion was combined with the underwriting of  the subscrip- 
tion to the loan by these banking houses. 
3.  The third means was to buy foreign bills directly on 
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The first means (payment of  the loan subscriptions in 
foreign funds)  gave the treasury  a very  large sum, viz, 
I ,773,000,000 francs. 
The second method rested on the following agreement: 
As in the case of  the loan of  2,000,000,000  francs the Go-v- 
ernment turned to large banking houses which would have 
been able, unassisted, to underwrite the loan.  This was a 
useless  precaution,  as  we  have  seen; however,  in  such 
troublous  times  and in spite of  the success of  the first 
loan, recourse was had for the second loan to a group of 
bankers.  In the  agreement  signed  with  them  it was 
stipulated that they should furnish 700,000,000 francs in 
foreign paper,  which  allowed  them  to receive  a  rather 
large commission.  It was also a way of  interesting these 
houses in the rate of  exchange, since they had to buy ex- 
change, and would not,  therefore, force the  price up.  Fifty- 
five banking houses belonging to all countries, some of  which 
were representing other houses, signed this agreement. 
The first and second methods brought into the treasury 
2,473,000,000  francs in foreign exchange.  So I ,775,000,000 
francs remained to complete the figures given above. 
This  last  sum  was  procured  by  the  third  method, 
namely, direct purchase by the Government. 
When we  go to the bottom of  the matter, we see that 
what facilitated these operations was the confidence which 
the  world  at large  had  in  France, a  country  rich  in 
capital, whose activity since the war was a sign of  great 
vitality and productive power. 
This  is  the place  to remark  on  the  export  of  gold 
indirectly  caused by the payment of  the indemnity.  In 
selling  all the foreign paper  they  could  to the French 
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Treasury, the bankers  were  creating a scarcity of  avail- 
able  French  effects  on  foreign markets; the result  was 
that those who owed money abroad were obliged to pay 
by sending gold, because exchange having  been  sold to 
this large new client, the State, had become very dear. 
It  is not for us to dwell at this  point on the arbitrage 
operations that the Government  encouraged between cer- 
tificates of  rentes that were  fully  paid up and those that 
were not; facts of  this  sort  do not enter into the special 
discussion of  banking  operations  that we are engaged in 
here. 
A  few  quotations  of  exchange  on  London-London 
exchange being  the best  index  in judging  money  strin- 
gency-will  show  the  fluctuations  which  our  metallic 
stock underwent as a result of  these operations 
Paris exchange  on London. 
Francs. 
1871-June  27 ---------.----..--~~.---~.~-~~~~~-~.~....  25.22 
September 26----.----.----..--------------.---.----  25.45 
October  17 --------.-.------------~~--~~~~---...-~~~  26.18% 
December 26-----.----.---..-------.---------..-----  25.73 
March 26----------------------------------------- 25.26 
November 12----------------------~----~.---~~~~~~  25.68% 
March 
25.33  June ~o---------_-------------.-------------------- 
25.57% 
The quotations given here are the highest  and lowest 
reached during this period. 
The average price of  government purchases on London 
was  25.494 francs.  The highest price quoted on London 
was 26.18%  francs gold, and the price of  26  francs was 
kept up for two months.  From the close of  the year 1872 
exchange became more normal.  This was a result of  the 
agreement made with the syndicate of  bankers. National  Monetary  Commission 
Here is a short table showing the fluctuations  of  the 
premium on gold, 20-franc pieces, and bullion: 
[Premium per  I ,ooo.l 
zo-franc pieces.  Gold bars. 
Year. 
-pp 
NOTE.-In  the loan which the Bank of  France made to 
1871  25 
1872 ..-.....-.....-....-.....-.....  II 
1873  .-...--...-.....-...-......-...l  9 % 
1874 ..--...-....--...-..... ....--.  1% 
the State, to make advance payments,  it furnished  the 
200,000,000 francs of  the loan  in gold.  It seemed pref- 
erable, then, to ask the Bank for gold rather than notes. 
The reason was that at that time the Bank had a reserve 
-  .- -  --  -  -  ---  - 




of  only  ~oo,ooo,ooo  francs in notes  before reaching  the 
limit  of  its issue.  It did  not  care  to raise  this limit 





deemed better to leave the Bank in possession of  its notes 
to help  it in  making  discounts.  If  it had  given  bank 





of  this gold would have been exported, and the case would 
have been the same after all as giving gold to the State, 
except, however, that the State gained gold thereby-dis- 
charging indebtedness at par-and  the bank note in the 
meanwhile kept its credit. 
It is important to emphasize here how much progress 
France had  made since the beginning of  the century in 
the understanding  and  habits  of  credit  in  connection 
with the issue of  notes; for when in 1805 it was rumored 
that Napoleon had carried off  gold from the Bank in order 
to make war in Germany a mad panic broke out. 
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THE BANK  OF  FRANCE AND  THE  DEVELOPMENT 
OF  CREDIT,  1875  TO  THE PRESENT TIME. 
INTRODUCTORY. 
Extension of the credit companies.-The  Bank of  France remains the center of  the 
credit organization in  France.-Its  gold  reserve  increases.-The  railroad panic. 
The agreement of 1883.-Panics  of 1882 and 1889.-The  panic of  the local banks. 
This third part comprises the study as a whole of  the 
period between 1875 and the present time. 
It  is a period especially remarkable for the development 
of  the great credit companies, first in France, then abroad, 
by means of  branch offices. 
As the companies expanded, they tended to become in- 
stitutions  somewhat  resembling the English  joint  stock 
banks.  They  were  not,  properly  speaking, banks  for 
financing industrial enterprises.  They continued to carry 
on  large  operations  in  disposing  of  securities, but were 
principally  concerned with  selling  securities  that  might 
be called official-state  and  town  funds, etc.  They suc- 
ceeded  in  building  up  an extensive  discount  business. 
Their  deposits, in  fact, grew to large  proportions.  The 
nature of these deposits and the character of  their clients, 
influenced the nature of  their operations in making them 
avoid  taking risks.  It is  through  these  companies  that 
the surplus capital, not used in France, is invested abroad. 
The  Bank  of  France  still  remains  the center  of  the 
credit  organization  in  France.  Even  if  it  makes  dis- 
counts directly to clients,  it is  especially  and above all 
a bank of  rediscount  for bankers  and credit companies. 
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Its r61e  in this direction  is becoming  more  and more 
clearly  defined,  in  proportion  as  the  business  of  the 
credit  companies  expands.  As  the  savings  of  France 
increase its wealth, part of  this wealth is converted into 
capital  invested  abroad,  France  becomes  creditor  of 
foreign  countries,  through  the interest  money  that its 
citizens receive, and so shows a favorable rate of  exchange. 
The  country's  stock  of  coin  increases; as  a  result  of 
this the Bank of  France sees its gold reserve grow.  Its 
silver reserve, on the other hand, tends to diminish.  In 
fact, since  France  stopped  coining  silver, owing  to the 
depreciation  of  the white  metal,  it is  bimetallist on its 
domestic,  although  gold  monometallist  on  the  foreign 
market.  Thus the gold  reserve  of  the Bank of  France 
has  lately  gone beyond  3,6oo,ooo,on, francs.  Its silver 
reserve is lowered only by the use made of  5-franc pieces 
to recoin fractional money. 
This  accumulation  of  gold  has  another  cause.  The 
note  of  the  Bank  of  France  enjoys  an unquestioned 
&edit; it is much in demand, and tends to replace  gold 
coin  in  circulation.  It  has,  therefore,  helped  to bring 
back  to the coffers of  the Bank a  part of  the stock of 
gold in circulation. 
This period witnesses, too, a  still more marked decline 
in the rate of  interest.  This is due to the abundance of 
capital, and also to the ease with which it is placed at the 
disposal  of  the public  by means  of  the credit  societies 
and their mode  of  procedure, so difierent  from that of 
private banks. 
Of  course,  this evolution  did  not  take place  without 
crises  and difficulties.  Prosperous  times,  which  always 
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tend to produce excessive and risky speculation, are fol- 
lowed  by periods  of  liquidation-of  reflection, one might 
say,  which  in  turn  is  nothing  but  the  natural  conse- 
quence  of  the conditions  brought  about by  such  over- 
speculation. 
In this case, one of  these periodic crises was complicated 
by a crisis  in  the national  finances caused  by too great 
haste  in  completing  the  railroad  system  of  France. 
Prospective  results  loomed  too  large  in  the  distance, 
and  dwindled  as  they  came  near.  The  whole  thing 
ended  by the State's making  an arrangement  with  the 
railroad companies, which was a sort of necessary liquida- 
tion of  affairs, and was called  "the agreement of  1883." 
However, in spite of  many errors and useless State ex- 
penditures, tax returns came in regularly, and more pros- 
perous years produced  a surplus and furnished  abundant 
resources  to the  growing  budgets.  The  price  of  state 
stock  rose  steadily,  as a  natural  result  of  the general 
lowering of  the rate of interest on money, owing to the 
abundance of  capital.  This  rise  lead  the  Ministers  of 
Finance  to  make  conversions.  The  profits  of  these 
conversions, however, were quickly  swallowed  up in  the 
rising  tide of  expenses.  There was  a  dark  side to the 
picture.  The economic evolution  was not  accomplished 
without  difficulties  and friction.  We shall mention  the 
panic of  1882, simple enough in its causes; then the one 
of  1889,  which  contains  valuable  insfruction.  The 
Comptoir d'Escompte was destroyed by it, but soon  rose 
from its ashes and resumed the work  interrupted by the 
ruinous  mistakes of  a  bad  management.  Henceforth it National  Monetary  Commission 
extended its activities by following a wise and profitable 
plan  of  business. 
The local or provincial banks suffered from the exten- 
sion of  the agencies of  the credit companies, and up to a 
certain point  also from the increase of  the branch offices 
of  the Bank of  France, which  has opened, especially of 
late years, branches or suboffices and made  "bankable" 
many  affiliated towns  in  numerous  localities.  Will  the 
local banks be able to adapt themselves to this newsitua- 
tion?  Certain ones made the attempt, it seems, and were 
changed to district credit companies;  others disappeared; 
still others remained, and confined  themselves to certain 
special functions. 
Finally,  we  shall  take occasion  to explain  the condi- 
tions under which the State in 1897 renewed the privilege 
of  the Bank of  France.  It asked services of  the Bank in 
the shape of  loans and a share in the profits.  The Bank, 
however, remained self-governing and independent of  the 
State.  We  shall have to express fears for the future in 
what concerns both  the Bank of  France  and the credit 
companies, with  regard  to the restrictive measures that 
are being planned against them by a certain political and 
social faction. 
CHAPTER  I.-The  situation  of  France  after  the  war.  A 
glance  at  the  development  of  saving  and  savings  insti- 
tutions. 
Creating capital by economy is at the very foundation 
of  French  finance.  This  particular  characteristic  be- 
came still more marked after the war of  1870-71.  There 
was need of  it, to be sure, to heal the country's wounds, 
to restore its military equipment, to organize new indus- 
trial undertakings or transform existing ones.  The sav- 
ings banks are an indication, especially in France, of  the 
development in the creation of  capital.  In thefollowing 
table we  give for every five years the balance due depos- 
itors on December 31 from the private savings banks, and 
also, after 1885, the balances due depositors on the same 
date from the National Savings Bank, adding to this the 
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The quinquennial average of  the years which preceded 
the war of  1870-71  of  the balance due depositors on De- 
cember  31  was  61  g,ooo,ooo francs. 
It is seen, then, in the thirty years from  1875 to 1905 
that the total funds of  the French savings banks increased 
from  681,000,000  to  4,821,000,000  francs,  or  nearly 
~,ooo,ooo,ooo  francs, increasing sixfold.  And, as we have 
said, this is only one of  the signs of  the growth of  capital. 
In  this interval the population had not increased to any 
great extent; it was  estimated  in 1875 at 36,5oo,ooo, ancl 
in  1905  at a little over  3g,ooo,ooo inhabitants. 
And this progress in saving was made at a time when 
the expenses of  the budget  were  increasing. 
Here is a list for the same years as in the previous table 
of  the resources  put  at the disposal of  the Minister  of 
Finance through taxes and public revenues of  all kinds. 
The resources called extraordinary, which come from loans, 
do not  enter  into the calculation. 
Ordznary recezpts of  the budget. 
Francs 
1875  ---.  .  - . -. .  . . -.  ---.-  -.  .--  --- ---.  2,705,300,000 
1880--- . -.-.-  .  -  ---- -.-  - -.-  . .. .---.  .--  2,957,000,000 
1885--  - . - -.  - - . .--  - -.  - - - --.  .  - - --  -  .  - -  - -  3,056,600,000 
1890__  - . .-..------  .-----------  - .----  --.-  3,229,400,  000 
1895  -  -  - -  - -. .  _  _  - -.  . . .  _  _  _  _  3,416,000,  ooo 
I  900-  .  - .  -  - -.  - .  - .  - .  - - - - .  .  -  - _.  -  _  3,8  14,000,ooo 
1905--  -  - . -.  ---- -.  .  ---.-  .  . .  .-.  -  3,  766,000,000 
So, in thirty years  the ordinary receipts of  the budget 
increased  by  I ,ooo,ooo,ooo francs-no  small  additional 
burden  for  the country.  The  quinquennial  average  of 
ordinary  receipts  for  the  years  preceding  1870  was 
I ,8oo,ooo,ooo  francs.  The expenses of  the war increased 
the  ordinary  receipts  by  means  of  new  taxes  to 
Evolution  Credit  and  Banks 
2,406,ooo,ooo francs in  1872, and to 2,679,500,000 francs 
in 1873. 
The free deposits of  securities at the Bank  of  France 
increased in  large proportions  (in spite of  the competi- 
tion of the great credit societies which organized an impor- 
tant service for this  operation). 
For  the ten  years  preceding the war  of  1870-71  the 
average  number of  depositors was about 25,000 and the 
average value of  securities on  deposit was  I ,300,000,000 
francs.  The following table will  give an idea of  this in- 
crease : 
[Mlll~on  francs ] 
Year 
The  increase  of  transferable  securities in general has 
Number 
of deposl- 





Leon Say, in his remarkable report on the payment of 
the war indemnity in 1875,  estimated the value of  foreign 
securities owned by the French at from ~o,ooo,ooo,ooo  to 
12,000,000,000  francs.  It is three times as much to-day. 
It is  not  our  intention  to  enlarge  upon  this  question, 
which  must  be  treated  by  another  author  in  another National  Monetary  Commission 
study.  It  will be  enough for us to give these few figures, 
the first  one  taken  from  M.  Say, and the others from 
M.  Newmarck. 
Estimate of  foreign negotiable securities owned  by the French. 
Francs. 
1875  10,000,000,0mto  12,ooo,ooo,m 
1880 ... .  .  .---.  ----.---------.  .----  13, ooo,  ooo, ooo to 15, ooo, ooo, ooo 
1890 __  .. -.  ..I-_  _ .. - - --  --  - - --  - -.  - --  -  18, m,  m,  ooo to 20, m,  ooo, ooo 
,900 .. -.  . -.  .  .  - - -.  .  - -.  - - --  - - - -.  - - -  25, mo,  000, om  to 27,000,000,000 
1903 -.  . -.  .---  .. .-.-----  .. .----.  .  28, ooo, ooo, ooo to 30, ooo, ooo, ooo 
The securities listed  on  the official  Paris  Bourse  (ac- 
cording to the estimate of  December 3  I, I 902)  represent 
the  sum  of  130,000,000,000  francs,  divided  into 
6~,ooo,ooo,ooo  francs  in  French  securities  and 
66,ooo,ooo,ooo in foreign securities.  If  to this are added 
securities  not  officially  quoted,  and  negotiable  at the 
bank, estimated at from seven to eight billion francs, we 
have  a  total of  nearly  140,000,000,000,  of  which  about 
go,ooo,ooo,ooo are French  still, according  to  statistical 
estimates based  partly  on  facts and partly  on theory. 
Without yielding too much to the magic of  these figures, 
it is certain that "movable wealth," to use a current ex- 
pression, has been much increased in the last thirty years. 
And  this increase of  capital in France is not the special 
work of  a group of  capitalists but for the most part of  the 
middle-class citizens, as we  have already had occasion to 
point  out. 
But we  will not insist further on the fact that a large 
amount  of  capital was  created  in  France by  means  of 
economy; one need not be either an expert financier or a 
professional statistician to discover it.  There is no end 
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of  evidence.  Moreover, the consequences of  this accumu- 
lation of capital helped to emphasize still more the larger 
supply of which it was the object.  The rate of  interest was 
lowered, in general, and the discount rate in particular. 
The State profited by this to make successive conversions 
of  its stock.  The law of  November  27,  1883, made the 
conversion  of  5 per  cent stock  to 4 g  per  centj that of 
November 7, 1887, converted the 4%  per cent and 4 per 
cent stock to 3% per cent; then that of  January 17, 1894, 
converted  the 4% per cent to 3% per cent; and, finally, 
that of  July 9, 1902, converted the 3% per cent to 3 per 
cent.  These conversions involved a total capital of  more 
than 2 I ,212,000,000 francs, and were  all successful. 
If  we  have called  to mind  these  general points,  it is 
with a view to emphasizing one thing: The sources of  the 
accumulation  of  capital  always  end  by  influencing the 
manner of  organization and working method of  the credit 
institutions  of  a  country.  It is in  national  habits and 
character  that  these  have  their  principal  roots.  This 
will  appear  presently, when we  reach  the study of  the 
credit  companies.  But, first  of  all, we  must  describe 
briefly the crisis of  1882, then that of  1889, outlining at 
the  same  time  the  operations  of  the  Bank  of  France 
during this period. Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
CHAPTER  11.-The  crises  of  1882 and  1889--4  brief 
survey of  the operations of  the Bank of  France from  1875  to 
1889-The  Comptoir dlEscomfite. 
The cbnstruction of  new  lines of  railroads  after 1870-71.-The  Freycinet pro- 
gramme.-Too  small estimate of  expenses.-Creation  of  redeemable government 
stock.-Capital  borrowed on redeemable 3 per cents.-Extraordinary  expenditures 
for public works, 1878-1882.-The  State in difficulties.-The  agreement of  1883.- 
Speculation from 1876 to  1882.-Investment  banks float large issues.-Success  of 
these issues.-The  exaggerated rise in stocks.-The  crash.-Intervention  of the 
Bank of France.-First  effects  of  the panic.  The rate of  discount rises.-The  credit 
of the bank notes extends  and increases.-Bank  dividends resulting from the 
panic.-The  Comptoir, during the war, meets all obligations.-Precautions  taken 
to keep up relations between the foreign and home agencies.-The  Comptoir con- 
tinues its operations during the Commune.-It  cooperates in  1871 in issuing  5- 
franc notes.-The  Comptoir shares the loans made necessary by  the war.-The 
deposits of the Comptoir after the war.-Fall  in the price of silver.  Business in 
the Far East.-Converting  and unifying of  the Egyptian debt.  R61e of  the Comp- 
toir.-Increase  in total of discounts.-Founding  of agencies in Australia and San 
Francisco.-Public  works  undertaken.-Competition  of  the other credit  compa- 
nies.-Cont~nuation of the Comptoir for twenty years.-Conversion  and loan opera- 
tions.-Stagnation  of  business in 1887.-Political  incidents, foreign and domestic.- 
Idle deposits.-First  loans to  Metal  Company.-Absurdity  of  this speculation.- 
The Comptoir continues its loans.-Increased  production of  the copper mines.- 
The Metal Company is unable to  meet  engagements.-Intervention  of  the Bank 
of  France.--Loan  of  140,000,000  francs to the Comptoir.-How  the  ban was 
made.-Advantages  of the monopoly  of  issue  for  the Bank.-Guaranty  of  the 
commercial paper  of  the  Comptoir.-Good  results  of  the  liquidation  of  the 
Comptoir.-Reorganization  of the Comptoir. 
The period from 1875 to 1882 was a time of  undoubted 
prosperity.  This  prosperity  was  destined  to  end  in  a 
panic  brought  about principally  by two causes.  One  is 
time-honored,  and  both  paves  the way  for panics and 
makes  them  more  acute:  it  is  over-speculation.  The 
other was special and may be termed accidental, although 
it had a precedent:  it was  the too  great and too  hasty 
extension of  our railroad system. 
We  shall  consider the second  cause  briefly,  recalling 
only the facts necessary to the present account. 
After the war, the need of  completing the railroad sys- 
tem  was  felt to be  urgent.  From  1871 to 1878 about 
6,000  kilometers  were  put  in  operation.  The  railroad 
lines  of  general  utility,  which  counted,  in  fact,  15,632 
kilometers in operation in 187  I, had 2 I ,435 in I 878.  The 
National Assembly had in its last sittings before adjourn- 
ment approved an imprudent policy  in this regard, and 
the policy  was continued.  A first experiment which led 
to the construction of  a state system in  1878, one might 
imagine, would have dampened the ardor of  the megalo- 
maniac  and  optimistic partisans  of  the construction of 
many  and extensive railroad lines.  But nothing of  the 
kind.  A plan  was  concocted to endow  France, in  the 
course of  a few years, with  a complete railroad system, 
covering  the  country  with  a  closely  woven  network. 
M. Freycinet prepared the outline of  these great works, 
which were to include not only railroads, but also canals, 
harbor improvements, etc.  This project was called after 
the name of  its originator, the Freycinet programme. 
Altogether, the length of  lines  decided  upon  in 1875, 
with those granted on the score of  local utility, which were 
made to pass into the class of  lines of  general utility, and 
including the new  lines, reached  a  total of  very nearly 
~o,ooo  kilometers. 
The first estimate placed expenses at about 4,000,000,- 
ooo francs.  But it was soon clear that this figure would 
need to be increased by 3,000,000,000  or 4,000,000,000,  for 
the originators of  the scheme had counted without the un- 
expected: they had made much too low an estimate of the 
net cost, and had omitted to take into account that the 
Chambers  would  enlarge  the original  plan  to a  degree National  Monetary  Cornmiss ion 
bordering  on  lunacy.  Political  high bidding  was  ram- 
pant also in the Senate, where it was usual to see more 
prudence than in the Chamber. 
France soon became a great railroad workshop. 
In order to meet the enormous expenses made necessary 
by  this  enlarging  of  the economic  "plant"  of  France, 
Lean Say, Minister of  Finance, created a new government 
stock-redeemable  stock-the  capital of  which,  divided 
into a series of  75 payments, was reimbursable by means 
of  drawing lots for a period of  seventy-five years.  The 
original  law  was  passed  June  11,  1878.  This  stock, 
quoted at a par value of  IOO francs, was sold in reality only 
in  15-franc  fractions.  It therefore  resembled  railroad 
obligations. 
Up to December, 1880, the State had borrowed by this 
means : 
Francs. 
Sum total of  interest on government stock-  _ _.  _ _..-  ---.  ..-  52,530,360 
Total nominal capital  _-___ _.-----.-..  .  ...-......-......  I, 751,012, ooo 
Total actually borrowed capital _-..._  .. ...........--  I,  439,845,912 
Ten years later, on December 24, 1890, the loans in the 
form of  redeemable government stock had risen to- 
Francs. 
Surn total of  interest on government stock-  _  _  __  _-------  127,624,395 
Total nominal capital- - - - - --  ---  -- -.  .  .  -.  .  -.  .  -.  - .. ---  - - -  4,254, 146,500 
Total actually borrowed capital-. .  .  .  _.  - -.  .  .  .  .  .  - -.  - -.  .  - -  3,459,359,545 
And here are the extraordinary expenses of  the budget 
for public works from I 878 to I 882 : 
Francs. 
1878---.-----.-..-----..-..--------.--------------- 557,000,ooo 
1879 ---..-...----..--.--------.--------------------  453,000,O~ 
1880-_-..----.------------.----.-------  538,000,ooo 
1881 -__-...-..--.-----.------------------..--.-----  735, m,  000 
1882___.__---~--------------------------  663,0oo,ooo 
Total-- ......................................  2,946, ooo, ooo 
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The normal  loans on the one  hand, treasury loans on 
the other, swelled our funded debt and our floating debt, 
the latter to  enormous proportions.  The State had under- 
taken  the construction  of  a  large  number  of  scattered 
and unconnected  railroads.  Those which were in oper- 
ation were bound to give poor results.  In fact, some of 
them were  administered  by the State itself,  others had 
been  put into the hands of  a trustee responsible to the 
State, and still others were  farmed  out to companies at 
rather burdensome rates. 
Everything indicated that before long the State would 
be reduced to making terms with the great railroad com- 
panies,  in  order  to escape from  a  troublesome  burden, 
and to avoid also involving further the national finances. 
Such were the causes of  the agreement of  1883. 
Our purpose here is not to describe what happened on 
that occasion, but to show  to what  extent  the public 
authorities were responsible for the speculative fever that 
seized  upon  France  at that moment. 
There were, too, other elements involved.  Since 1876 
certain banks which belonged  rather  to the category  of 
speculative  and  investment  banks,  such  as  the Union 
Gbnkale, the Cr6dit G6nkral Fran~ais,  the Banque de Lyon 
et de la Loire, etc., had  begun  to float stocks on the mar- 
ket, which  they issued  with  a  bonus.  The movement 
spread.  The public nibbled at the issues as if  they were 
forbidden fruit.  Times were prosperous, which of  course 
helped greatly.  The  issues  reached  their  highest  point 
after  1879  especially.  They  were  made in competition 
with  the  state  loans.  In  spite of  this  avalanche, the National  Monetary  Commission  -- 
average  level of  all  stock quotations  steadily rose.  As 
may be seen by the table given below, the total sum of 
issues  made  from  1876 to 1882, when  the crash  came, 
rose to more than 9,000,000,000  francs. 
Francs. 
1876-..  -......-.  .-.-.--....--  -....... .------  266,000,000 
1877- -...---------..---...-  - .-.------.-.-...--..  1,716,000,ooo 
1878.....--  -...--------.----..--.-.--....-----.-.-  605,000,000 
1879..-  -.------...-----...--------.-.--.---.--..  3,053,000,000 
1880  _....  ---....--  --.--.---..-----......----....-  1,568,000,ooo 
1881-  .... -.---.-----.-.----..----  .....-----....  1,223,500,000 
1882-  -....---.-.-------.--.--.--.--.--..  624,~,000 
'l'otal..  ....--..-..------.  -...-  ---- 9,055~5oo,  000 
These  heavy  issues,  far  from  cooling  public  ardor, 
simply  excited  it.  In 1881 the rise  in  stocks  assumed 
proportions  which  were  disquieting  to all business men 
who kept their heads and were not carried away by the 
current.  The  Union  Genkrale,  which  was  the  most 
active in  promoting  the bull  market, pushed  its shares 
so successfully, aided by the nameless complicity of  the 
general  infatuation,  that  from  being  quoted  at  1,000 
francs, at which  its shares were  held  in  January, 1881, 
they rose to nearly  2,900 francs at the end of  the year. 
The Suez Company followed  the same movement.  The 
rise in stocks continued  in spite of  its exaggeration like 
an irresistible nervous impulse.  The speculators  seemed 
victims  of  a  sort  of  St. Vitus's  dance,  inexplicable  to 
anyone  who  is  not  familiar  with  the  psychology  of 
crowds.  The  first  days  of  1882  opened  with  shares 
of the Union Gkndrale quoted at more than  3,000 francs 
and Suez at 3,440 francs.  However, the speculators were 
beginning  to  be  out  of  breath.  There were  no more 
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purchasers for these securities, at  least at  this price.  Then 
all of  a sudden came the crash.  By the end of  January 
Union  G6nkrale fell to 950 francs; a  few days later the 
company  was  declared  insolvent.  Suez,  which  repre- 
sented a prosperous undertaking, did not go  to pieces in 
this  way,  but  the stock  dropped  500  francs  in  a very 
short time. 
With these facts as a starting point,  we  will now see 
what part was played by the Bank of France under these 
circumstances. 
Let us give first the statement of  the principal accounts 
of  the Bank of  France from  1876 to 1882: 
[Milhon francs.] 
- -p-  -  --  I  I  /  Average reserve.  Average  Rate of  discount. I 
Runmng 
Collat-  ac- 
Year.  I  era1  counts,  1  ~ini- loans  average  tion. 
I 
mum.  mum.  balance 
Per cent 
4 0 
3  0 
3 0 
3  0 
3  5 
5 0 
5 0 
3  5 
3  0 
--P 
Per cent 
3 o  290  o  360  6 
2  o  376  o  473  8 
20  4090  4110 
20  4020  4210 
2  5  325  8  411  5 
35  1,1235  4682 
3  5  884  I  493  I 
3 o  664  6  416 o 
3.0  626  5  387  o 
A simple examination of  the figures shows as early as 
1880 and especially in  1881 the approach of  the panic. 
The reserve began  to fall as soon as 1880 to 1,975,000,ooo 
francs;  in  I 88 I  it was only  I ,824,000,ooo francs; these, 
we  must  remember,  are  averages.  But  in  1881  the 
gold reserve, which  was  648,000,000 francs  on  June  30, 
fell  to 552,000,ooo  francs  on  December  31, showing  a National  Monetary  Commission 
decrease of  96,000,000 francs.  Because of  this, the Bank 
raised the discount rate to 5 per cent as early as October 
20, which  diminishd  the  drain  upon  the  gold  in  its 
coffers.  In  comparison,  the  discounts  increased from 
September  to October;  they  rose  from  an  average  of 
I,  100,o00,000 francs to a  total of  I ,320,000,ooo  francs. 
Finally, another fact which shows plainly the intensity of 
the speculative craze was that the total of  loans on securi- 
ties, which was  325,000,000 francs in  1880, rose  in  1881 
to I ,I  25,ooo,ooo francs and after a decline was maintained 
at 884,000,000 francs. 
However, raising  the discount  rate to 5 per  cent  on 
October 20 effectually checked the drain of  gold from the 
coffers  of  the  Bank,  and  on  December  31,  1881, the 
reserve reached  about 646,000,000 francs, or  nearly  the 
figure of  the preceding June. 
The Bank  of  France, therefore,  was  protected,  or  at 
least  ready  to withstand  the shock of  the panic  in  its 
acute  stage.  When  the  storm  burst  in  January,  the 
stockbrokers  of  Paris  and  Lyons,  who  had  not  paid 
sufficient  attention to the consequences  of  this  frantic 
speculation,  could  not  meet  their  engagements.  The 
Bank of  France intervened at this moment and advanced 
80,000,ooo francs  to the parquet  of  the  Paris  Bourse 
and ~oo,ooo,ooo  to that of  Lyons-all  this being secured 
by bills of  exchange and collateral.  These operations in 
the last  days  of  January  raised  the figure  of  the dis- 
counts, which on February 2 reached I ,6~6,ooo,ooo  francs. 
It is important  to point  out here  that as a result  01 
the elasticity  of  issue,  the Bank  could  make  discounts 
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and loans with  greater  facility  in proportion to the re- 
serve;  the  maximum  issue  in  188  I  was  2,825,000,000 
francs, and in 1882, 2,953,000,ooo francs. 
It should be observed, too, that when the Bank, under 
some  accidental  circumstance,  such  as  a  panic,  for  in- 
stance, has been  obliged to increase its issue, the figure 
reached  has  almost  always been  maintained afterwards. 
This was  the case  in  1883 and  1884.  After a number 
of  small  declines  the  average  for  1890,  rose  above 
3,000,000,000 francs.  At  the same time the gold reserve 
tended  to increase, showing that the bank  note was ac- 
cepted more and more as currency, replacing part of  the 
gold  in  circulation.  This  phenomenon, which  is  easy 
enough  to understand,  began  to  be especially  evident 
after the crash of  1882. 
Moreover,  dividends  increased,  a  thing  that  always 
happens when the Bank  intervenes  in a panic to support 
the credit of  the money market.  The dividends  of  1881 
and  1882 ~vere  respectively  250  and  290  francs.  The 
average of  the preceding five years  had  been about 125 
francs. 
THE  COMPTOIR  D'ESCOMPTE  AND  THE  PANIC  OF 1889. 
We  left the Comptoir  d'Escompte  on  the eve of  the 
war.  During  the  terrible  ordeal  of  the  invasion  this 
establishment had to cope with many needs, and it ful- 
filled its duties as a commercial bank most honorably at 
this critical moment.  It was at that time, next to the 
Bank of  France, the largest discount house in Paris.  It 
attempted to send for disposable funds from its foreign National  Monetary  Commission 
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offices,  but they  did  not  arrive  before  the blockade  of 
Paris.  Notwithstanding, thanks to its resources, it was 
able to reimburse depositors for rather large sums.  In a 
single week  it repaid 40,000,000  francs.  In addition to 
this  the  Comptoir  served  as  an  intermediary  between 
the merchants, certain bankers  of  Paris, and the Bank 
of  France. 
In presence of  the terrible situation of  the capital just 
before the siege, the Comptoir had taken certain precau- 
tions, and  likewise the Bank  of  France.  The Comptoir 
sent its provincial "portfolio " and some of  its officials to 
the Nantes agency.  It transported to the London agency 
its foreign "  portfolio " and organized there a specia-l serv- 
ice to keep up the relations  it had  established  with  the 
credit  houses  of  all  foreign countries, and  to maintain 
communication with the agencies across the Atlantic.  As 
for  the  Nantes  agency,  it became  really  a  provisional 
center for France and the other French branch offices. 
During the insurrection  in Paris, known  as the Com- 
mune, the Comptoir, after taking the precaution of  sending 
the greater part of  its assets  to Versailles, continued  in 
operation.  The postal service being no longer carried on 
by  the regular  public authorities, the Comptoir found a 
way to send and receive mail by  way of  Versailles.  So 
the doors of  the Comptoir remained open in Paris even 
during the rioting. 
In October,  1871, it joined  with  several  other  credit 
companies in making  an issue-authorized  by  the Gov- 
ernment-of  5-franc  notes.  These  notes were  of  great 
service to commerce, accepted  as they were  with  great 
Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
.  - 
favor.  Their circulation extended to the whole of  France. 
This  concern  of  course  had  an important  share in the 
municipal loan of  Paris in I 87 I ; it received subscriptions 
on that occasion which amounted to the total of  the loan. 
Finally it collected for the national loan of  3,000,000,000 
francs, which  we  have  mentioned,  bids  of  15,ooo sub- 
scribers  that  represented  60,000,000  francs  interest,  or 
1,2oo,ooo,ooo  francs capital-more  than one-third of  the 
loan.  Like the great French banks, it helped the Govern- 
ment  to effect  the transportation  or  exchange of  these 
funds, which were  applied to the payment of  the German 
war indemnity. 
However, the Comptoir did not come through the terri- 
ble  ordeal  of  the war  without  suffering its effects.  At 
the time  Paris was invested, it had been obliged to make 
large  reimbursements,  paying  out 40,000,000  francs or 
more  in  a  single  week.  Now,  before  the  war  it  had 
63,000,ooo francs of  deposits.  It was a long time getting 
back  to  this  figure.  In 1875 the deposits were still not 
more than 54,000,ooo francs. 
It is  true that the Comptoir  had  been  entirely reor- 
ganized in that interval.  Then had come the fall in the 
price  of  silver,  which  had  already  been  foreseen,  but 
which actually happened very suddenly in I 8  75  and I 8  76. 
As  the Comptoir had agencies in the Far East, it hastened 
to decrease transactions in  that part of  the world.  On 
the other hand, the Comptoir commenced  at that time 
to  take  part  in  operations  known  as  "high  finance." 
It  transacted  successfully  all  the  business  connected 
with  the  unification  of  the  Egyptian  debt.  In  1876 National  Monetary  Commission 
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Egypt was  not  able to meet  its engagements.  French 
and English capital was in  great  jeopardy  there, and it 
was necessary  to bring  pressure  on  the  Egyptian  Gov- 
ernment in  order  to straighten out its affairs  and  safe- 
guard the interests of  the holders of  the debt.  After an 
agreement with the viceroy of  Egypt, the Comptoir was ' 
given charge in London and Paris of  operations connected 
with the settlement  of  the above debt.  In this way  it 
operated conversions involving 3,800,000 certificates. 
Nevertheless, the Comptoir  continued  to  be  a  com- 
mercial  bank  of  deposit  and  discount.  Deposits  came 
in slowly after the war, but showed a rapid increase after 
1876, when  they rose  to 72,000,000 francs.  Two  years 
later this  total exceeded  ~oo,ooo,ooo  francs.  Discounts 
had  increased  from  1,2oo,ooo,ooo francs  in  1874  to 
1,6oo,ooo,ooo francs  in  1878, the  year  of  the  World's 
Fair  in  Paris, which was  very  successful. 
About  this  time,  this  establishment,  which  saw  its 
business falling off  in the Far East, because of  the fluctua- 
tions in the price of  silver, began to restrict its operations 
in that part of  the world.  It founded agencies in Sydney 
and Melbourne, Australia, which gave accommodation to 
the woolen trade, for French industry obtains from that 
country  a  large  supply  of  raw  material  for  its woolen 
manufactures.  An  agency  was  opened  also  in  San 
Francisco,  because of  its commerce with the Far East, 
and, also, because  this  port was  the starting  point for 
a considerable export trade in wheat with France. 
Meanwhile the Comptoir was considering two important 
undertakings  which  were  later  carried  out  through  its 
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financial assistance:  First, constructing the sea canal of 
Corinth;  second,  building  the  Servian  railroad.  The 
aim of  the latter enterprise was to join  the railroads  of 
Turkey  with  the European  systems, and  so  open  com- 
munication  between  Paris and Saloniki. 
Beginning  with  1881,  the  competition  of  the  other 
credit companies was felt by the Comptoir.  These com- 
panies  (the Credit  Lyonnais  and especially  the Socidte 
GdnQale) were to increase and develop their commercial 
banking  operations  more  and  more.  So  the  discounts 
of  the Comptoir, which amounted to I ,9oo,ooo,ooo francs 
in 188  I,  began to decrease and fell in 1885 to I ,580,000,ooo 
francs.  However, three of  its most important  agencies, 
under  able  and wise  management, at Marseilles, Nantes, 
and Lyons, were successful on a large scale. 
The charter of  the  Comptoir Company, which  estab- 
lished  official  relations  between  that company  and  the 
Government,  expired  in  I 887.  After  making  inquiries, 
and on  the  request  of  the Comptoir,  the Government 
decided to extend the charter of  the company for twenty 
years from March 18, 1887.  In any case, these  relations 
with the State seemed rather useless, because the common 
law of  1867  on  joint  stock companies would  have been 
quite sufficient for this concern.  The government trade- 
mark did not protect it from disastrous errors, which were 
destined to bring it to a tragic end a few years  later. 
The Comptoir,  still  acting  as  official banker, effected 
the conversion of the old Tunis debt in 1884.  Two years 
later  it concluded a  loan  of  15,000,ooo francs with  the 
Madagascar government, organized the customs service to National  Monetary  Commission 
insure  its payment, and founded  agencies  at Tamatave 
and Tananarivo. 
The year  1887 was a difficult one.  Two events made 
business slack.  Frontier incidents, wantonly exaggerated, 
provoked  a  tension  between  France  and  Germany.  In 
another direction, a political crisis, raging among the high 
officials of  the Government, made it necessary for President 
Grevy to resign, after a scandalous law suit and violent 
polemics. 
The Comptoir, like all the other credit concerns, suffered 
from this state of  things.  The great confidence that it in- 
spired had  attracted to its coffers, both as deposits  and 
as running credit accounts,  200,000,000 francs  (total for 
December  31,  1887).  It was  difficult to find  a  way  of 
using this capital profitably, a fact which was responsible 
for a gigantic error, destined to be fatal to the Comptoir. 
Among its clients at this time was the Metal Company. 
The Comptoir consented to make loans to this company on 
the merchandise it bought.  There was nothing abnormal 
in this, provided these loans were made for a limited sum 
and after prudent calculation of  the risks of  depreciation. 
However,  these  first  transactions  whetted  the  appetite 
of  the Metal Company.  The purchases it effected with 
the aid of  the Comptoir made  the price  of  copper rise. 
This first speculative success led  the Metal Company to 
attempt to form a regular trust for the purpose of  corner- 
ing copper.  It negotiated  with the principal  companies 
which  engaged in copper mining, with  a view  to raising 
the price  by limiting  production.  To anyone who knew 
the copper-mining business from the point of  view of  the 
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producer  this  combination  was  absurd.  Both  the di- 
rectors of  the Metal Company and those of  the Comptoir, 
though it had  been  claimed that they were  informed of 
the facts about the copper market, must have been blinded 
by the chimerical hope of absorbing the copper product of 
the whole world. 
The president of  the Comptoir, M.  Denfert-Rochereau, 
at first  made loans to the Metal  Company without con- 
sulting his administrative board.  Later, after considerable 
capital had  become involved, M.  Denfert-Rochereau  dis- 
closed  the state of  affairs to the administrative council. 
It was alleged that at this moment it was difficult to cease 
supporting the speculation of the Metal Company.  The 
fact seems hardly admissible.  The very absurdity of  the 
scheme should have produced  a  rupture, even though  a 
painful liquidation must have been the consequence. 
The final scene in the drama was at hand.  As  might 
easily have been foreseen in 1888, the copper mines, profit- 
ing by the wild  contracts made with them by the Metal 
Company,  increased  their  output  enormously.  On  the 
other hand, the price of  copper being forced up very high, 
artificially, consumers in every  country refused to buy. 
To keep on buying  and paying  and never selling, to be 
crushed  under the piling up of  a  product  that brings  in 
nothing, is a situation that can not last long.  A sad and 
unexpected incident gave the signal for the disaster.  M. 
Denfert-Rochereau committed suicide on  March  5, 1889. 
His death did not alter the catastrophe in any degree, nor, 
any more than others of  the same kind, could it serve as 
an example. National  Monetary  Commission  - 
It  precipitated a panic which led to an irresistible run 
on  the Comptoir by  depositors  and holders  of  running 
credit accounts.  In two  days they drew out 70,000,000 
francs. 
We were on the eve of  opening the exposition of  1889, 
called the Centenary  of  the French  Revolution.  A dis- 
organization of the Paris market at that time would have 
been fatal to this international festival of  commerce  and 
industry.  At  that juncture  the Bank  of  France  came 
forward and loaned the Comptoir I 40,000,000 francs on its 
commercial  paper  or  securities.  The  Bank  was  not 
obliged to take this amount from the reserve, as the loan 
was  made  almost  entirely  in  bank notes.  The circula- 
tion, which on  March 7, 1889, was  2,741  ,000,000 francs, 
rose by degrees to 2,888,ooo,ooo francs on April 4.  The 
discount  rate was  not  and could not be  changed.  The 
Bank had then, by the law of  June 30, 1884, the right to 
issue notes up to 3,500,000,000 francs; so there was still a 
margin of  760,000,000 francs before reaching the extreme 
limit of  the privilege.  Besides, every time the need has 
been  felt, the maximum  figure  of  the  issue  has  been 
increased without  question  by  Parliament,  so that  this 
maximum  may always be considered as provisional.  It 
would even be simpler not to fix the maximum issue at all. 
The Bank of  France, then, helped by these operations 
the liquidation of  the Comptoir.  It should be noted that 
the latter  was  not  exclusively  a  speculative  bank.  It 
.Nas,  indeed, as the result of  a very unusual combination 
of  circumstances that it made the mistake of  supporting 
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the speculations of  the Metal  Company.  It was  much 
more  a  bank  of  commerce, holding a good  line of  com- 
mercial paper; its main  business,  in  short, was  making 
discounts.  To  be  sure, the total of  discounts  had  de- 
creased latterly.  After being I ,goo,ooo,ooo francs in I 881, 
it had fallen to 1,385,000,ooofrancs  in 1887, and had weak- 
ened still more in  1888 and 1889 as a result of  the com- 
petition  with  the other credit societies, which  were  ex- 
tending  their  commercial  banking  operations.  The 
Bank of  France had, therefore, in the line of  commercial 
paper  of  the Comptoir,  guaranties  which  induced  it to 
make a transaction that was not without risk, of  course, 
but permitted this establishment to use its right of  issue. 
The liquidation of the Comptoir was made by friendly 
agreement  and  was  ably  managed.  The  assets  were 
sufficient to settle in full all liabilities, including the loan 
made by the Bank of  France.  After balancing accounts, 
even the capital stock was found to be nearly intact. 
These facts, which were anticipated from the beginning 
of  the liquidation, were such as to make it seem desirable 
to found a credit establishment  which could resume the 
name and the traditions (such as were good)  of  the old 
Comptoir.  A  group,of  financiers, at the head of  which 
was M. Denormandie, a former governor of  the Bank of 
France, who  was much  esteemed in the business world, 
undertook  to reorganize  the Comptoir. 
M. Denormandie, then, made terms with the liquidators 
of the old company to obtain the cession of  the title and 
the clientele of  the former Comptoir, as well as its build- 
ings and furniture. National  Monetary  Commissiort 
It is not our purpose here to dwell on the details of  this 
reconstruction,  except to say that the new  capital stock 
was  fixed  at  40,000,000 francs.  The  issue  of  80,000 
shares at 500 francs took place May  IS, 1889, and these 
shares  were  bought  by  the  shareholders of  the  former 
Comptoir,  who  were  given  the  preference.  Additional 
bids were made by other people who wished to subscribe; 
these bids made a total of  85,000 shares, and had to be 
refused. 
It was with 20,000,000 francs, the quarter of  the capital 
paid in, that the new Comptoir began operations in June, 
I 889. 
The offices of  the old Comptoir had  not  been  closed 
during liquidation, so that business went right on, as far 
as the public was concerned. 
CHAPTER  111.-The  panic of  1890-91-Intervention  of  the 
Bank of  France in  behalf  of  the Bank of  England-The 
Sociktk  des Uepdts et  Comptes Courants-The  local crisis 
caused  by it. 
Two other examples of  panics.-These  examples may have had an influence on 
the  evolution oi credit companies.-The  Baring failure.-The  Bank of  England 
is asked for  assistance.-The  reduction of the reserve and especially the lack of 
freedom of  issue hinder the Bank of  England from playing its proper  part. 
The question of  the extension of  the credit companies, 
which is the heart of  this whole discussion, we shall leave 
to the next chapter.  Meanwhile, we  must state briefly, 
according to  the  plan  we  have  adopted, the  following 
facts, which it is necessary to know in order to understand 
the r81e of  the Bank of  France, in so far as it comes to the 
rescue of  credit during panics.  And perhaps it will not 
be without value to show that the same causes produce 
the same effects, and that commercial banks always come 
to grief  when  the rules of  good  management  are disre- 
garded.  Just as the old  Comptoir d'Escompte  had com- 
mitted itself  to the grave error of  violating its statutes, 
and at the same time the principles of  good administra- 
tion, so the Sociktb des Dbpdts et Comptes Courants chose 
to indulge in operations that no conlmercial bank has a 
right to touch.  It  went under.  Although in the financial 
world examples of  disasters, coupled with the most tragic 
incidents,  are not  always heeded,  it must  be  admitted 
that the two successive failures of  the Comptoir in  1889 
and the DdpBts et Comptes Courants in 1891 were some- National  Monetary  Commission 
what enlightening to the clients of  this sort of  establish- 
ments, for a time at least.  On the part of  administrators 
of  banks or credit  companies there is  a growing opinion 
that the regular  operations  of  commercial banking  are 
sufficiently profitable, and they are tending to lessen risks, 
even  in  the  underwriting  and  marketing  of  securities, 
where the companies are often nothing more than inter- 
mediaries selling on  commission merchandise which it is 
not well to accumulate in the warehouse. 
The crisis of  1890 was confined for the most part to the 
London market,  and was  caused by  the Baring failure. 
This famous old  concern, engaging in large operations in 
loans, speculation, industrial financing, had  opened  far 
too extensive credits at a time when it was involved in 
big speculations.  Being on the verge of  suspending pay- 
ments, it applied to the Bank  of  England, just  as  the 
former Comptoir d'Escompte  in France  had applied to 
the Bank  of  Prance.  A  syndicate  of  English  bankers 
went  security for the request  of  Baring Brothers.  But 
the Bank of  England has a constitution which  does  not 
allow it the necessary elasticity of  issue, in case of  need. 
In order to undertake the discounts of  Baring  Brothers 
or the Syndicate, it was obliged to diminish its reserve, 
which  decreased  its  issue  by  just  so much.  It raised 
the  discount  rate to 6 per  cent, but  though  that  was 
enough  to protect  the metallic reserve, it  did  not  en- 
able the Bank to  procure  the  necessary specie  to come 
to the aid  of  the London  market.  In order  to guard 
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itself  against the rebound of  the London crisis, the Im- 
perial  Bank of  Germany had  already raised  the rate of 
discount to 5% per cent. 
It was  then  that the Bank  of  England  borrowed  of 
the Bank of  France 75,000,m francs in gold, with which 
to relieve  the stress of  the English market.  The Bank 
of  France was not affected at all by this exportation of 
coin.  The average reserve, in fact, in the year 1890 was 
2,5 I 3 ,m,ooo  francs, composed almost equally of  gold and 
silver.  In London, the reserve of  the Bank of  England 
had fallen at the height of  the crisis to a little less than 
500,000,000 francs. 
The comparative merits of  the systems of  the Bank of 
England and the Bank of  France have been a subject of 
much  discussion, and the principal element of  this dis- 
cussion has been the state of  the reserve of  the two estab- 
lishments.  This is a secondary side of  the question, in 
the face of  a  local crisis such  as that produced  by  the 
Baring failure.  The real defect of the English system is in 
the limiting of issue.  It has been seen that the Bank of 
France was able in 1889 to come to the aid of  the Comp- 
toir  d'Escompte  without  drawing on  its specie, thanks 
to its margin  of  issue.  Since the crisis was  local, the 
remedy was  there, close  at hand.  If  the Bank of  Eng- 
land had been able to issue notes for  75,000,ooo  francs, 
in order to meet the difficulties of  the crisis, therewould 
not  have  been  the  slightest  need  of  an  appeal  to the 
credit  of  the Bank  of  France.  For, since the Bank  of 
France was willing to give credit to this establishment, the 
people of  England would have done so equally by accept- 
ing its notes. National  Monetary  Commission 
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The second crisis which we must mention was confined 
to Paris.  It was caused by the failure of  the Soci6t6 des 
D6pBts  et  Comptes  Courants.  Because  of  consenting 
to run risks of  a kind that no bank of  deposit has a right 
to incur, this company was forced into inevitable bank- 
ruptcy.  It lost  a  lawsuit,  a  fact which  attracted  the 
attention of  its depositors, and soon  aroused their  sus- 
picion.  It experienced a panic, just  as the Comptoir had 
done, though  a less serious one.  This happened  in the 
beginning of  March, 1891, almost exactly two years after 
the run on the Comptoir d'Escompte.  In four  days  the 
deposits withdrawn  amounted to more  than  19,000,000 
francs. 
A syndicate of  bankers was formed to go security  to 
the amount of  I 5,000,000  francs for the D6pBts et Comptes 
Courants.  The Bank of  Prance came to the rescue again, 
just as it had done two years before  in the case of  the 
Comptoir, and advanced 60,000,000 francs for the reim- 
bursement  of  the depositors and  creditors  of  the com- 
pany.  It  received  as  security  the  "  portfolio " of  this 
company, and other assets.  We will not inquire here if 
the Bank was  entirely disinterested  in  this advance, ar- 
ranged for at 3 per cent, but what is perfectly certain is 
that on this occasion  the total of  its discounts was  in- 
creased.  It rose that year to more  than  ~o,ooo,ooo,ooo 
francs, a figure that it had not reached since  1884.  At 
one moment, even, in  1891, the discounts amounted to 
1,361,000,000 francs.  As  for  the  reserve,  it  averaged 
more  than  2,553  ,OOO,OOO  francs,  of  which  I ,279,000,ooo 
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were in gold.  The  following  year the gold reserve went 
beyond  1,547,000,ooo francs.  In this  same year,  1891, 
the discount rate was maintained at 3 per cent. 
The  sums  needed  for  the liquidation  of  the Soci6t6 
des  D6p6ts et Comptes Courants were  not  so large as in 
the crisis of  the Metal Company and the Comptoir in 1889. 
In  that  year  the  blow  to credit  had  been  much  more 
serious and far-reaching.  However, it was by  the same 
procedure  and with  the  same results that the Bank  of 
France  intervened.  In  spite  of  their  success,  these 
interventions  have  been  criticised.  Taking  a  general 
point  of  view,  it  has  been  asked  if  the  help  supplied 
so  quickly  by  the Bank  of  France  to  insolvent  credit 
companies was not of  a nature to diminish the prudence 
of  the  administrators of  these  companies, and  to  give 
the  public  the assurance  that a tutelary  establishment 
would always come forward to protect the funds deposited 
in these establishments. 
The question is  not unimportant.  It seems to us that 
the rule to be followed in such cases is perfectly simple. 
The  Bank  should intervene only  when  its advances are 
substantially  secured.  It acts then  like  a  private indi- 
vidual  who  aids  without  risk  a  neighbor  in  distress. 
And, as it has the privilege of  issue, it may do it for a 
comparatively moderate price.  The side of  the problem 
most  difficult  to  solve  is  to  make  the  general  public 
understand  the  conditions  of  this  intervention.  The 
public  is  in  need  of  being  better  informed  of  banking 
processes.  Now, many prominent tradesmen and manu- 
facturers are entirely ignorant of  the r81e  and mechanism National  Monetary  Commission 
of  the various kinds of  banks.  It is a deep-rooted con- 
viction with us that if  this information were more wide- 
spread, it would form a tradition in the commercial and 
economic world which would exercise a salutary influence 
on the banks; for this education would teach people not 
to demand  miracles, and at the same time would make 
them watchful  of  the mistakes banks may be  guilty of. 
CHAPTER  1V.-The  credit  companies  and  their  develop- 
ment-Extension  of  their  operations-Their  general 
method-irheir  present  situation. 
The bank note.-Circulation  in France  and England.-The  bank check.-Con- 
ditions of its use.-Transfers  of  accounts.-Founding  of  the  Societe du  Credit 
Industriel et  Commercial.-Founding  of  the SociktC GBnerale pour  Favoriser le 
Developpement  du Commerce et de l'industrie en France.-Founding  of the Credit 
Lyonnais Company (1863); of  the SocietC Lyonnaise de Depdts and the Societk 
Marseillaise  (1865).-Definition  of  check  by  French  law,  June  14-20,  1865.- 
Transformation in bank methods.-The  banker of the large credit companies no 
longer waits  for  his customer behind his window-he  goes to  him.-The  credit 
companies found  branches in the principal cities of France.-The  Bank of  France 
increases the  number  of  its  branch  offices.-Parallel  development of  branch 
offices of  the Bank of  France and agencies of  the credit companies.-The  Bank 
of  France is the center of  the system of the organization of the great credit com- 
panies in France and of  the banks in general.-The  foreign agencies of  the great 
credit  companies.-Financial  activity of France  abroad.-Analogy  between  the 
organization of  the credit companies and the centralization of  the French Govern- 
ment.-Advantages  of  centralization.-Ways  of  escaping the  disadvantages of 
centralization.-Service  for the  publication of  financial  reports.-Sight  deposits 
and  running  credit accounts  grow  sixfold in  twenty-four  years.-The  time 
deposits show little or  no  increase.-Why  sight  deposits are preferable here to 
time  deposits.-Causes  of  the  increase  of  sight  deposits.-Remarks  on  the 
preceding table.-The  availability  of discounts.  The rdle of the Bank of France. 
We  have  already  seen  the use  of  bank notes  become 
general in France in proportion  as the need  made itself 
felt.  Little by little, the total issue of  the Bank of  France 
increased.  Every time the necessity  arose the authori- 
ties  extended  the  limit  of  issue.  Here  is  a  table 
recording the successive stages of  the increase of  circula- 
tion  of  the Bank  of  France, and the dates of  the laws 
authorizing an increasingly large  total of  issue, especi- 
ally  after  1860. 
Francs. 
1807----.--..-----------------.--------------------  84,600,000 
1810_---.-.-----------------.-----------  IOI,~OO,OOO 
1820------------------------------------..  153,800,ooo 
1830---------------------------------------  223,600,000 
1840-----.---------.------------.-------.  a223,400,000 
1850----------------------------------------------.  485,600,- 
a Law  of March  15,  1848,  carrying  the liniit  of  issue  to 350,m,000 
Irancs.  Law of December 22,  1849,  carrying it to 525,000,ooo  francs.  Law 
of August  6,  1850,  annulling the limitation of  the law of  December,  1849. National  Monetary  Commission 
Francs. 
1860_---------.------------------------------------  a749,  600,  000 
1870---------------.--------.---------------------.  1,544,300,000 
1880-----------------------------------------------  2,3Oj,  400,000 
189o_---.--~-~---.-----.--------------------------.b3,060,400,m~ 
1900__----------------------.-----.--.--.-----.--..  4,034,  100,  am 
1907---~--~~~~~-~~~~.-~~-~~-.--~~-.~--.~~~~~.~~~.~~~~,800,~00,000 
1908d_--_--_----.--.----------------------.------.  4,853,400,000 
In  1908 the circulation  reached  a  maximum  of 
5,  I 16,000,000 francs.  It is  probable  that the circulation 
will  be  extended  still  more; nevertheless, the  Bank  has 
at  present a sufficient margin. 
If the circulation of  the Bank of  France is compared with 
that of  the Bank of  England, it is very evident that that 
of  the Bank of England  is much smaller.  It ranges with- 
out much variation between  700,000,000 and 8oo,ooo,ooo 
francs-about  one-seventh  as  large  as  that  of  the 
Bank  of  France; and  yet,  England  does  an  enormous 
business.  It is  the most  important  place  of  exchange 
in the whole world, a center of  large financial operations. 
It possesses, then, a  substitute for the bank note, a tool 
which takes its place; this substitue is the check, a kind 
of  bank  money  which  plays  an important  part in Eng- 
land, and is a simple instrument for balancing payments, 
ending  in  the clearing  house.  Here debts  and  credits 
are  balanced  to the amount  of  hundreds  of  billions  of 
francs.  The check has been used in England  for a long 
0 Laws of  August  12  and  14, 1870,  of  December  29, 1871,  of  July  IS, 
1870,  carrying limit of  issue  successively  to  1,8oo,ooo,ooo,  2,4m,~m0,ooo, 
2,80o,mo,ooo,  3,200,000,000  francs. 
b Law of  June 30, 1884,  limit of  issue  3,500,000,000. Law of  January 
28, 1893,  limit of  issue 4,000,000,000  francs.  Law of  November  17,  1897, 
limit of  issue, 5,mo,am,o~  francs. 
c Law of February 9,  1906,  limit of issue 5,800,000,ooo francs. 
d The maximum circulation in 1908  was 5,116,000,000  francs. 
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time.  It presupposes a whole series of  banks of  deposits 
in which a great number of  capitalists, merchants, manu- 
facturers,  officials,  etc.,  have  deposits  and  accounts. 
Furnished  with  check  books, they draw  on  their bank, 
and  pay  their  creditors,  tradesmen,  etc.,  in  this  way. 
The check saves coin; it is the complement of  the mech- 
anism of  the joint stock banks; it explains how England 
carries  on  such  a  large  business  with  a  very  limited 
metallic stock.  It is certainly a rational economic organ- 
ization.  If  the Bank of England had a less archaic and 
more  flexible  machinery  of  issue, the system would  be 
perfect,  and crises in the English  market would  be less 
acute. 
The Bank of  France of  course opened running accounts 
with its clients at an early date; it gave them a chance to 
make transfers from one account to another (pink order), 
or to pay a third person from the account of  the drawer 
(white order).  But it was not everyone who was allowed 
formerly to open a running account at the Bank, and the 
accounts  were  not  yet  sufficiently  numerous  toward 
the end of  the last century to permit making clearances 
on  a  large  scale.  Moreover, one  bank  alone, or  nearly 
alone,  practicing  this kind  of  operations,  scarcely gives 
wide scope to the mechanism, which must be adopted by 
a whole market in  order to be completely effective. 
The check has its bases, as we  have seen, in a group of 
banks of  deposit organized after the plan  of  joint-stock 
banks. 
The example of England, as well as the fonvard,move- 
ment of  events, often more or less unconscious, led  cer- National  Monetary  Commission 
tain financiers in  France  to undertake  the  creation  of 
deposit concerns.  In 1859 a company called  the CrMit 
Industriel  et  Commercial  was  founded  to  perform  this 
function.  The aim was  clearly  stated to the  public  as 
extending  deposit  accounts  with  the use of  checks  and 
using  these  deposits for  safe short-date investments, in 
such a way as always to have  available  funds to meet 
the withdrawals  of  clients.  The president  of  this  new 
credit  establishment  declared  in  so  many  words, more- 
over, that the institution proposed  to imitate the  joint- 
stock banks.  To gather together scattered capital, which 
is most often unproductive in the hands of  its possessors, 
to pay interest on it, and make it fruitful by using it in 
safe short-date loans-such  was the method adopted.  Let 
us  remark  here  that the check  had not yet been legally 
naturalized in Prance.  The law which sanctions it,  in fact, 
dates from June 14-20,  1865. 
Several years  later  another company  was founded  in 
Paris, called the Sociitd  GinQrale pour  Favoriser  le  Dive- 
loppement du  Commerce et  de  l'lndustrie en France.  By its 
title one may see at once the tendency of  this company. 
It was a  sort of  off-shoot of  the plan originated by the 
Credit Mobilier of  the  Pereires.  This  concern  for  the 
"  advancement  of  commerce  and industry " proposed to 
make industrial loans and investments and to speculate. 
But besides these special functions it intended to engage 
in all the operations of  joint-stock banks, receiving depos- 
its, opening rurining accounts, etc.  Mixing together oper- 
ations of  "  cre'dit  mobilier " with  commercial banking was 
to unite risks of  a very different nature and to court many 
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dangers.  For how could the department which advanced 
funds for silent partnerships in industrial enterprises (an 
operation involving  large  risks)  be  kept  separate from 
the department of  discount and running accounts, with its 
deposits  payable  on  demand?  No  air-tight  compart- 
ment could keep them separated.  This kind  of  bank is 
a mixed type. 
Other establishments were founded at this time in imi- 
tation of  the Cr6dit Industriel  et Commercial : the Cre'dit 
Lyonnais in  1863 at Lyons; and two years later  (1865), 
in the same town, the Socie'te' Lyonnaise de Uipdts,  de Comp- 
tes Courants et de CrQdit  Industriel;  at Marseilles, the same 
year, the SociitQ  Marseillaise  de  Cridit Industriel  et  Com- 
mercial et de D6p6ts.  All these had for an object, if  not a 
sole object, at least a very  definite one, to encourage in 
these very important centers the use of  running accounts 
and  check books.  It was then  between  1859 and  1865 
that were founded the credit concerns which were later to 
expand  and  become  powerful, along with the Comptoir 
d'Escompte  created  several years  sooner, under  circum- 
stances that have already been described.  But this latter 
establishment  had  been  organized  after the old  plan of 
discount banks; it was not until afterwards that it  followed 
the lead of  the new  concerns and began to try to spread 
the use of  checks and running accounts. 
As may be easily seen, all these companies were founded 
either at a  time when  the existence and legal definition 
of  the check had not been settled, or very shortly after. 
The law of June 14-20,  1865, defined a check as "  a writing 
which, in the form of  an order  for payment, allows the National  Monetary  Commission 
drawer to effect the withdrawal in favor of  himself  or of 
a third person of  the whole or  a part of  the disposable 
funds which remain to his credit with the drawee."  "It 
is signed by  the drawer, and bears  the date of  the day 
when it is drawn.  It can not be drawn except for sight 
payment.  It may be made out payable to bearer  or to 
a  specified person,  and  can  be  signed  'payable to the 
order of ' and even transferred, by means of  indorsement 
in blank." 
The  check  is  preeminently  the  instrument  of  credit 
companies.  It is  well  known  that  under  the name  of 
"crossed  check"  it plays an important part in England 
However, in order that the check, which is only a tool, a 
practical  means  of  payment, may  be  of  service, there 
must  be many deposits and accounts in banks which  are 
engaging in these operations. 
With the exception of  the Comptoir d'Escompte, these 
banks  did not  develop greatly before the war.  Several 
of  these banks, even after the war, at the time of  the loan 
.for the payment of  the ~,ooo,ooo,ooo  francs indemnity to 
Germany, also for the restoration of  our military eyuip- 
ment, and later at the time of  the loans for great public 
works-several  of  them, we repeat, engaged in the sort of 
operations known as "  high finance " without the epithet 
'l high " being justified by the superiority of  the operation. 
Until I 881, especially, they made large issues;  We give 
the figures in the following table: 
Francs. 
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It  is true they continued later to carry on operations in 
disposing of  loans, but from this moment forth they began 
to widen  their  scope.  Their  mode  of  work  was  to be 
modified little by little.  They realized the advantage of 
going to the public to solicit custom, to induce it to open 
running  accounts,  and  consequently  to make  deposits. 
Afterwards they organized on a vast scale special services, 
such as safety deposit, supervision of  drawings, cashing of 
coupons, loans on securities, etc. 
And it was not only by printed circulars that the credit 
societies  informed  the  public  of  the  advantages  they 
offered; they  instructed  employees  in  the  business  of 
soliciting  patronage  and. making  overtures  (ddmarches)  ; 
hence the name of  ddmarcheurs was  given  to these em- 
ployees. 
Struck by the very obvious fact that France is every- 
where a land of  economy, some of  these societies, such as 
the Socibtb GGnGrale, the Credit Lyonnais, and the Comp- 
toir d'Escompte, founded agencies or branch ofices in Paris 
and the provinces.  Gradually the number of  these agen- 
cies has increased and covered  France with a close net- 
work.  In  this  way,  they  gather  capital  everywhere; 
everywhere they try to compete  in certain transactions 
with the local banks, which produces something of  a crisis, 
and brings  about a  slow  transformation  of  some of  the 
local banks and the disappearance of  others. 
Side by  side with  the credit companies, the Bank  of 
France  increased  the number  of  its branch  offices  and 
created auxiliary bureaus, increased very much  the num- National  Monetary  Commission 
ber of  affiliated towns, and so rendered the greater part of 
commercial effects bankable-that  is  to say, capable  of 
being discounted by the Bank, which collects them  at a 
greater number of  places. 
It should be remarked that the parallel development of 
branch offices and agencies of  the Bank of  France, and of 
the agencies of  the credit companies, greatly aided  the 
development  of  the latter.  They  have  now  near  their 
agencies a branch office or bureau of  the Bank where they 
can rediscount  rapidly their comnlercial "  portfolio " and 
realize on negotiable securities in case of  urgent need. 
It  is  here  that is  seen  the intimate  connection  that 
exists  in  France  in  the  organization  of  credit, such  as 
historical  evolution  has  made  it, between  the Bank  of 
France and the credit companies.  The first is powerful 
because of  its privilege of  issue and its considerable metallic 
reserve, which is due to two causes.  First, the continuation 
of  favorable  exchanges, resulting  from  our  considerable 
investments  of  capital abroad;  second, the great  credit 
of  the bank note.  With these two advantages the Bank 
of  France becomes the pivot of  the system; it permits the 
credit companies to keep a very small metallic reserve;  to 
use constantly  in making  discounts the capital which is 
confided to them.  The commercial "portfolio,"  as  we 
shall see, ranks next to the metallic reserve among avail- 
able resources, because it is  easily rediscountable  at the 
Bank  of  France.  It is  obvious, then, that the parallel 
development  of  the  credit  companies  and  the  branch 
offices  and bureaus of  the Bank of  France is an interesting 
study. 
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Here are tables which sum up this development: 
BANK  OF FRANCE. 
, 
Year.  :!:Eh  Number of  auxiliary  1  c. 
CR~DIT  LYONNAIS. 
Number of  agencies. 
Year. 
COMPTOIR  D'ESCOMPTE. 
I  l  l  I 
a Including branches in suburbs.  b Permanent.  c Temporary. National  Monetary  Commission 
The Credit Industriel et Commercial has no  provincial 
agency;  it possesses 34 in Paris and  I  in London. 
We may, then, sum up for the four great companies we 
have just  been  discussing the extent  of  their  means  of 
work, in contact with the public, by the number of  their 
agencies.  (We do not  count the occasional agencies of 
the SocietC GenQale.) 
Agencies in France in I 907 : 
Total forFrance--------.--------.---------------.---..--  g48 
These 950 agencies, in round numbers, are like so many 
branches springing from a central stem; but each of  them 
has  a  kind  of  separate  existence,  a  special  character, 
which  permits  it usually to adapt itself  to the environ- 
ment where it happens to be. 
In 1908, the total number of  the foreign agencies of  the 
credit companies (some of  which are very large) was 43. 
All four of the companies which we are considering have 
London  agencies; the Comptoir d'Escompte has opened 
branch  offices, too, in Liverpool and  Manchester.  This 
company and the Credit Lyonnais have established foreign 
agencies in nearly every important commercial center in 
the world.  In Europe, the Credit Lyonnais has European 
agencies  at  Brussels,  St. Petersburg,  Moscow,  Odessa, 
Constantinople, Geneva, Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Se- 
ville, and  the Comptoir d'Escompte  at Brussels, Monte 
Carlo, and St. Sebastian. 
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Outside of  Europe the Credit Lyonnais has established 
agencies in Egypt at Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said; also in 
Smyma, and Jerusalem and Jaffa in Palestine. 
The  Comptoir  d'Escompte  likewise  has  agencies  in 
Alexandria and Cairo, but it has founded others in India 
(it maintained the one at Bombay), and finally, in Sydney 
and Melbourne, Australia. 
Moreover, this establishment, faithful to its traditions, 
has opened a certain number of  agencies in our colonies 
and protectorates.  In Madagascar and our Indian Ocean 
possessions  it  has  seven  agencies,  including  those  at 
Tananarivo,  Tamatave,  Diego-Suarez, etc.  In Tunis it 
has four  agencies-at  Tunis, Bizerte,  Sfax, and  Sousse. 
So the financial activity  of  France thus makes  itself 
felt in the most important centers of  the world excepting 
those  of  the  United  States  of  America.  In  1892  the 
Comptoir d'Escompte founded an agency in San Francisco 
and a provisional one in Chicago; then in 1895 one in New 
Orleans.  But it closed the Chicago agency in 1900 and a 
few years later those of  San Francisco and New  Orleans. 
This is one of  the advantages of  the agency system; it 
makes  it possible  to suppress  very  quickly  the useless 
branch which seemed to be called for, but which has not 
been as successful as its founders hoped.  The system of 
affiliated banks is much less elastic.  These have a sort of 
independeht existence-a  personality-in  which the large 
establishments  that helped  to found  them  participate. 
Their  closing  certainly  involves  more  trouEle,  and  the 
moral  effect  is  much  greater, than when  an agency is 
abolished.  We  are alluding to the system  of  the great National  Monetary  Commission 
German credit companies.  This system has a historical 
background which it is not our purpose to dwell upon here, 
and  corresponds  to conditions  different  from  those  of 
France. 
In France, the organization of  the credit companies, so 
far as concerns their expansion, is modeled, one might say, 
on the  political organization, which is above all centralized. 
It is in the central seat of  the credit companies that the 
final  authority rests.  From there issue suggestions  and 
sometimes orders.  It is by  the central offices  that the 
agencies are supervised and audited.  Treasury questions, 
the placing of  loans, the general movement of  business, 
everything is an object of  study there.  The system of 
accounting  centralizes  all  operations and makes  it pos- 
sible for the head men to take in at a glance the general 
business  situation.  These are the advantages of  the sys- 
tem; one might fear its drawbacks, dread administrative 
red  tape, the  tendency to reduce  everything  to rules, 
delay in acting, the restriction of  the initiative of  managers 
of  agencies.  Now,  the companies have escaped  almost 
entirely  these  disadvantages; the heads  of  agencies  act 
with a certain liberty; their vigilance is stimulated, as  well 
as their activity, by the method of  remuneration which 
makes  their  earnings  depend  largely  on their  skill  and. 
prudence.  Those who are placed  at the head of  foreign 
agencies, sometimes far from the central office of  the com- 
pany, even though they have general instructions which 
they  must follow, are chosen  from  the most  energetic, 
superior,  and  experienced  employees,  because  they  are 
often obliged to make quick decisions. 
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The Crkdit  Lyonnais and  the  Comptoir  d'Escompte 
have  each  organized  a  service  for  publishing  financial 
reports in which one can constantly follow the economic 
facts  that  bear  upon  business:  state credit  and  loans, 
and  their  budgets; all  kinds  of  industrial  companies, 
metallurgical, coal-mining, mechanical construction, spin- 
ning,  and  weaving  companies;  trade  in  foodstuffs  and 
agriculture.  Numerous  documents  and detailed  studies 
permit the heads of these establishments to gain a rapid 
knou~ledge  of  the main lines of  the finances of  a country, 
the situation of industrial, commercial, or t;ansportation 
companies,  and of  the other banks.  Engineers  or  em- 
ployees who have technical or expert knowledge are sent 
out besides  to examine on the spot questions that need 
clearing up. 
What is more, other services are devoted to studying 
the  risks  either  in what  concerns  discounting  commer- 
cial  paper, or  in  ascertaining  the value  of  transferable 
securities. 
However, it would be difficult to understand the work- 
ings  of  these  great credit  concerns  without  knowing  in 
outline both  the automatic control  that results  from  a 
very  clear  system  of  accounting  and the factors  which 
enable the responsible men  of  the management to make 
rapid and timely decisions.  Granting that a mere glance 
is  enough  for a  banker  operating  on  a  given  market, 
imagine what a knowledge of details and comprehensive 
view of the whole situation is needed by the head of one 
of  these great houses, whose experience, like the horizon 
that  he sweeps, must  be  as broad  as the whole world. National  Monetary  Commission  Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
THE$  EXTENSION  OF  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  GREAT  CREDIT 
COMPANIES. 
The credit companies, as we have said, commenced to 
extend their line of  discounts and to receive deposits of 
increasing importance, beginning with 1885. 
To show this progressive  increase in deposits and dis- 
counting operations, loans and "carry-overs"  (contangos), 
we can not do better than call attention to the table that 
is given below.  As may be seen, it includes the four great 
companies that we are considering:  The Credit Lyonnais, 
the Comptoir d'Escompte, the Soci6t6 Gherale, the Credit 
Industriel et Commercial.  Beside these appear the figures 
for the Bank  of  France in  what concerns  deposits, dis- 
counts, and loans  on  securities. 
From  1885 we  have given  the figures  only  for every 
five years, judging  it unnecessary to draw up a complete 
table  of  every year, which would have been cumbersome 
and more  difficult to understand.  These statements  all 
refer to the same period, which  is  a  necessary condition 
in making clear  the course of  this  development. 
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In glancing at the columns of  total sight deposits and 
running  credit  accounts, one  may  see  the ratio  of  the 
increase;  it was very nearly regular.  prom  66o,mo,ooo 
francs the sight deposits and running credit accounts rose 
to  3,970,500,000  francs  in  1908; they  grew  sixfold  in 
twenty-four  years.  The  increase  is  due, therefore,  to 
normal  and  deep-lying causes, since the upward  course 
of the deposits followed an even progression. 
Consulting next the column of  time deposits, an increase 
is visible for the same period  of  time, but in proportion 
it is not nearly so great, since the total of  these deposits 
was  130,000,000 francs in  1885 and is only  268,000,ooo 
francs in  1908, so  that this  sort of  deposit  has merely 
doubled.  And, again, this doubling is due chiefly to the 
Societe Gengrale, whose  time  deposits  were  90,000,000 
francs in I 885 and 168,000,000  francs in 1908, an increase 
of  78,ooo,ooofrancs.  On the other hand, the time deposits 
of  the Credit Lyonnais, after increasing until toward 1895, 
show a tendency afterwards to decrease; in 1908 the total 
of  this kind of deposits was the same as in 1885,40,000,000 
francs, while  the sight  deposits  and  running  credit  ac- 
counts rose  in one company from 320,000,000 francs  in 
1885 to 1,745,000,ooo francs in  1908, or  nearly half  the 
sight deposits  and  running  credit  accounts  of  the four 
societies combined in 1908. 
This tendency to prefer sight deposits to time deposits 
proves  that  these  credit  companies  generally  use  the 
deposits for short-time operations such as discounts and 
"  carry-overs "  (contangos)  .  Moreover,  they  have  ob- 
served that having clients in every class of  the population, 
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and in every part of  the country, large, medium or small 
manufacturers  and  tradesmen,  people  living  on  their 
income,  officials,  etc.,  the  deposits  and  withdrawals 
balance each other in such a way as to maintain, not an 
even  level, of  course, but  an  average  level,  which,  in 
making  it  possible  to  count  on  an  average  length  of 
time  for  retaining  deposits,  gives  the  companies  full 
security  to  engage  in  their  various  operations.  Since 
the  interest  allowed  on  sight  deposits  is  less  than  on 
time deposits (which latter is I,  2, or 3 per cent according 
to the number  of  years), it has  been  possible  to lower 
very  appreciably  the discount  rate. 
Whence comes  this increase in sight deposits?  From 
several different kinds of  causes. 
In the first  place,  the increasing number  of  agencies 
gather capital  through  the whole of  France  by  offering 
accommodations to depositors  and  by  soliciting trades- 
men  of  every  kind, large or  small, to open  running  ac- 
counts.  These various  accommodations given to clients 
come mostly  from the very  genuine  competition  of  the 
companies with one another.  The small interest allowed 
on  sight  deposits,  even  though  it has  been  as low at 
times  as  one-half  per  cent, is  one  of  these  advantages. 
This rate, moreover, is  not  uniform  for  all  clients,  and 
this  is  easy  to understand  in  the  case  of  those  who 
have  opened  running  accounts.  Here  the  agreement 
made may change according to the state of  the account, 
which  depends  in  turn on  the kind  of  transactions the 
tradesman or manufacturer  engages  in  and  the nature 
of  the service he asks of  the credit company. National  Monetary  Commission 
It is useless to insist on this point.  Every bank in the 
world has solved it in the same way.  The various people 
who  have argued  that a banker  should sell his services 
at a fixed price are in the wrong as to discounts, loans, 
collections, etc.  The  client  who  brings  large  business, 
easy  to transact, yielding  quick  profits,  may  be  given 
terms such as would not be granted to another customer, 
whose  more  limited  operations  demand  just  as  much 
writing, offer  more risks, etc. 
Let us consider next the last column to the right of  the 
first part of  our table;  it relates to the Bank of  France. 
We see that the totals do not give the impression of  very 
great  variation,  and seem  from  1895 on to remain  sta- 
tionary.  In order  to judge  of  these  variations,  let  us 
take  the  figures  representing  the  average  total  of  the 
commercial discounts.  We  give  every  other  year  here 
in order not to make the table needlessly long. 
Annual average of  discounts  of  the Rank of  France (Table B). 
Francs. 
As  may  be  seen, the tendency  indicated by  the last 
balance sheet of  each year showed very clearly a stagna- 
tionin the whole.  The only large figure is the  I  ,125,700,000 
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francs for the year  1907.  This is due to the crisis which 
had begun in 1906, and whose effects were still apparent in 
1908 in the total of 897,000,000.  This shows that even if 
the commercial "portfolio"  of  the Bank  of  France  has 
risen slowly for thirty years, in comparison with that of 
the credit  companies, it increases distinctly during crises. 
The bank  is the place  of  refuge  where  the credit com- 
panies  and  other  banks  come  to rediscount  their  com- 
mercial bills  and turn them into ready resources. 
In order to see this clearly, it will be enough to call to 
mind  the  average  figures  of  the  commercial  discounts 
of  the Bank of  France during the serious crises  that we 





I,  760,600,000 
1, 305, 200,000 
906,000,000 
I, 166, 700,000 
I, 151, 100,  000 
I,  027,700, ooo 
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The crisis of 1891 is marked by a slight increase which 
is  always shown in this way by the average total of  dis- 
counts. 
Francs.  1890-------------------------------------------------  669,000,000 
1891-------------------------------------------------  7%  700,000 
1892-------------------------------------------------  550j400,000 
Although there is something like a regular increase in 
the discounts of the Bank after 1897 (see Table B), there 
are nevertheless very marked fluctuations up or down. National  Monetary  Commission 
In reality the Bank  of  France follows a different plan 
from the credit companies and private banks in general 
in the matter of  discounts.  Its rate is uniform, for the 
most  part,  and  is  modified  as  little  as  possible.  The 
Bank can do this, thanks to a sufficient margin of  issue 
and an imposing reserve.  But this state of  affairs does 
not  give it the flexibility of  the other  credit establish- 
ments, which are quite right in not maintaining  a fixed 
discount rate.  This is even a leading distinction between 
the companies and the large department stores, to which 
they  are often compared. 
Moreover, the credit companies, as we have said, solicit 
patronage.  They  offer  interest  on  deposits,  and  if  the 
' 
client  is  an important house  and  furnishes good  paper 
for  large  sums,  they  make  special  prices  in  his  favor. 
Finally, we  will call to mind once more that the network 
of  their  agencies, both  in  Paris  and  all  of  France  and 
abroad, extends the boundaries of  their activity. 
What is more, they keep in stock, one might say, a full 
line of  banking  articles; they take foreign paper, deliver 
letters of  credit for all countries, make collections on all 
markets, etc.  Their agencies are so arranged as to give 
the quotations on the different bourses  as  fast  as they 
are made.  One  may  enter  freely  into  these  agencies, 
which are not so awe inspiring as the old banking houses. 
Thanks  to  numerous  deposits,  coming  from  an  eco- 
nomical country like France, they have also been able to 
make discounts at rather reduced rates.  Here is a table 
which gives the average yearly  rate of  the discounts in 
France and the principal foreign countries. 
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Average discount rates. 
I  race  /  l  l 
Year.  England.  Germany  Austria  Belgium.  !l 
THE  METHODS  WHICH  THE  GREAT  CREDIT  COMPANIES 
USUALLY  FOLLOW-THEIR  PRESENT  SITUATION. 
We have seen on what the credit companies of  France 
base their operations.  They derive their resources: 
First, from third  parties-depositors,  holders  of  run- 
ning  credit accounts. 
Second, from their own capital and reserve. 
We  have noticed that the sight  deposits and running 
credit  accounts  had  increased  greatly  with  them, and 
that on December 3,1908,  they were nearly 4,000,000,000 
francs for the four following societies: Credit  Lyonnais, 
Comptoir d'Escompte, Soci6t6 G6nQale,  Cr6dit Industriel 
et Commercial. 
We have also called attention to the tendency of  several 
of  them not to increase their time deposits.  If  the total 
of  sight  deposits and running  credit accounts rose  from 
660,000,ooo francs  in  1885  to  3,970,500,000 francs  on 
December 3  I,  I 908, it was because of  the increase of  these 
deposits at the Societe GCndrale. National  Monetary  Commission 
To make clear how these societies employ their different 
resources,  it is  not  necessary  to write  at length.  The 
arrangement of  the accompanying table will give a better 
idea of  the workings of  these societies than long explana- 
tions.  Some explanations should be given perhaps as to 
the arrangement of  the table itself.  It is a balance sheet 
in fact, or at least a group of  balance sheets of  these four 
companies on December  31,  1908.  The assets are made 
up  after  the usual  fashion;  the  liabilities  are  divided 
into two parts-one  of  them is called "  Resources coming 
from third parties,"  and the other, the "Companies'  own 
resources."  For, although the companies owe their capi- 
tal  and  reserve,  in  the  last  analysis,  to  their  stock- 
holders, this capital and reserve are primarily to protect 
clients, those third parties who have intrusted their funds 
to the companies.  It was  necessary  to distinguish this 
part of  the liabilities from the other, since, with regard to 
clients, it may be termed assets. 
As may be seen, the total metallic reserve of  these four 
companies  is  401,500,000  francs.  Compared  with  the 
sight  deposits and  running  credit  accounts,  payable  at 
any time, which amount together to 3  ,g  70,500,ooo francs, 
this reserve is  found  to represent  about 10 per  cent of 
the debt of  the companies payable at sight. 
It will  be  noticed,  too,  that the collateral  loans and 
"carry-overs,"  which  come  to  a  total  of  a  little  over 
898,000,000 francs, compared to the total of  the compa- 
nies'  own resources, which are 789,500,ooo francs, shows 
only a relatively small difference-that  is, 898,000,000- 
789,500,000 -  108  ,5oo,ooo, or  one-eighth.  Now,  in  these 
898 ,ooo,om  francs are  included "  carry-overs "  for an impor- 
214 Balance sheets for  December 31, 1908,  of  the principal French credit companies. 
Name of  firm. 
[In thousand francs.] 
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collaterals  Running 
Discounts.  and  debit ac- 
"carry-  counts. 
overs." 
p- 
I,  187,835  549,600  8,594  83,814  2,392,346 
637, 204  331,045  17,874  56,456  1,330,940 
751.618  324,677  113.546  32,091  1.592, 111 
131.776  1  52.431  34.395  10.696  4.942  260,635  I  94,310  45.561 
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2,708~433  898.308  /  I.  239,717  150. 710  l  177.303  5,576,032 
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tant sum, at least one-third.  These loans on  securities, 
which are not so easily realized on as the commercial dis- 
couiits, would  then be amply covered by the private re- 
sources of  the credit companies (the capital and reserve). 
The Credit Lyonnais even, which  has nearly qog,ooo,ooo 
francs in collateral loans and "  carry-overs " (contangos) , 
can set off  375,000,000 francs against these less available 
funds.  The  same  proportion  exists  for  the  Comptoir 
dlEscompte,  and likewise the Credit Industriel et Commer- 
cial.  As for securities held by these companies, they do not 
amount in round numbers to  more than I 5  I ,ooo,ooo  francs, 
in which theSociet6 GenQale figures for I I 3,5~,ooofrancs. 
This proves that these companies are not banks for invest- 
ments involving risks, and speculating on negotiable securi- 
ties.  The Credit Lyonnais,  holds securities  only to the 
amount of  10,500,ooo francs; the  Comptoir d'Escompte 
for I 7,800,ooo francs ;  the Credit Industriel et Commercial 
for  ~o,po,ooo  francs.  These  figures represent the total 
amount of  securities on deposit of  the concerns we have just 
mentioned.  It  is the  natural course of  the business of  their 
clients in operations on negotiable securities. 
The commercial discounts are next in availability to the 
metallic reserve, which, of  course, is always available.  If 
the latter is the standing army of  capital for these compa- 
nies, the commercial discounts are the auxiliary corps of 
the army which may be  most  quickly put  in  the field. 
These discounts for the  four great companies amount to 
2,708,ooo,ooo francs,  of  which  I ,I  87,000,000 francs are 
for the Credit Lyonnais alone.  Now, in France, thanks to 
the Bank of  France and its margin of  issue, in panic times National  Monetary  Commission 
these  companies can rediscount  at this  establishment a 
part  of  their  "portfolio."  Although  the English  joint- 
stock banks take great  precautions  in their plan of  pro- 
cedure, they have not in the Bank of  England the same 
resource, for it is just  at the moment  when  it ought  to 
increase its issue-that  is to say, in panic  times-that  it 
is bound by the act of  1844.  Every system of  bank issue 
must, then, tend to give either to a single  bank  (if  the 
monopoly  is  established)  or  to the banks  of  issue  (if  a 
number of  banks have been decided on) the greatest pos- 
sible elasticity of  issue, in order to cope with crises.  What, 
in fact, is needed at these difficult moments?  More cur- 
rency  than  in  normal  times.  Who  can  supply  it?  A 
bank issuing bills against reliable securities, such as com- 
mercial effects.  It is these effects that must be coined into 
money and made to circulate, until calmer days arrive. 
It must  be added that in France the "portfolios"  of 
commercial bills of  the credit companies are composed of 
good  paper,  giving  very  few  losses.  This  is  evidently 
also one of  the necessary conditions if  the Bank of  France 
is to fulfil its r81e without  risk and maintain  its credit- 
the credit of  the bank note. 
It may be easily seen that the Bank  of  France is  the 
center  of  the credit  organization  of  France.  It is  its 
special constitution such as a historical evolution has made 
it which has  in  some sort  determined  the  development 
of  the credit companies and of  banks in France.  If  to 
this is joined the peculiarly prudent and economical char- 
acter  of  the French, their fondness for saving, it will be 
easy to understand the influence of  surroundings  on  the 
workings  and  methods  of  the credit companies. 
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CHAPTER  V.-The  credit companies and  the local  banks. 
The numerous agencies of the credit companies compete with the local banks.- 
The Paris banks are little affected.-It  is hard to estimate the exact number of the 
local banks and the importance of their affairs.-First  grouping.-Advantages  the 
local banks claim to offer.-Unjust  criticism.-The  real crisis of  the local banks.- 
Solutions of the problem.-A  central bank is established in Paris.-Sale  of securi- 
ties.-District  banks.-The  present moment is a period of transition for  the local 
banks. 
The  development  of  the  credit  companies,  of  their 
agencies  and operations,  was  not  accomplished without 
creating a sort of  latent crisis among the local banks.  It 
is a question  here of  the banks of  provincial cities with 
which the credit companies came to compete on their own 
ground.  The Paris banks, having been long established, 
were  not  particularly  affected  by  the  extension  of  the 
agencies  of  the credit  companies in  the capital.  Some 
carry on transactions known as "  high finance "-partici- 
pation in state loans, issues of  industrial securities, etc.; 
others  are  banks  of  commerce,  having  each  its  own 
patrons, answering needs and rendering services to which 
they are adapted.  In the first group may be mentioned 
the Mallet Bank, which was founded in  the first half  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  the  Hottinguer  Bank,  etc. 
Among the second are the bank of  Offron, Ginard & Co., 
founded in 181  7 ;  the one under the firm name of  Henrotte 
&  Muller, created  in  1823;  the  Lehideux  Bank, which 
goes back to 1835;  the Claude, Lafontaine, and Fouchet 
banks, etc. 
It is, then, the  provincial banks which have really suffered 
from competition with the credit companies.  These owed National  Monetary  Commission 
the  depression  they  experienced  to other  concomitant 
causes also, and to the necessity of  making  changes in 
their mode of  work.  Improved means of  communication, 
the extension of  the railroad  system, the telegraph  and 
telephone, have contributed to make more effective, even 
in  the most  remote  towns,  the regulating  and  leveling 
action of  the law of  supply and demand in the matter of 
capital. 
What is the number  of  these provincial banks?  It is 
rather difficult to tell.  The only way of  approximating 
it is by the licence tax they pay.  But here again one must 
make distinctions-the  tax is greater or less according as 
they  are bankers  or  discounters.  The number  of  dis- 
counters  is  probably  greater.  It may  be estimated  at 
about  1,200;  the number of  private bankers is doubtless 
slightly  less-perhaps  I ,m or  I ,100.  The  counting 
houses and loan agencies may be estimated at something 
like  a  hundred.  Finally,  other  establishments  make  a 
specialty  of  placing  transferable  securities.  They  seem 
to have increased in number, and may  be roughly esti- 
mated at 400.  There are, then, from 2,700 to 2,800 local 
banks of  varying importance, ranging from the little dis- 
count bank of  a small town  to the large city banks with 
big capital. 
.  A certain number of these banks have formed a syndi- 
cate or union to protect their interests.  They find them- 
selves in competition, in fact, in two operations, one of 
which  has  been  much  extended;  the  agencies  of  the 
credit companies make collections at a much lower price 
than that formerly charged by most  of  the local banks, 
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especially the ones situated in third-class towns; thanks 
to the central office  in  Paris,  the credit  companies are 
better  informed and better situated for  all transactions 
on the Bourse.  The result is that the operations involv- 
ing the most risk fall to the local banks-that  is to say, 
advancing  funds  for  a  silent  partnership  in  industrial 
enterprises  (commandite)  .  As  for  discount,  the  rate 
charged by the agents of  the credit companies has tended 
to make it lower. 
For the rest, we  are summing up the grievances of  the 
local banks as expressed in the publications on the sub- 
ject,  and the reasons put forward in their favor by their 
representatives : 
The local  banker  belongs  to the  neighborhood;  his 
family,  property,  and  interests  are  there.  He  cooper- 
ates  in  aiding  local  commercial  or  industrial  under- 
takings. 
He  receives  as  time  deposits  the funds  of  the land- 
owners, who are the local capitalists, and pays them good 
interest.  This  capital  he  can  again  use  as  a  silent 
partner  (commandite)  in  local  enterprises,  which  the 
credit companies are not willing to do. 
Knowing the local credit better  than the manager  of 
an agency, who is often a stranger in the place, the local 
banker can give personal credit. 
In a  local  bank  the management  is  permanent; the 
son generally succeeds the father, or, if  not, the son-in-law 
or some other member of the family. 
These  local  banks  claim  that they  are  able  to save 
expense for clients  in  the business  they do with  them, National  Monetary  Commission 
because their profits consist of  the difference between the 
interest  they  pay  depositors  or  clients  who  are  their 
creditors,  and  the  interest  they  receive  on  discounts, 
loans,  etc.  (This  argument  does  not  quite  agree  with 
the facts, because  in  the  case  of  many  operations  the 
credit companies have brought  rates down.) 
In the terms relating  to accounts they  claim  to offer 
more  stability  than would  be  possible  for  the manager 
of  an agency, who  receives  instructions from the central 
office of  his company. 
The credit companies centralize capital at Paris in order 
to use it for "  carry-overs " (contangos)  , etc.  In this way 
s~eculation  in negotiable securities receives more encour- 
agement than commerce and industry. 
The local banks divide the risks; one of  them may go 
under  or  suspend  payments  without  affecting  anything 
but the local market, while  if  a credit company  should 
fail, it would involve as many markets as it has agencies. 
Finally,  certain  aggressive  writers  have  accused  the 
credit  companies of  investing  French  capital  in  foreign 
securities.  Now,  we  have  seen  that  this  exodus  was 
made  necessary  by  the  large  amount  of  unemployed 
capital; this use of  French capital is besides of  the greatest 
economic and financial aid to our country.  The income 
on the thirty-odd  billion  francs that we  hold  in foreign 
investments  establishes  a  balance  of  exchange  very 
favorable to France.  This makes it possible for the Bank 
of  France to possess and maintain, even  in crises, a large 
gold  reserve-at  this  moment  more  than  3,)oo,ooo,ooo 
francs-and,  in short, it facilitates commercial relations, 
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extends French influence, and sometimes paves the way 
for political understandings. 
Nevertheless  the  crisis  existed,  and  after  criticisms 
and recriminations  came investigations  of  ways to meet 
the difficulties.  Naturally, too, by  reason of  the evolu- 
tion of  the organization of  credit in France, certain solu- 
tions were  suggested by the facts.  We shall state them 
briefly. 
In the  beginning,  a  great  number  of  local  and  pro- 
vincial  bankers  came  together  and  formed  a  union  for 
the purpose  of  considering means of  defense.  The first 
aim  was  to bind  together  the various  members  of  this  ' 
union in common  business relations  and  to establish in  - 
Paris a credit concern which was to centralize provincial 
operations  on  the  capital  at moderate  rates,  and  was 
also to try to procure its share in the great issues of  securi- 
ties,  in  order to give  its provincial  correspondents  the 
benefit of them and allot to each one his share of  securities 
to dispose of. 
This  solution  resulted  in  practice  in  the founding  at 
Paris  of  the  SocidtP  Cer~trale  du Syndicat des  Banques 
de  Province, which  now  goes  under  the  name  of  the 
Soci&t&  Centrale des Ranques de Province.  It dates from 
1905, and has a capital of  I ,185,ooo francs.  Its provin- 
cial correspondents are the members of  the syndicate of 
provincial  banks, from 320 to 330 in number.  Together 
with  the branch  offices of  certain  of  these  banks,  they 
represent about 368 agencies open for issuing and market- 
ing  transferable  securities.  Among  the  operations  in 
which it engages, this one seems to be the most important. National  Monetary  Commission 
It has a safety-deposit service and transacts other bank- 
ing  operations,  but is  apparently for  the most  part an 
investment  bank.  Will  it persist  in this  course to the 
point  of  entering  as  a  silent  partner  into  industrial 
enterprises (conzmandite) ?  Will  it be  an organ for trans- 
forming or aiding the medium-sized or small local indus- 
tries?  It is  difficult  to give  an opinion on  this  point, 
because the association dates only from  1905.  This last 
function, relating  to local  industries, has been  and still 
is one of  the data of  the problems raised by the local or 
provincial bankers. 
A movement entirely different from this  one has been 
started  in certain  parts  of  the country.  Several very 
important local banks, which enjoy the confidence of  the 
region where they operate, have extended their radius of 
activity and formed veritable  district  credit companies. 
They, too, have  agencies and branch  offices  and solicit 
patronage.  As the bankers or managers of  these societies 
live in the locality and are deeply rooted in it, they are 
well acquainted with the geography of  credit, the progress 
of  industries, and the trend of  local business.  During the 
crisis which raged in the Lyons silk market in 1907-8  the 
Lyons bankers were of  great assistance to the merchants, 
and saved many failures.  Lyons, we  should add, counts 
many experienced bankers of  the first order. 
But it is especially in  the north that the widening out 
of  local banks into district  banks or agencies has taken 
place.  Among these should be named the bank of  Verley 
Decroix & Co., with headquarters at Lille, which possesses 
27 branch offices  in the Departments of  Nord and Pas-de- 
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Calais;  the  Devilder  bank, which  has  g  branches  and 
is also located at Lille; the Varin-Bernier Bank at Bar-le- 
Duc, which has 10 agencies.  In these regions of  the north 
and  east  are  grouped  the  metallurgic  industries  and 
factories.  In the southwest, too, at Bordeaux, must be 
mentioned  the Bank of  Bordeaux, which  has 7 agencies 
in  the  region  (Angouleme, Bergerac,  Blaye,  Libourne, 
Royan, Ste. Foy  la  Grande, and Sarlat).  Moreover, it 
has an agency in Paris, 3 district offices in Bordeaux, and 
18 auxiliary offices in the surrounding region. 
The local or provincial banks in France are, then, in a 
transition  state.  The  most  important  of  them  will 
probably  develop into district banks; other still smaller 
ones  will  gravitate  around  the  Socidte  centrale  des 
Banques de Province; others still, licensed as discounters, 
will continue in a limited radius to discount paper for the 
small trade, and rediscount it at the Bank of  France if  it 
is "  bankable." Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
CHAPTER  V1.-The  Bank  of  France-Renewal  of  its priyC 
lege-Present  situation-Its  rdle in the crisis of  1906. 
Renewal of the privilege, law of  November  17, 1897.-New  duration of  the privi- 
lege.-The  agricultural syndicates and discount.-Incompatibility  of  the duties of 
governor  and deputy governor with all legislative authority.-Operations  for  the 
benefit of the Treasury.-Extension  of  the number of  branch of8ces.-Profits  above 
5 per cent shared with the State.-The  maximum of  issue is extended.-Falling  off 
in the commercial discounts  ot the Bankof France from  1880 to 1896.-The  extension 
of business in 1899-1900 and the demand for gold.-The  Bank of  France discounts 
English commercial paper.-Necessity  for a bank of  issue to  have the right to dis- 
count foreign paper.-The  solidarity between banks of issue of  various countries 
is established naturally by the action of the law of supply and demand, and by the 
course of  international business  affairs.-State  royalties.-Royalties  paid by  the 
Bank to  the State.-Taxes  on bank notes.-Remarks  on the revenue of the Bank 
of France.-The  revenue from discounts is encumbered with heavy expenses.- 
Advantages of revenue on  loans.-Royalties  and taxes compared to  the total ex- 
penses. 
We left the Bank of  France, above, at  the moment when 
it intervened in 1891 in the matter of  the suspension of  the 
Soci6t6 des D6pdts et Comptes Courants.  From this time 
on, until the renewing of  its charter in 1897, nothing hap- 
pened particularly worthy of  note.  It may be observed. 
however, that the gold reserve had a tendency to increase, 
and likewise the circulation of  notes, as may be seen by the 
following table, which gives the average totals of  the com- 
mercial discounts and the loans: 
The rate of  discount bears witness to the calm of  this 
period, and the cheapness of  capital.  The following table 
























The law of June 9, 1857, had renewed the privilege of 
the Bank for thirty years, until December 31, 1897. 
This 
law had been made more than ten years before the lapsing 
of  the privilege, which, by the law of  June 30, 1840, had 
been prolonged  until 1867.  This time they waited  much 
later, since the law renewing the privilege again was pro- 
mulgated on November 17, 1897, not a month and a half 
before the old privilege expired. 

























We will note here nothing but the special new points of 
this law, the official  text of  which is, besides, a current 
document.  For this we will follow the order of  its articles. 
The privilege is prolonged for twenty-three years, end- 
ing December 31,  1920; however, a law passed by both 
Chambers may bring the privilege to an end on December 
31, 1912. 
The agricultural syndicates, whose legal existence dates 
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the Bank paper at a maximum maturity of  three months. 
bearing the signatures of  their representatives. 
The duties of governor and deputy governor of  the Bank 
were becoming incompatible with a seat in the legislature. 
Senator  Magnan  had  to  resign.  He  was replaced  by 
M.  Georges Pallain, who had been one of  the most emi- 
nent collaborators of  Leon Say in the Ministry of  Finance, 
and left the post of  Inspector-General of  Customs to assume 
the governorship of  the Bank, which he still holds. 
A change which was new in its tendency was that the 
Bank from I 897 to I 920, inclusive, must hand over to the 
State twice  each  year  a  royalty  equal  to the proceeds 
of one-eighth of  the discount rate multiplied by the total 
productive circulation, without its ever  being  less  than 
2,000,000 francs. 
The state loans granted by the Bank in those previous 
agreements, one of  6o,mo,ooo francs  at 3  per  cent, the 
other of  ~O,OOO,OOO  francs at I  per cent, or 140,000,000  in 
all, ceased to pay interest to the Bank.  Henceforth, these 
14o,ooo,om  francs advanced to the State cost the Treasury 
nothing. 
Moreover, the Bank engaged to put at the disposal of 
the State, still  without  interest, and  during  the whole 
continuance of  the  privilege,  an  additional  40,000,ooo 
francs. 
The Bank was compelled to make gratuitously a certain 
number of  transactions for the benefit of  the Treasury: 
Payments  of  coupons,  issues  of  French  government 
securities, collections of  drafts  drawn  on  the  Treasury, 
etc. 
Evolution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
- 
This  law provided, besides, that branch offices  should 
be  opened in all the departmental capitals not  yet  sup- 
plied  with  them, and  auxiliary bureaus were  also to be 
created. 
In case the rate of  discount rose above 5 per cent, the 
resulting proceeds must be deducted from the sums to be 
divided  annually among the shareholders:  A  quarter is 
added to the capital of the company;  the rest reverts to 
the State.  This case has not arisen even in the crisis of 
1906-7,  the effects of  which  made themselves felt  from 
the United States upon England, and from England upon 
France. 
The  limit  of  issues  of  the  Bank,  which  the  law  of 
January 28  had fixed at 4,000,000,000 francs, was  carried 
to ~,ooo,soo,ooo  francs. 
Finally, the Bank is bound to weigh in the reserves of  its 
branch offices and auxiliary agencies and to transport at 
its own expense to the mint the light-weight gold pieces 
that the Minister of  Finance has ordered to be recoined. 
Under the prudent  and  skilful direction of  M. Georges 
Pallain, the Bank has prospered since the renewal of  its 
privilege; it has  performed  with  unfailing efficiency the 
functions for which it has been fitted by historical events. 
This is clearly proved by the following facts: 
DISCOUNTS. 
After  1885 the commercial discounts of  the Bank had 
decreased.  In 1894 the total discounts of  the Bank had 
fallen off  40 per cent in comparison with those  of  1880. 
The  extension  of  discounting  operations  by  the  great National  Monetary  Commission 
-- 
credit  societies  has  certainly  exerted  an  influence  on 
this decrease, whlch was mentioned, besides, in the official 
report of  the operations of  the Bank for 1894.  But since 
1896, as we  have  already seen by the table given at the 
beginning of this chapter, the average discounts increased 
in  1896-97.  But  there was  a  drop in  1901-2;  then  a 
recovery in  1903, reaching  in the panic  years  1907 and 
1908 the respective sums of  I 3,goo,ooo,ooo and  I g ,700,- 
ooo,ooo francs. 
We give in the following table the sum total of  annual 
discounts, and their  average total, beginning with  1897, 
as well  as the maximum, minimum, and average rate of 
discount : 
[Mlllton francs l 
1  Rate of  dlscount 
Year 
Ik--IL-  1  Pn  cl  I p-  Pnrt  /  Per ri 
I  I  l 
The modifications of  the rate of  discount  after  1898 
may be seen more in detail in the following table.  Added 
to it are the rates on loans. 
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It will  be noticed that in  1899 the discount rate rose 
to 3.5 per cent, then to 4 5 per cent, and the rate of  loans 
to 4 per cent and 5 per cent; the 4 per cent discount rate 
and that of 4.5 per cent for loans-which  were still above 
normal-were  maintained  until January  I I, 1900.  Now, 
at the end of  1899, the discount rate was 7 per cent at 
the Imperial  Bank  of  Germany, and  6  per  cent  at the 
Bank of  England.  Business had  extended greatly since 
1898.  French capital was in demand abroad.  The Bank 
of  France,  in  the  presence  of  thiq  increasing demand, 
raised the discount rate to 4%  per cent, a rate that had 
not been charged since 1888-89  at the time of  the failure 
of  the first Comptoir d'Escompte 
The increase in the discount rate in March, and again in 
November,  1907, was  brought  about by a  crisis caused 
by the tightness of  money, originating  in the New  York 
market.  This crisis was  first  felt  in 1906 in  the United 
States.  A latent  crisis, not  very  serious  however,  was 
already making itself felt in the markets of  Europe.  That 
Date 
-- 
1898-December  2 -  -  -- 
1899-December  7 
1  Loans 
Pa  cl 
3  0 
December 2 I 
3  5 
4  5  1900-January  rr 
4  0 
January 25 
May 25 -  !  35 
1907-January  I 7  l 
March 2 I - 
3  0 
November 7  1  35 
4  0 
1908-January  g 
January  23  I  35 
May29  --  l  30 
3  0 
-P 
Pw cl 
3  5 
4  0 
5  0 
4  5 
4  0 
3  5 
4  0 
4  0 
4  5 
4  5 
4  0 
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of  the  United  States  rendered  it  much  more  acute. 
The  London  market, being  in  constant  relations  with 
that of  New  York, was  first  affected  by  the situation. 
The discount  rate in  London was  raised  to 6 per  cent. 
But this barrier was not enough to check the flow of  gold 
to places where it was needed, and greatly needed. 
To defend its reserve the  Bank  of  France  could  use 
the normal expedient of  raising the discount rate; it did 
not do this in 1906, but had recourse to another equally 
normal expedient which the situation clearly demanded; 
it discounted English paper, and so made it possible for 
the London  market to procure  the capital necessary  to 
alleviate its current crisis.  This is, in fact, a proceeding 
which is much more economic, in the high sense of  the 
word, than the rather  archaic one practiced  formerly of 
making  discreet loans of  gold  to the Bank  of  England. 
In the following year, 1907, the crisis grew worse.  Dis- 
count at the Bank of  France went up  again to 3% per 
cent and then to 4 per cent.  The Bank of  France inter- 
vened a second time, discounting English paper.  The re- 
port of the operations of  the Bank for 1907 states that in 
this way a ready capital of  more than 80,000,ooo francs in 
American  gold was furnished to the London market.  In 
another direction, the Bank of  France opposed no obstacle 
to the shipments  of  French  gold  to New  York,  which 
were  furthered by  the Bank's  making  its normal  COITI- 
mercial  discounts.  Finally,  the discount  rate remained 
3 per cent lower in France than in England or Germany. 
In this way, the action  of  the Bank  made itself  felt, 
not  only on  the  French market  but  also on  the inter- 
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national,  and particularly  the English  market.  Making 
discounts  on  foreign  paper  must  be  considered, to-day, 
a  very  normal  means  of  establishing  useful  relations 
between the different markets,  and of  applying  the law 
of  supply  and  delnand  of  capital in  an  intelligent  and 
profitable  manner  for the  country  which  furnishes  its 
capital.  Not  making  foreign  discounts  is  a  deficiency 
which the Bank of  England adds to its lack of  elasticity 
of  issue.  The  Reichsbank  has  a  foreign  iiportfolio" 
which  has  increased  in  importance from  year  to  year. 
The  Bank  of  France  has  the right  to discount  foreign 
paper, and has used it  very ably, thanks to the enlightened 
direction of its governor, M. Georges Pallain. 
This proves that the alliance of  all the banks of  issue 
of  Europe, which  a former Italian minister  proposed to 
establish  some  time  ago,  an  alliance  prepared  by  the 
Governments with the idea of ending in a final consortium 
of  these banks, is not only useless  but  dangerous.  There 
is no need of  official intervention, of  contracts with bind- 
ing clauses, to create a  solidarity  between  these  estab- 
lishments.  This solidarity is established when necessary, 
either directly, if  the banks  of  issue  have  the privilege 
of  discounting  foreign  commercial paper,  or  indirectly, 
by  the  credit  companies  or  the  intermediary  banks. 
The intervention of  one or another of  the banks of  issue 
in  favor of  a  foreign market  is  therefore  free,  and  so 
much  the  more  useful  on  that  account,  because  this 
action  is  performed in response  to a  solidarity  dictated 
by tlie positive interest that the bank has in intervening, 
since it derives profit from so doing.  But it can not be National  Monetary  Commission  --  -- 
repeated  too  often-the  right  of  making  foreign  com- 
mercial discounts is to-day undeniably useful for a bank 
of  issue. 
According to the law of  November  I 7, 1897, renewing 
the privilege of  the Bank of  France, this  establishment 
owed a royalty to the State equal to the proceeds of one- 
eighth of  the discount rate multiplied by the total of  the 
productive circulation, the payment not to amount to less 
than 2,000,000 francs.  The average of  productive circula- 
tion is calculated by the decree of  June 24, 1878.  In mak- 
ing this estimate a statement is made out for each working 
day, for Paris as well as the branches, of  the debit bal- 
ance  under  the  following  heads:  Discounts;  loans  on 
securities, on  gold  and  silver  bullion;  notes  payable to 
order, and in  circulation.  This statement  is  added up 
and then divided by the number  of  working days, thus 
obtaining the average productive circulation of  the Bank 
for the year.  Here is the table of  royalties  paid  by the 
Bank to the State since the law of  1897: 
Francs. 
2, 742, - 
3, 3439 "0 
4,857,000 
5,6559 "0 
49  Io7,ooo 
3,777, - 
4,3148 000 
47  521,000 
4, 225>000 
53  333, - 
7' 357, - 
5,538,000 
The Bank pays the State, in addition to this, a stamp 
tax on  the circulation of  its  notes.  For  the assessment 
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of  this  tax a distinction is made  between the productive 
and unproductive circulation.  The first is  subiect to a 
tax of  0.50  franc per  1,000, the second to a tax of  0.20 
franc per I ,000. 
This  stamp  tax,  paid  by  installments, was  1,404,632 
francs  in  1908.  The  unproductive  circulation  of  the 
Bank is very high.  About two-thirds of  this circulation 
represents metallic reserves of  gold  and silver.  If  to the 
stamp tax on  the notes  are  added  printing  and  book- 
keeping  expenses  for  these  notes,  the  total  probably 
exceeds 2,000,000 francs a year. 
The Bank of  France has three great sources of  revenue: 
(I) Revenue  from discounts;  (2)  revenue  from  loans 
on  securities;  (3)  accrued  interest  on securities held  by 
the Bank. 
In  addition,  certain other minor revenues are given under 
the heading "miscellaneous  in the following table: 
Revenue.  I  1906  I.  (  1908. 
- 
.  .. 
Total -----------__---.......-...-  60.744.000  77.183.  ooo 
--  l  l 
/  Francs. 
Discounts----------- ----.---..-..---.....  27, 998, ooo 
Loans onsecudies -.----..---...-----..  .-I  18,256.000 
Accrued interest- -------.--........  .  .  .-_-_.  10,  s02,  ooo 
Miscellaneous ------ - - -.  .  .  -.  .  .  .  .  .  -.  .  .  - - - - -.  1  4. 188. 000 
The  importance  of  revenue  from  loans  on  securities 
will  be  noticed  here.  This  revenue  entails  much  less 
expense  than  the  revenue  from  discount.  Discount 
requires  a  whole  army  of  collecting clerks,  in  Paris  as 
well  as in the branch  offices and  bureaus.  In order to 
collect bills  the debtor has to be visited  at his place of 
Francs. 
39,523,000 
23,320,  ooo 
10,436,  ooo 
3.9043  000 
Francs. 
27.935.000 
20,677,  ooo 
lo,  646, ooo 
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business or residence.  In the case of  loans on securities 
it is the debtor who brings what he owes to the windows 
of  the bank.  If  to the revenue of  loans on securities are 
added  the  accrued  interest  (arrkages) it will  be  seen 
that these two represent very nearly half  the revenue of 
the Bank, and certainly more than half  the profits, inas- 
much as the accrued interest costs nothing but the safe- 
keeping of  these securities, and the expenses of  loans on 
securities  are much  less  than on  discounts. 
Here is  the comparison of  the expenses of  the  Bank 
of  France and the royalties and taxes paid to the State. 
The taxes in  the total given  here  include not only the 
stamp tax on the bank notes, but also the stamp tax on 
shares, and the 4 per cent tax on the interest on loans to 
the companies, plus the direct taxes. 
It is therefore  about a third of  the expenses that are 
represented by the payments turned over to the profit of 











Royalties and taxes paid to State  8,721,000 
Total expenses ----.-  ... .  - ..-.---..--.-....  1  26,574,000 





Bfrst period: The slow and difficult conquest of  its complete privilege by the Bank 
of  France.-Second  period: Period of transition.  The beginnings of  the credit 
system.-The  development of the credit companies and their  increasing impor- 
tance.  Rapid adaptationto surroundings.-R6le  of the Bank.  It is the mainstay of 
the credit organization of  France. 
The conclusions arising from this account, in which we 
have tried to present the principal facts of  the evolution 
of  the banks  and credit  in  France  since  1800,  may  be 
summed up as follows: 
In the first period, of  which our first part treats, we see 
the Bank of  France modest, at its beginnings, in spite of 
the determination of  Napoleon I to make it a state bank, 
gradually freeing itself  from this compromising function. 
The escape from this danger was due: First, to its regents, 
who  were  experienced bankers or merchants; second, to 
the wisdom  of  two of  Napoleon's  ministers, Mollien  and 
Gaudin.  The  Bank  became  in  this  way  the  bankers' 
bank, the bank of  rediscount which it has since remained. 
It profited by the tendencies of  its founder, Napoleon, to 
obtain the exclusive  privilege  of  issuing bank  notes  in 
Paris.  It  passed successfully through formidable political 
crises;  saw  several  changes  of  government.  Little  by 
little new  inventions, the steam engine especially, revo- 
lutionized industry.  Other banks of  issue, called depart- 
mental banks, were founded.  They lived and prospered in 
spite of  defective corporation  laws; they performed  local 
services in the places where they were established.  Then 
came  the crisis  of  1848.  The  Bank  of  France,  which National  Monetary  Commission 
understood  the usefulness  of  founding provincial  comp- 
toirs,  and  already  had  several,  desired  to  extend  its 
activity.  The Revolution  of  1848 made  it possible to 
realize this plan as a result of  a series of  rather unforeseen 
circumstances.  An  unprecedented  panic  at Paris gave 
the  Bank  an  opportunity  to make  energetic  and  wise 
decisions.  The departmental banks disappeared  shortly 
after, much more as a result of  this political accident than 
of  a concerted plan.  A sole bank of  issue was produced in 
France as a result of  a revolution whose programme was 
to suppress privilege. 
Until then the Bank  of  France had been  especially a 
local bank, the bank  of  issue for Paris.  It owes to the 
wise and prudent banking traditions of  the Paris bankers, 
its regents, the fact that it has remained a bank of  redis- 
count.  All  around  it,  industry,  progressing  rapidly, 
brought  into existence banks of  speculation  and invest- 
ment.  The Bank of  France, however, joined in the gen- 
eral movement in this direction only with prudence. 
The second period, to which our second part is devoted, 
was a time of  transition.  The Bank had won the exclusive 
privilege of  issue for the whole country; it was only from 
this moment  that it was properly  called the  "Bank  of 
France."  It  became  the  center  and  mainstay  of  the 
credit system of  France.  The crises that it experienced 
were less severe than in the first period.  It grew because 
wealth in  general was  increasing, because  the railroads 
encouraged the creation of  capital, especially in a country 
so gifted with the spirit of  economy.  It shared the ideas 
of prudence which in all that relates to saving are a part 
of  the French character. 
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However, in these ten or twelve years, years of incuba- 
tion, legislation on corporations became more liberal; the 
laws of  1863 and 1867 gave better facilities for founding 
great industrial  and commercial credit companies.  The 
concentration of  capital must be made to correspond to the 
concentration of  industries that results from new  inven- 
tions.  This is  a mathematical  function of  an economic 
movement.  Then  new  credit companies were  founded, 
which  felt their way for a while, at a time when one of 
them, the Comptoir d'Escompte, produced by the events 
of  1848, had in its origin the form of  the credit companies 
of  the future.  Founded for the purpose of  acting as an 
intermediary between merchants, manufacturers, etc., and 
the Bank of  France, it was the first bank which achieved 
the aim of  the Bank for the public.  The war of 1871  turned 
aside this  development  for a  time, or  at any rate, pre- 
cipitated it.  The terrible events which  took  place-the 
defeat of  France, the payment of  the war indemnity, the 
great loans, the great works for the extension of  the eco- 
nomic plant  of  the country-produced  still  more  credit 
companies, which  did  not  reach  over a wide area, banks 
which, although they engaged in operations of  commercial 
banking,  also took part in loan operations, made invest- 
ments, etc., and that extensively. 
Finally, in the third period, the methods of  the credit 
companies became more clearly defined.  They gradually 
extended their activity in France by means of  numerous 
branch offices or agencies.  The Bank of France followed 
the  same  movement,  either  of  its  own  accord  or  by 
reason  of  conditions imposed by the Government.  The National  Monetary  Commission 
present  organization  of  credit began to take shape; the 
r61e  of  the credit companies  grew  in  importance;  they 
adapted  themselves to the temper of  the country and of 
their depositors ;  they engaged preferably in discounting, in 
short-date operations; they made  every effort to render 
available  by  means  of  suitable  investments  the capital 
entrusted to them, which  they received  at sight in much 
greater amounts than on time.  Finally, they took root on 
foreign soil and helped  to invest  French capital (which 
would  be  idle in  Prance) in  foreign securities.  France, 
always economical, invested abroad in this way savings to 
the amount of  some thirty-odd billions.  This  situation 
made France a creditor of  many nations and gave it  almost 
constantly a favorable exchange rate.  It made it possible 
for the Bank of  France, thanks to the prudent monetary 
policy  inaugurated  by  LCon  Say, to accumulate  a  for- 
midable gold reserve.  The Bank of  France thus became 
a center of  supply, not only for the credit of  France, but 
for the important neighboring market of  London. 
Financial  methods, too, had  gradually  been perfected. 
The Bank no longer had recourse to the premium on gold; 
although  it  lent  the  Bank  of  England  directly  a  few 
years ago a large sum in gold, it was able recently to come 
to its aid economically by discounting English paper. 
So, as we have often said in this study, in reality, the 
organization  of  the credit  system  of  a  country  always 
adapts itself  more or less to surrounding conditions.  In 
France this adaptation has  been taking  place, especially 
in recent  times, more  rapidly than would  have  seemed 
possible thirty years ago. 
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However, there are still several gaps in the organiza- 
tion  of  credit  in France,  and they are due precisely  to 
certain  of  these  surrounding  conditions.  Initiative  in 
founding industries  and  boldness in planning new enter- 
prises  and new outlets for capital are not adequate to the 
needs of  the productive  power  of  the country.  So, our 
special  banks  for  advancing  funds  for  silent  partner- 
ships in  industrial  enterprises  (comwzandites) are few in 
number.  There  is, to  be  sure,  one  great  concern, the 
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, which is working in this 
field, conforming to  the principle of  the division of  labor and 
of risks, exploiting its own capital and, unlike the credit 
companies, not accepting deposits, which latter could not 
properly be employed by this company for the operations 
in which it engages.  It  does business on a large scale only, 
and is organized for that purpose.  So, it seems to us, 
that the very thing we lack in France are institutions of 
this  same kind, which, working  on a smaller scale, could 
perhaps give efficient aid to the transformation or creation 
of  middle-sized industries. APPENDIXES. 
APPENDIX  I.-Note  on the Cridit Foncier de France. 
Two systems of  organizing land credit.-Historical  sketch.-The  Banque Hypothe- 
caire, 1818-1846.-Bad  mortgage laws in France until 1852.-Founding  of  several 
companies after this decree of February 28,  1852.-The  Credit  Foncier de Paris.- 
The decree of December 10, 1852.  It extends the privilege of  the  Credit Foncier, 
and authorizes fusion of  this institution with the others.-Influences  of the Crimean 
war, 1854-55, bad harvests, and issues of other securities.-Administration.-Prin- 
ciple and system of  land loans.-Securities  with prizes.-Regular  automatic amor- 
tizement by the periodic  drawing of  a certain number of  obligations.-Simple  mech- 
anism of  the Credit Foncier. -Should  a land credit company be centralized?-The 
Credit Foncier is authorized to make loans to towns, etc.-Founding  of the Credit 
Agricole by  the Credit Foncier, 1861.-Bad  operations of  the Credit Agricole.  It 
was merged in the Credit Foncier in 1876.-Capital.-The  Banque HypothBcaire 
is merged with the Credit Fancier.-Lowering of  the rate of  interest.  The Credit 
Foncier is obliged to  submit to  conversions.  It makes  conversions on its own 
account.-Loans  to  private  individuals.-Town  loans.-Statistics  of  mortgage 
loans.-Issues  of  loans.  Rate and amortizement. 
The organization of  credit on real estate, the introduc- 
tion of  deeds on landed property into the general system 
of  paper  currency, the prompt  and easy negotiation  of 
these  deeds, the suppression of  obstacles, the lightening 
of  the burdens  which  encumber  landed  possessions, are 
some of  the questions which have most occupied the public 
mind  for  sixty years  back,  and given rise to the most 
various projects and schemes. 
Two  different  systems  came  under  consideration  at 
the start: Was it advisable  to follow  the German  plan 
of  forming companies of  borrowers, that is to say, syn- 
dicates  of  landowners who  issued  certificates  of  liens 
and left to those of  their number who  desired credit the National  Monetary  Commission 
task  of  placing  these  securities  and  realizing  on  them? 
Or, was it better to form companies of  lenders who should 
borrow on their own credit and lend to the private indi- 
viduals who applied to them?  The latter plan was pre- 
ferred.  Lastly, should there be a single company for the 
whole of  France?  Or, rather, was decentralization useful, 
and was it better to found a certain number of  societies 
in  the jurisdiction  of  various  courts  of  appeal?  After 
a  short trial of  the latter plan, the system of  a  single 
society was  adopted. 
This development was rapid.  The Bank of  France was 
fifty years in gaining its exclusive privilege for the whole 
of  France; the establishing  of  the land  bank  monopoly 
was a matter of  something less than two years.  Central- 
ization has always been the rule in France; it belongs to 
the system  of  political  organization  which  concentrates 
everything in the Capitol. 
Let us sum up briefly the evolution in France of  the 
Cr6dit Foncier. 
The first mortgage bank in France was founded in I 8  I 8 
under  the form of  a commandite with the firm name of 
Deleuze, Briot  & Co.  It became a joint-stock  company 
in  1820.  It made loans for twenty years  at 4 per  cent 
plus the amortizement.  It turned over to the borrower 
obligations  which bore a fixed  interest and m-ere redeem- 
able one-twentieth each year.  It collapsed in 1848.  Its 
failure was the result, first, of  bad operations; second, of 
inadequate  mortgage  laws.  The  defects  of  these  laws 
were  (a) the absence of  outer  forms for  the purpose of 
making the transfer of  property  rights with regard to a 
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third person;  (b)  defective registration  of  encumbrances, 
such  as charges for water  rights, right  of  way, life rent, 
use,  etc.; (c)  defective information  as to privileges  and 
legal mortgages. 
To  Volowski  is  due  the credit  of  bringing  about  the 
reform of  this legislation. 
An  important  decree, issued  February  28,  1852, pro- 
vided : 
I. The option  of  discharging  a  debt by  annual  pay- 
ments. 
2.  Each  land credit  association  must  have  territorial 
limits. 
3. These associations have the right  to issue obligations 
or certificates of  liens. 
4.  They can make loans only on first mortgages. 
5.  The  loan  must  not  exceed  half  the  value  of  the 
property. 
Expenses.-Maximum  interest,  5  per  cent ; amortize- 
ment,  2  per  cent or  I  per cent of  the total of  the loan; 
administration  expenses,  according  to  schedules  estab- 
lished by the statutes. 
Summary procedure  in favor oJ  land  credit concerns.- 
Courts can not grant extension of  time for the payment 
of  annuities.  Payments of  annuities are not  subject  to 
attachment.  The  land  credit  companies may  foreclose 
on  the property  by  filing a  petition  with  the presiding 
judge of  the civil court, within fifteen days, at  the expense 
of  the debtor.  During sequestration the land credit com- 
panies may collect any profits produced.  The extensions 
of  time for foreclosure are shortened. National  Monetary  Commission 
Several land credit companies were founded after this 
decree, but not  without  difficulty.  They  had  as oppo- 
nents the notaries who were then in the habit of  making 
all mortgage loans. 
A great association was founded at that time in Paris, 
with a capital of  25,000,000 francs; it got together by sub- 
scription  ~o,ooo,ooo  francs.  Its statutes were approved 
by  the  act  of  August  3, 1852.  It took  the  name  of 
Banque  Fonciere  de  Paris, or  SocietB  de  Credit  Foncier. 
The principal bankers of  Paris were its stockholders. 
Other associations of  the same kind  were  founded at 
Marseilles  and  Nevers.  Two  others, at Lyons and Tou- 
louse, were on  the point  of  obtaining  licenses when  the 
decree of  December  10, 1852, was  issued.  This  decree 
extended the privilege of  the Credit Foncier to all the de- 
partments where institutions of  this kind had not yet been 
founded, and authorized  it to take over the land credit 
companies of  Marseilles and  Nevers.  The Credit Foncier 
de Paris then changed its name to the Crddit  Foncier  de 
France.  In reality the obligations or certificates of  liens of 
the land credit companies of  Marseilles and Nevers had not 
been placed to advantage.  They  were new  securitiesof 
a special kind, and the public was not well informed about 
them.  The same thing  was  true, besides, of  the Credit 
Foncier de Paris. 
This  concern  received  from  the  State a  subsidy  of 
10,000,ooo  francs.  Its  guaranty  fund  was  placed  at 
6o,mo,ooo francs, half  of  which was  to be  subscribed at 
once.  It  undertook to make mortgage loans to the amount 
of  zoo,ooo,aoo francs,  including  interest,  sinking  fund, 
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administration expenses, so as to wipe  out the  debt  in 
fifty  years. 
But rigid  regulations  were  established, based  on mis- 
taken theories; the State, or at  least the ministers, thought 
that they and the Cr4dit  Foncier  together  were  strong 
enough to fix at  will the interest on capital-a  false notion, 
as future events proved.  ,4n issue of  a loan of  200,000,000 
francs  did  not  succeed  entirely.  Another  decree  was 
passed  (December 21,  18  53)  modifying  the  5  per  cent 
rate by setting up a movable scale, based on the average 
market price of  government 3 per cents. 
Operations were  more  successful after this.  In April, 
1854, the total of  loans realized on  amounted to about 
jo,ooo,ooo francs.  But the organization was not  as yet 
paying  the Government,  and in  reality the period  from 
1852  to  1854  had  not  been  at  all  favorable.  Bad 
harvests,  the war, numerous  issues of  securities, among 
others  railroad  obligations,  had  increased  the  rate  of 
interest  and  made  the  placing  of  the  Credit  Foncier 
obligations  very  difficult.  The  annuity  was  increased 
successively  from  5  francs  to  5.44 francs, 5.65  francs, 
5.95  francs, and  6.06  francs. 
In order to remedy a situation which was due only to 
chance  circumstances, a  system of  monopoly with state 
control  was  instituted,  and  on  July  6,  1854, a  decree 
bestowed  on  the CrCdit  Foncier  de France  an organiza- 
tion  similar to the one  of  the Bank of France.  At the 
head  of  this establishment were  placed  a  governor  and 
two  deputy governors, named  by  the  Emperor.  The 
maximum  rates imposed  on the rates of  the annuity by National  Monetary  Commission 
the preceding decrees were suppressed.  The fact was at 
last recognized that the rate of  interest is not a thing to 
be fixed by decree.  This institution was placed in reality 
under  the department  of  the Minister  of  Finance,  and 
controlled by  his representatives. 
This r6gime has not been changed in its fundamental 
points. 
The governor is  named  by  the President  of  the Re- 
public, likewise the two deputy governors. 
The board  of  directors, composed  of  20 members,  is 
named by the general assen~bly  of  the stockholders. 
The censors, three in number, are also named by the 
general assembly. 
It is  this  combined  authority-state  inspection  and 
the supervision of  the general assembly of  stockholders- 
that directs the operations of  the Cr6dit Foncier. 
The principle  on  which  land  loans  are based  is  that 
capital of  this kind can be reimbursed but slowly.  It is 
necessary, therefore, to make loans for a long term, and 
tie up  capital for  a  certain time, and assure its partial 
return each year  by  a regular  sinking fund.  It is  also 
important to have new capital available when it is needed, 
since the annuities collected each year  must be devoted 
in part to a special use.  The Credit Foncier, in order to 
procure this capital, issues obligations on which  it pays a 
rather small interest, for the reason that these obligations 
are issued with prizes.  The bearers of  obligations have the 
chance of  winning prizes.  This attracts purchasers, and 
the obligations are easily placed.  The Credit Foncier uses 
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as an amortizement for its borrowings the annuities that it 
receives from its debtors.  This amortizement is so planned 
that there is a rotation between the amortizement, the pay- 
ment  of  annuities,  and fresh borrowings.  Capital  here 
changes hands more slowly than in an ordinary bank, hut 
it circulates,  one  might  say,  automatically.  There  is, 
then, according to the needs, a demand for capital, and in 
proportion to the size of  the sums borrowed by the Credit 
Foncier, an amortizement of  this capital.  Finally, a thing 
that we  must bear in mind is that the obligation of  the 
land credit, which in reality represents a lien on "  immov- 
able"  property,  becomes  "movable"  property  which 
may  be  transferred  and  sold  like  all  securities  of  this 
kind. 
The mechanism is ingenious and simple; it acts auto- 
matically and regularly.  But if  the tool is  fitted to the 
work it has to do, it must be added that the difficulty of 
the case in point is not to find capital and a scheme for 
its amortizement, but to know how  to lend this capital 
wisely,  and  to debtors  who  will  be  able  to keep  their 
engagements; then  it is  important  not  to loan  on  real 
estate that is  likely  to depreciate  to any great  extent, 
and to measure the loan by the property that secures it. 
Here is  the chief  difficulty, and it is  in this connection 
that the question  arises: Should a  land  credit company 
be  centralized,  especially when  it is  in  a  country  with 
diverse and varying regions as to land, cultivation, indus- 
try, and density of population?  Is it possible by sending 
zgents from a distant central point to make sure of  the 
approximate value of  real estate?  The Credit Foncier de National  Monetary  Commission 
France seems to have succeeded in  doing so, in the main 
because the loans  are principally  on  city  buildings and 
town  lots.  But  in  countries  of  wide  area  where  the 
regions are unlike  and where it needs an intimate knowl- 
edge  of  the locality  in order  to make investments with 
as little risk as possible, centralization  is certainly not a 
method to be  recommended. 
There is furthermore another field into which the Credit 
Foncier de France branches out.  It has, in fact, been au- 
thorized  (by the decrees of  July  6,  1860, and February 
28,  1862)  to  make  loans  to  communes,  departments, 
syndical associations, etc., with or without landed security. 
In the matter of  communal loans, especially, the company 
is almost sure to be paid regularly and its pledge consists 
of  the  additional  communal  tax,  the  extra  centimes 
voted by the town council to secure the loan.  Properly 
speaking,  then,  this  is  not  a  question  of  land  credit. 
These loans are made on special issues of  communal obli- 
gations, whereas the issues for ordinary mortgage  loans 
consist of  land obligations. 
Other decrees enlarged the scope of  its activity.  The 
act of  January 11, 1860, had already extended its privi- 
leges  to Algeria, and the same year  the law  of  May  19 
had  substituted  it for  the Comptoir d'Escompte in the 
operations of  this establishment with  the Sous-comptoir 
des  Entvepreneurs, an  institution  which  made  loans  on 
building lots or on houses in process of  construction. 
Then the Credit Foncier created a joint-stock company 
which was legally independent, but was in fact affiliated 
with the parent  concern,  and dependent  upon  it, since 
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it was under the same management.  This association was 
called the Crbdit Agricole.  It  was chartered by the decree 
of  February 16, 1861, and began operations April I of  the 
same year. 
The aims of  this  society were  as follows To procure 
capital or  credit  for agriculture and the industries con- 
nected with it, by making or facilitating by its guaranty 
the discount or negotiation of  effects payable at the latest 
in ninety days ; to open credits or loans for a longer period, 
but without  exceeding  three  years,  on  pledge  (nantisse- 
ment)  or any other  special  security; to receive  deposits 
with or without interest, not exceeding twice the capital 
in cash or represented  by  securities placed  in the com- 
pany's safe; to open running accounts, make collections, 
to carry  on, with  government  sanction, all  other oper- 
ations which  aim at helping the clearing and  improving 
of  the soil, etc., and the development of agriculture. 
But the Credit Agricole, whose object was supposedly to 
help French agriculture, thought proper  to loan  a  large 
sum-168,000,ooo  francs-to  the Khedive of  Egypt.  This 
unfortunate speculation was on  the point of  bankrupting 
the  company  in 1876 when  the Credit  Foncier absorbed 
the concern and straightened out its business as  best  it 
could, not,  however,  without  losses  to the  amount  of 
something like 9,ooo,ooo francs. 
As  a result of  uniting with the establishments we  have 
mentioned,  the Credit  E'oncier  had  increased  its capital 
successively to 60,000,ooo francs, and at the end of  I 869 to 
9o,ooo,ooo  francs.  But this was  only a nominal figure, 
since the goo-franc shares had been sold for only 250 francs. National  Monetary  Commission 
When it took over the Banque Hypothdcaire-a  joint-stock 
company founded  in  1879, but without  the privileges of 
the larger concern-its  capital was increased to I 55,ooo,ooo 
francs.  It  is today 200,000,000 francs. 
The Credit  Foncier  had from  the beginning  seen  its 
rate of  interest on  loans regulated  by the public authori- 
ties.  The stupidity of  this measure was  soon perceived. 
It became free to follow the law  of  supply and demand 
for  capital  in  this  direction,  that is  to say, for capital 
to be used in  land  investments.  It made  loans, then, 
at 5 per cent and over.  But the lowering of  the interest 
rate  on  capital  in  general was  especially  evident  after 
the war  of  1870-71.  The Crddit Foncier was  not  long 
in feeling the effects of  this.  Its debtors had, according 
to contract, the right to anticipate the payments of  their 
loans, and they  took advantage of  this right on a large 
scale  beginning  with  1875.  The city  of  Paris  was  its 
debtor for the sum of  ~83,000,ooo  francs, redeemable in 
28  annuities.  Seeing the state of  the money market, the 
city could lessen  its expense and find money at a cheaper 
rate.  It  had, therefore,  the  easy  alternative  of  reim- 
bursing the Credit Foncier.  This establishment did  not 
allow other  debtors to operate conversions in  this  way, 
but proceeded to make them on its own account. 
A loan of  ~oo,ooo,ooo  francs in communal obligations was 
issued by the CrCdit  Foncier on August 5, 1879.  Shortly 
after, in  September,  1879, another  loan  of  900,000,000 
francs in land obligations was subscribed for with  equal 
success.  The Credit Foncier, which had been loaning its 
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funds  to the city  of  Paris at 5.15  per  cent before this 
conversion, now  charged slightly less than 4 per cent or 
fully I  per cent less. 
The rate of  interest was also lowered for ordinary mort- 
gage loans made to private individuals.  Besides, the two 
kinds  of  operations  of  the  Crddit Foncier  have special 
funds that have  been borrowed for the loans of  each of 
these branches separately; money borrowed on municipal 
obligations is  applied  to making  loans to towns,  syndi- 
cates, etc., and money raised on land securities is used for 
land loans to private individuals. 
The lowering of  the rate of  interest increased the opera- 
tions of this establishment.  Beginning with 1882 it loaned 
to private individuals and towns 394,000,ooo francs.  In 
1883 the total was nearly 300,000,000. 
It  makes loans of  two descriptions: 
I. Mortgage loans for long periods with amortizement; 
the period may be from ten to seventy-five years, according 
to the plan chosen.  The borrower may clear himself  by 
advance payments.  The interest  on these  loans is  4.30 
per cent at the present moment, without commission. 
2.  Loans on mortgages for a short date without amor- 
tizement; these are for periods of  from one to nine years. 
The interest  is  4.30  per  cent, without  commission; the 
borrower can not make advance payments. 
The Crddit Foncier  loans  to the amount  of  half  the 
value of the property, if  it is a question of  houses or arable 
lands, etc., and up to a third of  the value if  the loan is 
on woods and vineyards.  This is easily explained.  The 
woods may be cut down or destroyed  by fire, the vines National  Monetary  Commission 
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ravaged by phyloxera, mildew, etc.  As  for buildings of 
factories or mills, they are appraised only for their value 
taken apart from their industrial use. 
The Credit  Foncier  loans  to communes, departments, 
and public establishments with or without amortizement. 
The rate of  interest is 3.85 per cent for towns and depart- 
ments, and 4.10 per cent for public establishments. 
Here  are  the statistics for  loans  on  mortgages  since 
the.  founding  of  the Credit  Foncier,  taken  in  ten-year 
periods  except  for  the last, which  comprises  the years 
1905 to 1907, or three years. 
Period.  1 2~2:  1  Total  of loans. 
The total of  these loans from the time of  the founding 
........................................  1843-1854 
1855-1874  . 
1875-1884 
...  1885-1894 
..........................................  1895-1904 
..........................................  1905-1907 
of  the CrCdit  Foncier  amounts  to 5,577,000,ooo francs, 
out of  which  2,073,000,ooo francs  are still due. 
The following are the statistics of  the communal loans 
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The total of  communal loans since the decree of  1860 
is  3,687,000,ooo  francs.  The  CrCdit  Foncier  has  col- 
lected  1,89g,ooo,ooo francs,  and  there  are  still  due  it 
I ,792,ooo,ooo francs. 
The  Cr6dit  Foncier  has  borrowed  money,  and  still 
borrows, according  to its needs, by  means of  issues  of 
obligations  with  prizes.  These  are  land  obligations  if 
they are issued for mortgage loans, and communal obliga- 
tions  if  they are  issued  for town or department loans. 
These issues of  the Crddit Foncier for land loans (land 
obligations)  have a rather  slow  amortizement. 
Thus the loan of  1879 (3 per cent land obligations) is 
payable at the latest in sixty years;  issue of  loan of  1883 
(land obligations), 3  per  cent, in ninety-eight  years; of 
1885 (land obligations), 2.6 per cent, in ninety-five years; 
of  1895  (land obligations),  2.8  per cent, in  seventy-five 
years;  of  1903 (land obligations), 3 per cent, in seventy- 
five years ; of  I go9 (land obligations), 3 per cent, in seventy 
years. 
For the last  ten  years or so it is seen that the time of 
reimbursement  tends to decrease.  As  for the rate, it is 
seen that after issues made below 3 per cent from 1885 to 
1895, the last two loans (land obligations) have been at 3 
per cent. 
For communal loans the rates and duration of  amortize- 
ment~  are  as  follows:  Loan of  1879 (municipal obliga- 
tions), 2.6  per cent, payable in sixty years;  of  I 880  (mu- 
nicipal obligations), 3 per cent, payable in sixty years; of 
I 89 I (municipal obligations),  3 per cent, payable in seventy- 
five years;  of  1892 (municipal obligations), 2.6 per cent, National  Monetary  Commission 
payable in seventy-five years ; of  I 899 (municipal obliga- 
tions), 2.6 per cent, payable in seventy-five years;  of  I go6 
(municipal obligations),  3 per cent, payable in ninety years. 
The obligations of  the Credit Foncier are very popular 
with  the public. 
The establishment is wisely administered and answers 
certain well-defined needs in the country.  It  has greatly 
helped, both by its land loans and its communal loans, in 
the improvement  of  towns, because of  the aid  it gives 
private individuals in  their  building  operations, as well 
as by making  it possible for towns  to undertake public 
works and improve surrounding conditions. 
Here are, in addition, the dividends distributed in the 
last few fiscal years: 
Francs. 
1903------.-----.------------------.--.------.---------------  27 
1904-----..-----.--------.--.------------------.-------------  27 
1905 ---------.---------.-----------..-.--...--..-..------.---  28 
1906 ..........................................  28 
1907- .. ..--....  ...........................................  30 
Let us add that the Credit Foncier uses its free funds in 
discounting commercial paper and making collateral loans. 
On  December  31, 1907, the various  bills  and  securities 
figured in its balance sheet for 18z,ooo,ooo  francs, and its 
collateral  loans for more than  3 7 ,ooo,ooo francs. 
Its debtors owed the Company on December 31, 1907-  Francs. 
Mortgage loans- -.  -.  - - -.  - -.  .  - - - - - --  - --  - - - - - - - - - - -  2, 103,800, ooo 
Communal loans-. -.  - -.  .  -.  .  .  -.  .  - -.  - - - - -.  .  .  .  -.  .  .  .  -  I,  788,500,000 
3,892,300,000 
It  had in circulation at  this date-  .  . 
Land obligations- - - -.  .  -.  - - -.  - - -.  .  -.  .  -.  - - -.  - - -.  - -.  2,02 I,  000, 000 
Communal obligations- -.  - - -.  - - -.  -.  .  - -.  - - - - - - -.  .  -.  I,  61  2, 900, ooo 
3,633, gm, 000 
APPENDIX  11.-Note  on the Crddit Agricole Mutuel. 
Societies of  the  Rayneri-Rostand type.-Durand  banks.-Law  of  November  5, 
1894.  Creation of local banks of agricultural credit.-Causes  of  their lack of suc- 
cess.-Law  of March 31, 1899.  Founding of district banks.-Condition  of  the local 
and district banks.-Liability  of the members.-Rates  on loans. 
On  the outskirts, so to speak, of  the general organiza- 
tion  of  banks  and  credit  in  France,  a  more  specialized 
and less ambitious business than that we  have studied in 
this treatise  is  carried  on  in  the so-called  Crddit Agri- 
cole Mutuel banks.  We  must not confound them with the 
Societe du Credit Agricole, related to the Credit  Foncier, 
the workings  and  the ill  luck  of  which  have  been  set 
forth  in Appendix  I.  The object  of  the one  and  the 
others is indeed to make loans to agriculture; but while 
the Credit Agricole  (related to the Credit  Foncier) made 
loans at very long terms of  payment, to be used  on land 
improvements the outcome of  which  was  more  or  less 
in  the  distant  future, the banks of  the Credit Agricole 
Mutuel  grant  much  smaller  loans,  with  much  shorter 
terms of  maturity, and in order  to meet  immediate ex- 
penses.  The transformation  of  capital arising from this 
last form of loans must in principle be much quicker, and 
the repayment, for the same reason, likewise quicker. 
The characteristic of  the Credit Agricole  Mutuel is to 
give a mutual basis  to credit; to offer  as security to the 
lender  the joint  responsibility  of  a  company  of  people. 
Its existence and development are closely bound up with National  Monetary  Commission 
the laws sanctioning groups of  individuals and with the 
progress of  the spirit of  association and solidarity.  This 
explains the rather late appearance in France of  a form 
of  credit institution which  had  already been  working in 
Germany  since  the middle  of  the nineteenth  century- 
we  mean the Raiffaisen and Schulze Delitzsch banks. 
It is only after the law of  March  21,  1884, organizing 
professional syndicates, was  put into effect that we  see 
the beginnings of  the organization of  the Credit  Mutuel. 
After various  gropings about and a few setbacks-with- 
out serious material  detriment, since it was  all  experi- 
mental-we  see  a  whole  series  of  banks  taking  shape, 
which  we  can  class  under  three  chief  types:  (I) The 
Societe CoopQative de Credit Mutuel de 1' Arrondissement 
de Poligny (Jura);  (2) the societies of  the Rayneri-Rostand 
type;  (3) the Durand banks. 
Soci6t6  CoopCrative  de  Credit  Mutuel  de  I'Arron- 
dissement de Poligny was founded in 1885 with a capital 
oE  20,000 francs divided  into  500-franc shares.  It  was 
regulated by the law of  July  24,  1867, on societies with 
variable capital.  It lent only to its members; the maxi- 
mum of credit for each member was limited to 600 francs; 
the loan  was  made  for  three  months  with  privilege of 
renewal up to a year; the borrower had to furnish surety. 
He signed a note to the order of  the society; the surety 
gave his indorsement on this note; the society added its 
signature  and, bearing  these  three  signatures, the note 
was  presented  for  discount  at the branch  office  of  the 
Bank  of  France  at Lons-le-Saulnier.  The interest  rate 
on the loan was higher by  I  per cent than the discount 
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rate of  the Bank.  The Poligny  Bank  was  imitated by 
five or six other banks started about the same time.  Its 
statutes are models  of  prudence. 
Societies of  the Rayneri-Rostand type are rather more 
numerous;  there  are  about  60  of  them.  They  meet  a 
demand  for a  more complete and widespread  organiza- 
tion than do societies like the Poligny cooperative banks. 
They are under the influenc of  the "  Federative Center of 
Popular Credit " (Centre Fe'dkatif du Cre'dit Populaire) , an 
organ  of  propaganda, having headquarters  at Marseilles 
and founded on the initiative of  MM. Rayneri and Rostand. 
This federative center continues the work begun by the 
"Society for the promoting of  popular credit," started by 
Father  Ludovic de  Besse.  Hence  its origins, if  not  its 
tendencies, are ecclesiastical.  It must  be  said  that the 
banks of  Rayneri and  Rostand try-even  if  they do not 
always succeed-to  observe absolute neutrality in regard 
to religion as well  as poiitics. 
The  "Centre Fedhatif " plays  the part of  adviser to 
the banks.  These latter are perfectly free in their choice 
of  method  in realizing credit, and they follow their own 
interest, which is to adapt themselves to the special con- 
ditions of the environment in which they operate.  They 
are  encouraged  by  the  State,  and  they  organize  and 
govern  themselves  as  they  please.  Most  of  them  act 
in concert with the agricultural syndicates.  The Centre 
Federatif  has tried  to get  the savings  banks  to use for 
the advantage of  local and regional federated banks the 
privilege given them by the law of  July  20,  1895, of  loan- 
ing part of their money to credit companies. National  Monetary  Commission 
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Finally, the Durand banks have a very clearly defined 
ecclesiastical  character; most  of  them  are  administered 
by  the Catholic  clergy.  Their  founder,  M.  Durand,  a 
lawyer of  Lyons, adopted  in their entirety the principles 
of  the Raffaisen banks of  Germany, which are also purely 
ecclesiastical.  They are based on the united and unlim- 
ited  responsibility  of  all their  members; they  have  no 
capital stock and borrow only the funds strictly necessary 
for  loans  and  in  proportion  as  loans  are  made.  They 
lend to the members alone and for a maximum term of 
five years.  Their  resources  come  either  from  savings 
deposits to a small extent  or  from donations or  legacies 
inspired by a feeling of  beneficence and philanthropy. 
There  are  about  a  thousand  Durand  banks.  The 
average  amount  they  loan  is  370  francs,  which  shows 
that their clientkle is especially made up of  small farmers. 
On  this organization of  popular  credit, due to private 
initiative, has been  grafted  an official organization,  fol- 
lowing  the law  of  November  5, 1894.  The aim  of  the 
lawmaker was to coordinate  all  these  efforts, to extend 
them  by  combining them  with  the effort  of  syndicate 
organization, and to develop  these  two  institutions,  one 
through  the other, by making  them  strictly and jointly 
liable. 
So, then, the law of  November  5, 1894, sanctions  the 
union  of  credit  banks  and  agricultural  syndicates.  A 
priori  this union  might  be fruitful;  each  member of  a 
syndicate being  in principle a cooperator, it is  easier to 
make him go in for mutual credit.  On the other hand, 
one of the chief  functions of  agricultural syndicates is to 
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furnish  their members with  fertilizers,  seeds, machines, 
utensils, etc., sometimes even with the live stock needed 
for  farming.  Consequently  the  loan  from  the  Credit 
Agricole will  most often  be  used in paying for these pur- 
chases.  So  there  will  be  the certainty  that  the funds 
loaned will  be well  employed to productive ends, which 
increases the guaranty of  repayment.  Finally, the fact 
that the borrower belongs to an agricultural syndicate is 
a guaranty that it is really a farmer who  is being bene- 
fited  by  the  credit  accommodation  that  people  have 
tried to provide. 
The law of  1894 minimizes the formalities and expenses 
necessitated  by  the creation  of  a  bank  of  agricultural 
credit.  It can be started with or without capital.  In the 
latter case, it must stipulate the unlimited  liability of  its 
members, whether it operate under a  firm name  or as a 
joint-stock company.  If  there is a capital, all of  it must 
be subscribed and at least a quarter of  it paid in.  With 
certain  reservations,  the societies have  perfect  freedom 
in  drawing  up  their  statutes; they  may  lend  only  to ' 
agricultural  enterprises-they  do  not  distribute  any 
dividends;  the personal  shares  receive  a  fixed  interest. 
However, at the end of  the year they may pay  back  to 
their clients a  quarter, at most, of  the profits, prorated 
according to the business  their  clients  have  done  with 
the company.  The other three-quarters  are paid  into a 
reserve fund. 
Except for these  restrictions  the framers of  the stat- 
utes  are perfectly  free in  organizing, administering, and 
determining  the conditions  of  dissolving  the company, National  Monetary  Commission 
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of  widening its field of  action, or limiting the responsi- 
bility of  its partners. 
Such as it is, the law of  November 5, 1894, lends itself to 
the introduction into France of  the various kinds of  agri- 
cultural credit societies.  Its terms are very  broad.  As 
we  said  in the beginning, it brought  no innovations; it 
aimed merely to give an official and regular cast to the 
movement already started by private initiative, which had 
overstepped  a little the bounds  set by the lawmaker of 
1884 to the activity of  professional syndicates.  In spite 
of  this patronage the success was not remarkable.  Five 
years  after, in  1899, the companies founded  under  the 
provisions of  the law of  I 894 numbered only 83, according 
to statistics; a hundred  of  the same kind had been cre- 
ated  but  had  not  registered  their  statutes.  Alongside 
of  these, a thousand  banks  of  the Durand  type, or the 
Rayneri type, and a few autonomous societies were con- 
tinuing to do business with their old constitutions. 
Why were  these  agricultural credit  banks  so  slow to 
develop?  Because  their  private  capital  and  their  de- 
posits were insufficient.  It is not enough to wish to ex- 
tend credit; means to do so must be provided at the same 
time.  Without  doubt  the joint  guaranty of  the mem- 
bers and all the other kinds of  guaranties which we  have 
enumerated  above  were of  such a nature as to facilitate 
the  borrowings  of  local  banks.  But  borrowing  from 
whom?  There are involved here loans of  long and very 
uncertain maturities, according to the district.  The risk 
is greater and of  a different kind from that on the dis- 
count  of  ordinary  commercial paper.  The  commercial 
Evolution  Credit  and  Banks 
bill  represents  a value  already  created,  and you  only 
have to wait to realize on it; the note of  the credit bank 
represents  a value still  to be created; that is to say, a 
value subject to all the uncertainties of  production  and 
sale-uncertainties  especially  numerous  where  it  is  a 
question  of  agricultural  products.  So  means  had  to 
be found to facilitate the discount of  the paper of  local 
banks if  the movement was  to progress at all; a  second 
story had  to be  added  to the  building,  hence  the  law 
of  March 31, 1899. 
We have said in our general study that the State had 
demanded from the Bank of  France, as the price for re- 
newing its privilege in 1897,  a gratuitous loan of 40,000,000 
francs and an annual royalty equal to the proceeds of  one- 
eighth of  the discount rate multiplied by the figure of  the 
productive circulation, the payment not to amount to  less 
than  2,000,000 francs.  These two sources of  income are 
going to be used for  establishing discount funds for the 
credit banks. 
To this end the law provided for the establishment of 
district banks patterned on local banks, but with functions 
more  clearly defined.  The district  bank, like the bank 
of  the first  degree, rests  on  the principle of  mutuality; 
money-making  is  not  its  aim  nor  dividing  of  profits, 
except among its clients in proportion  to their dealings 
with it.  It receives gratuitous and temporary loans from 
the State, the conferring of which is made every year by 
a distributing committee composed of  senators, deputies, 
bank representatives,  the governor of  the Bank of  France, 
etc.  These  loans  must  not,  as  a  matter  of  principle, National  Monetary  Commission  Evolution  of  Credit  and  Ba~ks 
exceed a fourth of  the capital paid in by the stockholders 
of the district  bank; they  are made  for  a  term  of  five 
years, with the possibility of  renewal.  The district bank 
is authorized  to receive deposits in the form of  running 
accounts, and to issue notes, the total of  which may not 
exceed  three-fourths  of  the sum  total  of  its discounts. 
This limitation is very open to criticism; the total of  the 
discounts being essentially variable, it is very difficult to 
keep to this clause; the most one can do is to accept it as 
prudent advice to bear in mind. 
Pinally  another  resource  not  mentioned  in  the  law, 
which nevertheless is one of  the principal elements of  the 
work carried on by  the district banks, is the rediscount 
of  bills indorsed by the local banks.  Besides discounting 
these bills, they can make direct loans to the local banks 
for the formation of  their working capital.  These are the 
only two operations allowed them.  The district banks do 
not lend directly to the farmers; they have relations only 
with their  affiliated local  banks.  Borrowers go  to the 
local banks. 
A  special  department,  "  department  of  mutual  agri- 
cultural  credit  and  cooperation,"  established  by  the 
Government  Board  of  Agriculture  undertakes  to watch 
over  the workings  of  this organization  of  credit  of  the 
second  degree.  It  makes  a  report  every  year  to  the 
President of  the Republic on the condition of  the district 
and local banks.  We give below a few items taken from 
the last report: National  Monetary  Commission 
The number of  district banks increased from 21 in 1901 
to 88 in  1907; their paid-in capital from 2,927,000 francs 
to g,o15,ooo francs;  the state loans reached  28,628,000 
francs in 1907; loans to local banks, 1,827,000  francs; dis- 
counting operations, including renewals, 79,888,000 francs; 
their  reserves, I ,48  I ,000 francs ; general expenses, I 94,000 
francs, or 0.28 per  cent of  the sum total of  transactions. 
In 1907  they  received  6,825,000 francs in  deposits with 
an average balance of  600,000 to 800,000 francs. 
But the progress made by the local banks is more inter- 
esting because they distribute credit.  Their number in- 
creased from 309 in 1901 to 2 ,I  68 in 1907 ; their members 
from  7,998 to 96,122;  the paid-in  capital was  5,654,000 
francs  in  1907;  the  loans  accepted  in  the  same  year 
70,708,000  francs,  of  which  ~o,ooo,ooo  francs  went  to 
cooperative production  companies, especially dairies, and 
to  agricultural  syndicates;  the reserve  reached  739,000 
francs, and the current loans on December 31, 1907, were 
30,452,000 francs. 
The law  of  1894 rightly  allowed  the founders  every 
liberty in regard to the liability of  the members; in three- 
fourths of  the banks this liability is limited either to the 
shares subscribed, or to a multiple, or to the value of  the 
harvest of  each member, or to his capacity for credit; each 
district has adopted the system best suited to it.  In the 
south especially most of  the banks have adopted the prin- 
ciple of unlimited liability of  all the CO-members  of  the  same 
local bank; this obtains particularly for almost all the local 
banks affiliated with the district bank of  the south, which 
has  its  headquarters  at Montpellier.  Efforts are being 
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made to generalize this principle which  procures a  wide 
credit for the companies which adopt it. 
The tendency at the beginning, in local as well as dis- 
trict banks, was to allow loans at an interest rate lower 
than the ordinary market rate.  It  was a serious economic 
mistake which resulted  in placing these banks and their 
borrowers  in an abnormal and hence a  dangerous situa- 
tion.  It  ought to have been foreseen that when the gratui- 
tous loans of  the State could no longer be continued, the 
whole  system would  have to be  changed  at the risk  of 
compromising the prosperity of  these institutions.  In the 
mind of  the lawmaker, the object of  the credit banks was 
especially to act as intermediary between the farmer and 
the Bankof France, to  educate him in commercial practices, 
and to teach him  to use  credit.  Now,  in  lowering  the 
interest on money below the market rate, the borrower was 
deceived as to his real position and as to the terms which 
he has a  right to obtain; it was made impossible to extend 
operations and render more kinds of  service, since the banks 
could not discount their paper at  the Bank of  France with- 
out loss. 
This situation was pointed out in the report to the Presi- 
dent of the Republic for the year 1903.  Here is the pas- 
sage from this report in which the credit banks are advised 
to correct their methods: 
"The  Banks must  face the possibility of  the total or 
partial cutting off of  the  State  loans, and anticipating 
this event, they must establish large reserve funds so if  the 
case  demanded  they  could  increase  their  resources  and 
consequently their credit and their power of  discount with National  Monetary  Commission  EvoZution  of  Credit  and  Banks 
the Bank of  France and other large institutions.  An ex- 
ample will  illustrate more clearly the situation of  banks 
which discount below the normal rate.  One of  the banks 
which does the largest business, making very large loans, 
has been able to place in reserve after running three years 
only 30,000 francs or so, because it discounts at 2 per cent 
paper which it could not pass over to the Bank of  France 
without  losing  I  per  cent.  Other  banks in  similar  cir- 
cumstances  lose from  1%  to  2  per  cent when  they  are 
forced to procure funds by having opened for themselves 
a collateral loan account.  Consequently, the  more business 
they do beyond  a  certain  figure, the more  their  profits 
diminish.  It is the opposite of  what happens in every well- 
regulated  business,  where  the  relative  rate of  general 
expenses  diminishes in proportion as business  increases." 
A few banks have paid attention to these observations 
and changed their method of  business in the way pointed 
out to them by the inspectors of  the Ministry of  Agricul- 
ture.  Many have continued to give rates on loans lower 
than the normal interest rate. 
To sum up, the Credit  Agricole  was  organized  with a 
real privilege.  The Bank of  France  furnishes capital  to 
the State gratuitously, which loans it in the  same  way 
without interest to district organizations of  rural credit. 
These latter can at their own pleasure lower the interest 
rate and compete with the bankers who would like to en- 
gage in these operations.  It is an indirect means of  protec- 
tion.  Has it brought about the expected results?  That 
is,  does  this  credit, deliberately  made  cheap by  capital 
which  does not pay any interest, really  profit  the small 
farmers whom it was meant to help?  In some localities 
this end has been attained, at least in part, as in the de- 
partments of  the south where property is divided because 
of viticulture.  Besides, the crisis which has been severe for 
several years past in these regions, has led the vine grow- 
ers to deal with agricultural credit banks.  But very often, 
too, the cheapness  of  agricultural credit  has  helped  the 
larger  farmers,  those  who,  better  equipped,  better  in- 
formed on questions of  credit, have really no need for this 
protection.  They benefit by a reduction in rate of  inter- 
est for which the Bank of  France in the last analysis bears 
all the burden, since this reduction is only made possible 
by  the  gratuitous  loan of  qo,ooo,ooo francs which  the 
State exacted from the Bank of  France when  it renewed 
its privilege in 1897. 